DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL DOCTRINE COMMAND
1540 GILBERT STREET
NORFOLK VA 23511-2785

May 1998

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Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
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Naval Operational Planning

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GLOSSARY

A

amphibious objective area (AOA). A geographical area, delineated in the initiating directive, for purposes of command and control within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by the amphibious task force. This area must be of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious task force’s mission and must provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, air, and land operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of interest. That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of influence. A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander’s command or control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of operations (AO). An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. See also area of responsibility. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of responsibility (AOR):

1. The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant command has authority to plan and conduct operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

2. In naval usage, a predefined area of enemy terrain for which supporting ships are responsible for covering by fire on known targets or targets of opportunity and by observation. (NWP 1-02)

C

campaign plan. A plan, inherently joint in nature, consisting of a series of related major operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. (This publication only)

center of gravity (COG). A source of massed strength — physical, moral, or, sometimes, a source of leverage — whose neutralization, serious degradation, dislocation, or destruction will have the most decisive impact on one’s ability to accomplish given offensive or defensive objectives. A COG will always be found among “critical strengths,” but never as a critical weakness or critical vulnerability. (This publication only)

close air support (CAS). Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

close support. That action of the supporting force against targets or objectives that are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force. See also general support. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combat service support (CSS). The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war. Within the national and theater logistic systems, it includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service forces in ensuring the aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battlefield. (Joint Pub 1-02)

command and control warfare (C²W). The integrated use of operations security (OPSEC), military deception, psychological operations (PSYOP), electronic warfare (EW), and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary command and control capabilities while protecting friendly command and control capabilities against such actions. Command and control warfare is an
application of information warfare in military operations and is a subset of information warfare. Command and control warfare applies across the range of military operations and all levels of conflict. C2W is both offensive and defensive:

1. C2 attack — Prevent effective C2 of adversary forces by denying information to, influencing, degrading, or destroying the adversary C2 system.

2. C2 protect — Maintain effective command and control of own forces by turning to friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy the friendly C2 system.

See also electronic warfare; psychological operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

commander’s estimate of the situation (CES). A logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission. A commander’s estimate that considers a military situation so far in the future as to require major assumptions is called a commander’s long-range estimate of the situation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

commander’s intent. A clear, concise statement that defines success for the force as a whole by establishing in advance of events the operation’s desired end state and the general means to be used to achieve that state. (NWP 1-02)

concept of operations (CONOPS). A verbal or graphic statement in broad outline of a commander’s assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. (Joint Pub 1-02)

contingency plan (CONPLAN). A plan for major contingencies that can be reasonably anticipated in the principal geographic subareas of the command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

course of action (COA):

1. A plan that would accomplish or is related to the accomplishment of a mission.

2. The scheme adopted to accomplish a task or mission.

It is a product of the joint operation planning and execution system concept development phase. The supported commander will include a recommended course of action in the commander’s estimate. The recommended course of action will include the concept of operations, evaluation of supportability estimates of supporting organizations, and an integrated time-phased data base of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces and sustainment. Refinement of this data base will be contingent on the time available for course of action development. When approved, the COA becomes the basis for the development of an operation plan or operation order. (Joint Pub 1-02)

critical vulnerability. That element of a military force vulnerable to attack and whose degradation or destruction will lead to defeating the enemy’s center of gravity and, ultimately, his ability to resist. (NWP 1-02)

deception. Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deterrent options. A course of action that is developed on the best economic, diplomatic, political, and military judgment and is designed to dissuade an adversary from a current course of action or contemplated operations. (In constructing an operation plan, a range of options should be presented to effect deterrence. Each option requiring deployment of forces should be a separate force module.) (Joint Pub 1-02)

direct action (DA). Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by special operations forces to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel. In the conduct of these operations, special operations forces may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace mines and other munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; and conduct independent sabotage. (Joint Pub 1-02)

doctrine. Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (Joint Pub 1-02)
electronic warfare (EW). Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. See also command and control warfare. (Joint Pub 1-02)

enemy course of action (ECOA). Broad and conclusive actions (i.e., DRAW-D: defend, reinforce, attack, withdraw, delay) that an enemy force can carry out under conditions favorable to them. Each ECOA represents a major option open to an enemy in the employment of his force as a whole. (This publication only)

essential elements of information (EEI). The critical items of information regarding the enemy and the environment needed by the commander by a particular time to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist in reaching a logical decision. (Joint Pub 1-02)

execute order:

1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the authority and at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to implement a National Command Authorities decision to initiate military operations.

2. An order to initiate military operations as directed. (Joint Pub 1-02)

factors affecting course of action. The principal factors affecting any course of action at any level of war are space, time, and forces, and their combination. The higher level of war, the more critical it is to properly balance these factors. These critical factors ensure a commander the maximum freedom of action, the key prerequisite for obtaining the initiative, which in turn can create the necessary conditions for a commander to further enlarge that freedom of action.

1. Factor “space” — Deals primarily with the position, size, distances, and the physical characteristics (topography, oceanography, vegetation, cultivation, population, weather/climate, politics, economics, etc.) of the area in which combat forces operate.

2. Factor “time” — Rather fixed conditions that cannot be readily conformed to the commander’s wishes. Factor time must be properly calculated or anticipated for a wide range of conditions, from mobilization, to making decisions, planning, deployment, employment of combat forces, regeneration of combat power, redeployment, and demobilization.

3. Factor “force” — Pertains to both military and nonmilitary source of power. In the narrow definition of the term, it pertains to military elements of power (overall size of force, forces’ type and composition, organization, mobility, combat readiness, leadership, doctrine, etc.). The higher level of war, the more fixed factor force becomes, thereby the harder it is for the commander to change these conditions.

forward line of own troops (FLOT). A line that indicates the most forward positions of friendly forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time. The forward line of own troops normally identifies the forward location of covering and screening forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

fragmentary order (FRAGO). An abbreviated form of an operation order, usually issued on a day-to-day basis, that eliminates the need for restating information contained in a basic operation order. It may be issued in sections. (Joint Pub 1-02)

functional plans. Plans involving the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or permissive environment developed by combatant commanders to address requirements such as disaster relief, nation assistance, logistics, communications, surveillance, protection of U.S. citizens, nuclear weapon recovery and evacuation, and continuity of operations or similar discrete tasks. They may be developed in response to the requirements of the joint strategic capabilities plan at the initiative of the CINC or as tasked by the supported combatant commander, Joint Staff, Service, or Defense agency. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff review of CINC-initiated plans is not normally required. (Joint Pub 1-02)

general support. That support that is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. See also close support. (Joint Pub 1-02)
host-nation support (HNS). Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint task force (JTF). A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. (Joint Pub 1-02)

lines of communications (LOC). All the routes, land, water, and air that connect an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. (Joint Pub 1-02)

logistic estimate of the situation. An appraisal resulting from an orderly examination of the logistic factors influencing contemplated courses of action to provide conclusions concerning the degree and manner of that influence. (Joint Pub 1-02)

military operations other than war (MOOTW). Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. (Joint Pubs 1-02 and 3-07)

naval gunfire support (NGFS). Fire provided by Navy surface gun systems in support of a unit or units tasked with achieving the commander’s objectives. A subset of naval surface fire support. See also naval surface fire support. (Joint Pub 1-02)

naval surface fire support (NSFS). Fire provided by Navy surface gun, missile, and electronic warfare systems in support of a unit or units tasked with achieving the commander’s objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

order. A communication, written, oral, or by signal that conveys instructions from a superior to a subordinate. In a broad sense, the terms “order” and “command” are synonymous. However, an order implies discretion as to the details of execution whereas a command does not. (Joint Pub 1-02)

order of battle (OOB). The identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of the personnel, units, and equipment of any military force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

organic. Assigned to and forming an essential part of a military organization. Organic parts of a unit are those listed in its table of organization for the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps and are assigned to the administrative organizations of the operating forces for the Navy. (Joint Pub 1-02)

outline plan. A preliminary plan that outlines the salient features or principles of a course of action prior to the initiation of detailed planning. (Joint Pub 1-02)

psychological operations (PSYOP). Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

rules of engagement (ROE). Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (Joint Pub 1-02)

staff estimates. Assessments of courses of action by the various staff elements of a command that serve as the foundation of the commander’s estimate. (Joint Pub 1-02)

strike. An attack that is intended to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective. (Joint Pub 1-02)
supported commander. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the joint strategic capabilities plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Joint Pub 1-02)

supporting commander. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate. See also supported commander. (Joint Pub 1-02)

theater of operations. A subarea within a theater of war defined by the geographic combatant commander required to conduct or support specific combat operations. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separate and focused on different enemy forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations over extended periods of time. See also theater of war. (Joint Pub 1-02)

theater of war. Defined by the National Command Authorities or the geographic combatant commander, the area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war. A theater of war does not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander’s entire area of responsibility and may contain more than one theater of operations. See also area of responsibility. (Joint Pub 1-02)

unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. (Joint Pub 1-02)

warning order:

1. A preliminary notice of an order or action which is to follow.

2. A planning directive that describes the situation, allocates forces and resources, establishes command relationships, provides other initial planning guidance, and initiates subordinate unit mission planning. (Joint Pub 1-02)

warning order (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). A crisis action planning directive issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that initiates the development and evaluation of courses of action by a supported commander and requests that a commander’s estimate be submitted. (Joint Pub 1-02)
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Note
An (*) denotes use of term applicable to this publication. A (1) denotes a term is also listed in NWP 1-02. All other terms listed in Joint Pub 1-02.

A
AO. Area of operations.
AOA. Amphibious objective area.
AOR. Area of responsibility.

C
C2. Command and control.
C2W. Command and control warfare.
C3. Command, control, and communications.
C4. Command, control, communications, and computers.
CA. Civil affairs.
CAA. Command arrangement agreements.
CAP. Crisis action planning.
CASREP. Casualty report (1).
CES. Commander’s estimate of the situation*.
CI. Counterintelligence.
CINC. Commander of a combatant command; commander in chief.
CJCS. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
CJTF. Commander, joint task force.
COA. Course of action.
COM. Combatant command (command authority).
COG. Center of gravity*.
COMSEC. Communications security.

COMTAC. Command tactical (publications).
CONOPS. Concept of operations.
CONPLAN. Concept plan; contingency plan.
COS. Chief of staff (1).
CS. Combat support.
CSS. Combat service support.

D
DCOS. Deputy chief of staff*.
DEFCON. Defense readiness condition.
DIA. Defense Intelligence Agency.
DPP. Deliberate planning process*.
DRAW-D. Acronym for broad actions open to a military force (defend, reinforce, attack, withdraw, delay).
DSCS. Defense Satellite Communications System.

E
EC. Enemy capabilities*.
ECOA. Enemy course of action*.
EEI. Essential elements of information.
EO-IR. Electro-optical-infrared.
EPW. Enemy prisoner of war.
EW. Electronic warfare.

F
FAD. Force activity designator (1).
FLOT. Forward line of own troops.
FOM. Figure of merit (1).
FRAGO. Fragmentary orders *.
MOOSEMUSS. Acronym used for principles of war (mass, objective, offensive, security, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, surprise, and simplicity)*.

MOOTW. Military operations other than war.

MOU. Memorandum of understanding.

MOVREP. Movement report.

NATO. North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NBC. Nuclear, biological, chemical.

NCA. National Command Authorities.

NWC. Naval War College*.

OOB. Order of battle.

OPCOM. Operational command (NATO).

OPCON. Operational control.

OPLAN. Operation plan.

OPORD. Operation order.

OPREP. Operational report.

OPSEC. Operations security.

OPSTAT. Operational status (maritime tactical message) (1).

OPTASK. Operational tasking (maritime tactical message) (1).

PAO. Public affairs officer.

PIR. Priority intelligence requirements.

PL. Phase line (1).

POL. Petroleum, oils, and lubricants.
PSYOP. Psychological operations.

PWRMS. Pre-positioned war reserve materiel stock.

ROE. Rules of engagement.

SAG. Surface action group (1).

SAR. Search and rescue.

SATCOM. Satellite communications.

SECDEF. Secretary of Defense.

SIGINT. Signals intelligence.

SIOP. Single Integrated Operation Plan.

SJA. Staff Judge Advocate.

SLURPO. Acronym used for principles for conducting MOOTW (security, legitimacy, unity of effort, restraint, perseverance, and objective)*.

SOP. Standing operating procedures.

SOW. Special operations wing.

SPECAT. Special category.

TACOM. Tactical command (NATO).

TACON. Tactical control.

TACWAR. Tactical warfare model.

TCC. Transportation component command.

TF. Task force.

TG. Task group.

TLCF. Teleconference (WIN).

TPFDD. Time-phased force and deployment data.

TO&E. Table of organization and equipment.

UCP. Unified Command Plan.

UNITREP. Unit Status and Identity Report.

WIN. Worldwide military command and control system (WWMCCS) intercomputer network.

WMD. Weapons of mass destruction.
Planning is fundamental to leadership. A naval commander must lead and direct actions, not just react or await for events to dictate his/her actions. Planning is also the link that binds the members and activities of an organization together. The more effectively we plan and exercise the plan, the more efficiently we can react to changing circumstances. This warfare publication is devoted to describing the process by which this is accomplished, with emphasis on the procedural rather than the substantive aspects of the process.

Naval commanders are responsible for executing the plans of their superiors. To this endeavor, planning determines the composition of naval forces and the role we play in national strategy. The unique planning requirements mandated by the nature of naval forces and the commonality restraints imposed by the necessity to effect a transition to the joint or multinational arena make it necessary for naval forces to be efficiently organized and properly staffed.

Our freedom to use the seas is defended by our naval services. Planning is integral to our combat readiness and our ability to remain forward deployed, daily engaged on the oceans and in the regions that are vital to our national interests. To this end, it is a fundamental military tenet that our forces be employed with a clear mission, adequate support, and good intelligence. This careful, prior consideration together with a balance between mission objectives and the means to accomplish them is the essence of a good plan.

Despite the enormous changes in global politics, the formal process by which the operational military plan is developed and defined has changed very little since its adoption. The military professional should be: knowledgeable of the planning process and its products; able to interpret and use joint planning products in naval operations; and able to adapt the principles of military planning to operations at the unit level. While the process is considered valid for all commanders, the formality with which it is applied will vary with the circumstances.

NDP 5, Naval Planning, supports NDP 1, Naval Warfare, by discussing the contribution of planning to our combat readiness in support of “...From the Sea” and subsequently “Forward ...From the Sea.” NDP 5 defines the basics of planning, describes the overarching naval planning guidelines, and ties naval planning to joint operational planning. It provides the planning framework for the use of naval forces in joint, joint, and multinational operations to ensure unity of effort towards a strategic objective. This publication, NWP 5-01 (formerly NWP 11), Naval Operational Planning and the Marine Corps Doctrinal/Warfare Publications series relative to planning, contain current guidelines and formats for operational planning. NDP 5 introduces the reader to naval planning while this publication provides more detailed discussions and specifies on “how to” conduct a commander’s estimate of the situation and prepare the appropriate directives.

This publication provides numbered fleet commanders, their subordinates, and their staffs a common, logical framework for analyzing their mission, evaluating the situation, deciding the best course of action, translating the decision into planned action, and monitoring and modifying the planned action as required. Navy planning is joint planning tailored to the unique naval environment. The joint operation planning and execution system provides extensive procedures for planning the deployment of military forces. Although the detailed JOPES procedures are not repeated in this publication, some of the JOPES formats for estimates and directives are contained in the appendixes. The planning for operations, for intelligence, for logistics, and for communications are treated separately in order that their differences and their interrelationships can be appreciated. Appendix A is intended to be used as a pull-out worksheet that can be locally reproduced to facilitate staff planning efforts.

Throughout this publication, references to other publications imply the effective edition.

Report any page shortage by letter to Navy Warfare Development Command Division -Washington.

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4. JUSTIFICATION
CHAPTER 1

Origins of Formal Planning in the U.S. Naval Service

1.1 HISTORY OF NAVAL OPERATIONAL PLANNING

The history of naval operational planning is almost as rich and diverse as the history of the United States Naval service itself. Firmly rooted in the early 19th century revolutionary ideals of the Prussian Kriegsakademie, naval operational planning and the military planning process have provided the basis for sound military decision and successful naval operations from before World War I to post-Desert Storm crises.

Until relatively recently in the history of warfare, however, military planning was assumed to be the exclusive province of a chosen few with the special gifts of genius and charismatic leadership. Prussia’s defeat by Napoleon in 1806 was largely attributed to a lack of generalship or ability to “see” the battle as it unfolded and take appropriate action. To preclude these lapses in decisionmaking and action, the concept of military planning evolved and was associated with command. To this end, the first war college, the Kriegsakademie, was established in Berlin in 1810, and the Prussian General Staff became the model of the systematic approach to planning for and waging war. The Germans adopted “the estimate of the situation” (Lagebeurteilung) in 1859.

1.2 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

The Naval War College was founded in 1884 under the stewardship of Commodore Stephen B. Luce. The Civil War was less than a full generation earlier and, still terribly fresh in the hearts and minds of most Americans, served only to reinforce the belief that war was an aberration.1 Regardless of what was going on in Europe (or perhaps because of it), Americans did not believe that future wars were inevitable, and they certainly did not want to waste a lot of time thinking about or planning for them. If it became absolutely necessary for Americans to go to war at some indeterminate time in the future, they would fight and win like they always had—with inspired amateurs led by some Washington-type geniuses who would undoubtedly rise to the challenge in time of need. Admiral Luce disagreed and was successful in his attempt to establish the first American institution of higher learning dedicated to the study of war.

1.3 EARLY LITERATURE

Another problem Luce had to consider almost immediately was the scarcity of useful literature directly associated with teaching professional military men about their chosen career. The one exception to this was the fairly extensive body of instructional material, compiled by the Kriegsakademie, in the area of military planning. It was referred to as “the system” or “the estimate of the situation,” and was already adopted by most European military. What is generically referred to today as the military planning process, what NWP 5-01 (formerly NWP 11) and FMFM 3-1 label “the commander’s estimate of the situation,” are direct descendants of 19th century Prussian military instruction.2

As early as 1895, the Naval War College was drafting actual war plans utilizing an early form of the “estimate process.” In March of 1900, Secretary of the Navy John D. Long created “The General Board of the Navy” specifically to advise the Secretary on naval matters associated with war plans and war preparations. The Board was composed of some of the Navy’s most capable officers and maintained a close association with the Naval War College. In 1907, in conjunction with the General Board, the College staff drafted the first series of War Portfolios. The War College continued to plan for the General Board until the Chief of Naval Operations

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1 Weigley, The American Way of War
assumed those duties in 1915. During that period, no other agency in the Navy was capable of completing this type of staff action.  

1.4 ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

In fact, since the birth of modern formal planning in the United States Naval Service until 1948 when Admiral Raymond Spruance, then President of the Naval War College, advocated it be moved to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the methodology of naval operational planning was the exclusive province of the Naval War College in Newport, RI. The college officially introduced “The Estimate of the Situation” into the curriculum in form of a lecture given to 26 officer students of the summer class of 1910.

Commander Frank Marble’s 1910 “Estimate” lecture relied heavily on two pamphlets previously published at the Army War College at Fort Leavenworth. The first, “Field Orders, Messages and Reports,” was written in 1906 by Major Eban Swift, USA, and the second, “Estimating Critical Situations and Composing Orders,” by Captain Roger S. Fitch, USA, in 1909. Many officers of the War College staff were also involved in the formulation of the first “Estimate of the Situation” lecture. A young Major John H. Russell4 worked out map exercises (to be used for the first “Estimate of the Situation” lecture. A young Major War College staff were also involved in the formulation of mating Critical Situations and Composing Orders,” by 1906 by Major Eban Swift, USA, and the second, “Estimate of the Situation” was written in the Army War College at Fort Leavenworth. The college officially introduced “The Estimate of the Situation” into the curriculum in form of a lecture given to 26 officer students of the summer class of 1910.

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In 1915, the first pamphlet containing the “Estimate of the Situation” was written by then President of the College, Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight, and published in The United States Naval Institute Proceedings. The pamphlet was routinely revised by each succeeding president until 1926 when the estimate and order form were combined into one planning manual titled: “The Estimate of the Situation with the Order Form.”

Later revisions of the combined pamphlet were issued by the Naval War College Presidents about every 2 years (the typical tour length of a NWC President) until 1933 when a companion booklet was published (titled “The Study and Discussion of the Estimate of the Situation”). This prompted Admiral Kalbfus, who became president of the War College in 1934, to observe that if the “Estimate of the Situation” pamphlet had been written clearly and logically, it would not need a companion document.

Although it took him two separate terms as President of the Naval War College and three distinct published versions, Admiral Kalbfus expanded the 40 to 50 page pamphlet into a 243-page book. “Sound Military Decision” was intended to be an authoritative treatise on naval warfare in the vein of Clausewitz’s “On War.” While other “Estimate” pamphlets sought simplicity, Admiral Kalbfus’ version was anything but simple. It was difficult to read and comprehend, and dedicated very few pages to the actual process of preparing a plan.6

Because of its length, ponderous style, and complexity (as opposed to the brevity and simplicity of previous “Estimate” pamphlets), it became the center of an expanded controversy, particularly in the Navy, but to a lesser degree, in the Marine Corps as well. It was, however, the official, definitive document on naval operational planning during World War II. And it was utilized extensively. Several copies are still available in the Naval War College library.

In 1936, then CNO Admiral Standley decided that Admiral Kalbfus’ first version of his expanded Estimate pamphlet “Sound Military Decision,” should be classified because, in Rear Admiral William S. Pye’s words, “To deny that such a guide to naval thought would be a distinct asset to a foreign nation is to deny the usefulness of the publication itself.”7 Admiral Spruance’s 1948 manual was also classified “restricted.” NWP 5-01 (formerly NWP 11) is unclassified, but it is still distributed as a COMTAC (command tactical) publication. The Naval War College has always retained reviewing authority over this publication, but the “fleet” officers who had not attended the Naval War College never became overly familiar with the book.

Rear Admiral Charles J. “Carl” Moore, who served on Kalbfus’s staff at the War College and later as Admiral Spruance’s Chief of Staff at Central Pacific Force and Fifth Fleet, relied heavily on the book, but summed it up

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5 Ibid

6 General John H. Russell served as Commandant of the Marine Corps.

7 Rear Admiral William S. Pye worked for Admiral Standley at the time and was the one who actually informed Admiral Kalbfus of the decision to classify the manual in his 1 December 1936 letter. (NWC Archives)
relatively succinctly. “I believe, and I always have believed and I still believe, that the book is sound, that everything that he has said in it is correct. But to get what you want out of it is extremely difficult.”

Admiral Spruance had also served with Admiral Kalbfus at the War College in Newport and had been very direct in his criticism of “Sound Military Decision” from the very beginning. In his opinion, it was too long and convoluted to meet the needs of the Service. Admiral Spruance returned as President of the Naval War College in 1946 armed with his extensive command and planning experience of World War II and his considerable intellect. He immediately initiated the production of a “simplified and reduced” version of the “Estimate of the Situation.” He also insisted that the manual should not be subject to the whims of Naval War College presidents every 2 years or so and strongly recommended that the “Estimate of the Situation” be issued under the purview of the Chief of Naval Operations.

World War II had clearly demonstrated the utility of the formal naval operational planning process and had underscored the requirement for that process to be consistent with the process used when planning joint operations. Under Admiral Spruance’s direction and supervision, revisions to procedures and formats were carefully compared to the most recent joint texts prepared by the War Department. It was determined that the basic steps of the “Estimate of the Situation” were completely compatible with joint and other service procedures.

1.5 THE NAVAL MANUAL OF OPERATIONAL PLANNING

In 1948, the Chief of Naval Operations published the first doctrinal manual on naval operational planning based on the original draft submitted by Admiral Spruance. “The Naval Manual of Operational Planning”, 1948, was 48 pages long and, with surprisingly few substantive changes, survives today as NWP 5-01 (formerly NWP 11), Naval Operational Planning, and the planning portion of FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action.

The foreword of the Naval Manual of Operational Planning, 1948 states:

“Following the adoption of standard planning forms for use in Joint schools and in all agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations directed the President of the Naval War College to prepare a manual containing these standard forms and such amplifying instructions as necessary in order to adopt these forms as standard throughout the Navy.

The Naval Manual of Operational Planning has attempted to combine, in the clearest and simplest terms, the various existing instructions in effect for planning Naval operations.

This foreword, presumably written and approved by Admiral Spruance and promulgated by then Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Louis Denfeld, would seem to indicate that naval operational planning was not only fairly codified by this document, but also completely compatible with joint doctrine. There is a lot of evidence to suggest that in 1948 the United States Naval Service was, in fact, the proud owner of a working, written, comprehensive, joint-compatible, effective doctrine for naval operational planning.

1.6 COLD WAR MISSIONS

The advent of the Cold War and the perceived monolithic Soviet threat of the early 1960’s, however, greatly affected the way the United States Navy looked at the formal planning process. Between 1960 and 1980, naval forces, or at least ships at sea, concentrated almost entirely on two types of missions: self-defense and fire support. There were no high-seas fleet engagements or major amphibious assaults during this timeframe. Leyte Gulf (1944) and Inchon (1950) have been, to date, the last of their kind. Self-defense meant countering the threat, mainly from the former USSR, and was much more focused on identifying the threat (i.e., enemy capabilities) than it was in selecting and executing a course of action. Once the threat was identified, the response (i.e., course of action) was almost automatic. Likewise, planning for Naval gunfire support and air strike missions required great emphasis on the mechanics of delivering ordnance swiftly and accurately, rather than on the selection of a course of action that was adequate, feasible, and acceptable.

In general, this kind of planning became known as “threat-based” planning as opposed to the classic “mission-based” planning. During the latter, the mission is identified and the work is approached backward through intermediate or enabling objectives with all their associated decisions and details, which, when

8 Oral History of Rear Adm. C.J. Moore, USN (Ret.), Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport, RI, pp. 594-5.
9 Commander Buell’s “Planner’s Holy Scripture” article.
10 Frank M. Snyder, Introduction to “Sound Military Decision”, U.S. Naval War College, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1942.
11 One of the original copies of Naval Manual of Operational Planning, 1948, is held in the Naval War College Library.
orchestrated and executed correctly, provide for the best chance of mission accomplishment. In reality these two seemingly opposite “types” of planning are probably more differences of style and common sense streamlining than contrasting processes.

For what the United States Navy was doing on a day-to-day basis during this period, identifying the threat and relying on standard operating procedures to counter it was probably a perfectly acceptable way of solving the specific military problems at hand. But, the “larger” planning picture (for major contingencies or global war with the former USSR) seemed to be totally eclipsed by the day-to-day routine. “Big picture” planning was done by “Joint” staffs and most lower echelon naval officers never made the connection between what they were doing in “the real world” and anything joint staffs did or were supposed to be doing.

If there was a mistake made during this period, it was one of omission. A large part of the Navy seemed to be willing to ignore the requirement for formal planning (and formal planning education) altogether. Everything we learned up through World War II about planning processes, procedures, and methodology seemed to have been discarded since it did not offer the easiest and quickest way to solve the current, lowest-level, tactical military problems. On the other hand, Marine Corps missions never changed during the Cold War, so neither did their basic planning procedures. The operative title has changed a couple of times from expeditionary to amphibious back to expeditionary, but what they did during and before World War II remained essentially the same as they did during the Cold War.

1.7 POST-COLD WAR PLANNING

However, since the end of the Cold War, the Marine Corps has found it necessary to engage in an evolutionary process of developing the planning methodology necessary to accommodate the uncertain and time constrained environment of the Post-Cold War world. The result is the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) which is a six-step process that is focused on the threat, and is based on the tenets of maneuver warfare. Detailed information concerning the MCPP can be found in MCWP 5-1, “Marine Corps Planning.”

The Marines had a version of FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action, and read and used it extensively. The Navy had a similar publication, NWP 5-01 (formerly NWP 11), and though similar to the Marine 3-1, it was not extensively used throughout the Fleet. This lack of use can be largely attributed to a growth of academic versus operational standoff in the realm of tactics and planning.

Dating back to 1748 when Frederick the Great wrote his version of “The Principles of War” and held each of the 50 copies strictly accountable, it has been generally accepted that letting the enemy know how you “think” about war is not a good idea. As one would expect, eventually one of Frederick’s officers was unlucky enough to be captured with the book and it was copied, translated, and widely distributed throughout Europe almost immediately.

The formal planning process seemed to be inextricably linked to the academic world of the Naval War College. At the same time, more and more top-notch Navy officers were getting on-the-job planning experience out in the fleet where the Soviet threat was much more than just an interesting classroom discussion item. It became a kind of academic versus operational standoff. As a result, the formal naval operational planning process (tried, proven, and well established through the end of World War II) was somewhat sidetracked for a couple of decades in the “real,” operational world of ships at sea.

The end of the Cold War, the advent of “…From the Sea” and the establishment of the Naval Doctrine Command do not mark the beginning of a new era in formal naval planning. The Naval Service is simply revitalizing a very old, tried, and true systematic approach to thinking about how we will fight the next conflict. NDP 5, Naval Planning, initiated the process by providing a general overview on what formal naval planning is. While JP 5-03.1, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures), discusses the requirement for submission of a commander’s estimate of the situation, it does not provide guidance for conducting one. NWP 5-01 is the “how to” manual. The letters and numbers in the title may be new, but the basic information is very similar to that provided to Carl Von Clausewitz, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, General John H. Russell, and Admiral Raymond Spruance.
CHAPTER 2

The Commander and His Staff

2.1 STAFF STRUCTURE

Planning is fundamental to leadership. A naval commander must lead and direct actions, not just react or wait for events to dictate his actions. It is through planning that his leadership is applied to solve problems. In his plan, the commander estimates his organization’s situation, clearly states his intention to his staff, and with the aid of thorough staff analysis, anticipates the actions required to achieve the desired objectives. As the plan is briefed and discussed, it establishes a common purpose and clearly understood objectives within his organization, up and down the chain of command.

Planning is the link that binds the members and activities of an organization together. The more effectively we plan and exercise the plan, the more efficiently we can react to changing circumstances. Ultimately, operational success is enhanced by planning and reacting faster and more effectively than the enemy.

The unique planning requirements mandated by the nature of naval forces and the commonality of constraints imposed by the necessity to effect the transition to a joint or multinational arena make it necessary for naval forces to be efficiently organized and properly staffed. This facilitates planning future operations and rapidly reacting to changes as they arise. How a commander organizes his staff, although not without ample precedent, is very much an individual decision as he is ultimately responsible for the success of his organization and the success of his mission.

Command and staff relationships are established and function within a definite organizational structure. Generally, this structure includes a commander, an assistant or deputy commander, subordinate commanders, and flag general executive and special staffs.

2.1.1 The Commander. Naval commanders at every echelon perform administrative and operational functions in order to accomplish their missions. They make decisions, formulate plans, issue directives to subordinates to carry out those plans, and follow through to ensure that orders are being carried out in accordance with their intentions. They set the policies and supervise the day-to-day activities that mold the people and equipment of the command into an effective force, and they plan for future requirements.

The commander alone is responsible for everything that his unit does or fails to do and must be given commensurate authority. He cannot delegate his responsibility, or any part of it, although he may delegate portions of his authority. In discharging his responsibility, the commander issues orders to subordinate units through the chain of command that descends directly from him to his immediate subordinate commanders, whom he holds responsible for everything that their units do or fail to do. The commander issues orders and instructions to his staff through staff channels that are described in subsequent paragraphs.

Although specific responsibilities will vary, regardless of level of command, every commander possesses the general responsibilities to provide the following:

1. Timely communication of clear-cut missions, together with the role of each subordinate in the superior’s plan. Missions must be realistic and leave the subordinate as much freedom of execution as possible.

2. Forces and assets in a timely manner to immediate subordinates for accomplishing assigned tasks. This includes the requisite time to plan and prepare for military action.

3. All available information to subordinates that bears on the changing situation including changes in plans, missions, and tasks; resources; and friendly, enemy, and environmental situations.

4. Delegation of authority to subordinates commensurate with their responsibilities.

In addition to other responsibilities that change according to circumstances, all subordinate commanders
possess the general responsibilities to provide for the following:

1. The accomplishment of missions or tasks assigned by the plans and orders of the superior.

2. Timely information and advice concerning force protection.

3. Advice to the superior commander regarding employment possibilities of and consequences to the subordinate command, cooperation with appropriate government and nongovernment agencies, and other matters of common concern.

4. Timely information to the superior commander relating to the subordinate commander’s situation and progress.

Commanders who share a common superior or a common boundary possess the responsibility to provide for the following:

1. The impact of one’s own actions on adjacent commanders

2. Timely information to adjacent commanders regarding one’s own intentions and action as well as those of nonmilitary agencies or of the enemy, which may influence adjacent activity

3. Support to adjacent commanders as required by the common aim and the unfolding situation

4. Coordination of support provided and received.

2.1.2 Deputy or Assistant Commander. These positions do not exist at all levels of command in each of the Naval Services. The Navy has the position of Deputy at the Fleet CINC level but not at the numbered fleet level. There is no position of assistant commander within any command group but each does have a chief of staff. The largest Marine Corps commands normally have either a deputy commander (MARPOR and MEF level) or an assistant commander (wing/division/force service support group level).

The actual distinction between a deputy commander and an assistant commander lies in the types of duties assigned. Where some or all of the routine duties to be performed require the delegation of some part of the commander’s authority, a deputy commander is provided and is delegated specific authority with respect to specific duties. In performing these duties, the deputy functions in both the command and staff channels. In performing other duties that do not involve the delegation of the commander’s authority, the deputy is in neither command nor staff channels.

An assistant commander is provided when none of the routine duties require that he be delegated any portion of the commander’s authority. An assistant commander, therefore, never functions routinely in the command or staff channels emanating from the commander. In special circumstances, such as during the displacement of a tactical command post, the assistant commander may be directed to perform functions that require him to exercise the delegated authority of the commander. In such instances, the assistant commander functions in both command and staff channels. In other circumstances, the assistant commander may be placed in command of a task group organized for a specific mission. In these cases, the assistant commander ceases to function as such and assumes the status of a subordinate commander.

2.1.3 Chief of Staff. The chief of staff functions as the principal staff officer, assistant, and advisor to the commander. In the largest commands, there could be one or more deputies to the chief of staff and a secretary of the staff may be provided to assist the chief of staff in the performance of assigned duties. The secretary of the staff is the executive in the office of the chief of staff and, among other duties, is responsible for routing and forwarding correspondence and papers and maintaining office records. Included among the many duties of the chief of staff are the following:

1. Coordinating and directing the work of the staff divisions

2. Keeping the commander informed of current and developing situations

3. Supervising the preparation of staff estimates, OPLANs, or OPORDs

4. Ensuring staff training is conducted, when appropriate

5. Establishing a scheme to develop a daily schedule for the staff that emphasizes coordination and logic to ensure effectiveness and efficiency

6. Representing the commander when authorized

7. Ensuring the commander’s decisions and concepts are implemented by directing and assigning staff responsibilities when necessary and reviewing staff actions

8. Formulating and announcing staff policies
9. Ensuring the establishment and maintenance of liaison with higher, adjacent, subordinate, and supported units.

2.1.4 Staff. The staff of a unit consists of those officers and enlisted personnel who assist and advise the commander. Functions common to all staff members include providing information and advice, making estimates, making recommendations, preparing plans and orders, advising other staffs and subordinate commands of the commander’s plans and policies, and supervising the execution of plans and orders. The commander and his staff should be considered a single entity. However, no staff member has any authority in his capacity as a staff member over any unit in the command.

Because the purpose of a staff is to help the commander carry out the functions of command, it is first necessary for the staff members to have an understanding of these functions and of the command and staff unity necessary for their effective performance. The functions of command are categorized broadly as operational and supporting. Operational functions lead directly to the accomplishment of the assigned mission. They include the evaluation of intelligence, the formulation of plans, and provision for directing and commanding their execution. Supporting functions provide for the supply and allocation of personnel, material, bases, and fighting equipment, for the training and morale of the command, and for the physical and mental welfare of its people. The emphasis on the various functions of command will vary with the type and size of the command. For instance, a type commander (a supporting commander) is concerned primarily with support of units assigned, including personnel administration, training, sustained material readiness, and the initial fitting out of aircraft and ships. An operational commander is more directly concerned with the purely operational functions—overall training for combat and planning for, supervising, and evaluating combat operations.

The many duties that the commander is required to perform in the exercise of command are grouped into several broad functional areas as a basis for organizing the flag officer, general or executive staff. Despite the variations mentioned in the previous paragraph, the following functions, at a minimum, are common to all commands:

1. Personnel
2. Intelligence
3. Operations
4. Logistics

5. Plans and policy
6. Command, control, communications, and computers.

Important to note, however, is the commander’s prerogative to organize the staff and assign responsibilities as deemed necessary to ensure unity of effort and accomplishment of assigned missions.

In units commanded by a flag/general officer, the staff organization will normally consist of a personal staff, a flag/general staff, and a special staff. The flag/general staff and special staffs are directed, coordinated, and supervised by the chief of staff. In units commanded by other than a flag/general officer, the counterpart of the flag/general staff is termed the executive staff, the personal staff is omitted with the exception of the senior enlisted representative/advisor; the staff organization is directed, coordinated, and supervised by the executive officer. Staffs are not normally formed in units smaller than a group or wing (Navy) or a battalion or squadron (Marine Corps). The senior enlisted representative/advisor is a member of the command division and is directly responsible to the commander. His duties are those specifically assigned by the commander and generally concern matters pertaining to discipline, welfare, conduct, morale, and leadership of enlisted personnel of the command.

The personal staff, normally composed of aides, the senior enlisted representative/advisor, and personal secretaries, is directly responsible to the commander. This staff handles matters over which the commander wishes to exercise close personal control. Depending on the level of command and the desires of the commander, the personal staff may also include functions such as public affairs officer, staff judge advocate, chaplain, surgeon, inspector general, comptroller, and others.

The flag/general staff normally consists of the chief of staff, a deputy chief of staff (if one is authorized), and the functional staff divisions, each headed by an assistant chief of staff. The ACOSs are designated, depending on whether Navy or Marine Corps, as N-1/G-1 (Personnel); N-2/G-2 (Intelligence); N-3/G-3 (Operations); N-4/G-4 (Logistics); N-5/G-5 (Plans and Policy); and N-6/G-6 (Command, Control, Communications, and Computers). It should also be mentioned that the functional divisions previously mentioned are compatible with those normally seen on a joint staff. The major difference, of course, is the level/scope of command and the use of “J” designators to depict the divisions.

The executive staff, the counterpart of the flag/general staff in smaller units, can be similarly organized. This staff consists of the executive officer and,
again depending on the service, can be specifically designated. In the Navy, the divisions can be referred to by their “N” designators but are often referred to by their functional names (administration, intelligence, etc.). In the Marine Corps, the divisions are designated as S-1 (Personnel); S-2 (Intelligence); S-3 (Operations); S-4 (Logistics); etc. (Throughout the remainder of the publication, references to flag/general staff or staff officers should be interpreted as equally applicable to the executive staff or executive staff officers unless otherwise indicated).

The chief of staff is responsible to the commander for all activities of the flag/general and special staffs. He is assisted by the DCOS, if authorized, and by the staff secretary. Other flag/general staff members act as advisors, planners, supervisors, and coordinators in their broad functional areas which, taken together, include all activities of the command. Their general duties include the following:

1. Providing the commander and other staff members with information and recommendations pertaining to matters in their respective functional areas.
2. Formulating plans, orders, and instructions necessary to implement the commander’s policies and decisions.
3. Exercising staff supervision to ensure compliance with the commander’s orders and instructions.
4. Maintaining records and preparing reports covering the activities of the command.
5. Coordinating all matters in their respective functional areas with all interested flag/general and special staffs divisions and with the staffs of other interested units.
6. Flag/general staff members may be assigned broad coordinating responsibilities for special staff divisions in the areas of primary interest to the staff member. This would be done to facilitate coordination within related areas of staff functioning and to ensure systematic channeling of information.

The special staff consists of staff/staff corps members whose activities pertain to particular military specialties. There may also be representatives of technical and administrative services, and possibly even government or nongovernment agencies. Within their respective fields, special staff members act as advisors, planners, supervisors, and coordinators. They are normally authorized direct access to the chief of staff or the executive officer and direct liaison with other staff divisions in matters of primary interest to those divisions. When a commander’s headquarters is organized without a special staff group, the individuals who might otherwise compose the special staff group may be organized as branches of the divisions of the flag/general or executive staff or, perhaps, even as their own staff division. The duties of special staff members include the following:

1. Providing the commander and other staff members with information and recommendations pertaining to their respective specialties
2. Preparing plans, orders, and instructions necessary to implement the commander’s policies and decisions as they affect matters and activities within their respective fields
3. Maintaining records and preparing reports about their specialized activities
4. Assisting the flag/general or executive staff in preparing studies, estimates, plans, orders, instructions, and reports
5. Exercising staff supervision of a technical nature to ensure compliance with the commander’s orders and instructions
6. Coordinating matters within their respective fields with all interested flag/general, executive, and special staff divisions and with staffs of other interested units.

In some cases, commanders of subordinate units of the command are concurrently designated as special staff members. Such officers exercise command solely by virtue of their status as subordinate commanders and only with respect to those specific units of which they are the designated commanders. In their status as special staff members, they do not exercise command.

Realizing full well that, to this point, we have been dealing mostly with the staffing of a service component or subordinate command structure, there are other considerations. In today’s world, there is the strong likelihood that a forward deployed naval expeditionary force could evolve into a joint task force. If this were to happen, the naval staff would form the nucleus from which the JTF would be built. This necessitates some standardization in structure. Being able to translate like functions from a naval expeditionary force staff to a joint task force level staff is necessary for effective transition. Allowing for service uniqueness, it stands to reason the closer to joint structure that the naval forces can be organized, the more rapid the evolution to a JTF will be realized. This factor is already in evidence today as naval expeditionary forces must be able to perform joint
planning functions both within the operational chain of command and under the administrative control of their service chiefs within the Department of the Navy. Within the chain of command, Naval Services recommend the proper force composition and employment of service forces, provide service forces and support information for joint planning, and prepare component-level OPLANs or OPORDs in support of tasks assigned. Under administrative control, the respective Naval Services prepare an executive administrative and logistic plans to support their operating forces.

As with any other level of command, the JTF commander organizes his staff to ensure unity of effort and accomplishment of assigned missions. Moreover, a joint staff should be reasonably balanced as to numbers, experience, influence of position, and rank of the members among the services concerned. In determining the composition of a joint staff, due regard should be given to the composition of forces and the character of contemplated operations to ensure the commander’s staff understands the capabilities, needs, and limitations of each component of the force. By necessity, the number of personnel on a joint staff built from a naval component nucleus should be kept to a minimum consistent with the mission to be performed.

2.2 STAFF FUNCTIONS

2.2.1 Personal Staff. As previously stated, the personal staff is composed in accordance with the desires of the commander. They perform duties prescribed by the commander and are directly responsible to the commander. This group, normally composed of aides to the commander, the senior enlisted representative/advisor, and staff members, handles special matters over which the commander wishes to exercise close personal control. In addition to the aides and senior enlisted representative/advisor, the personal staff may include any number or type of staff members. It should be noted that, depending on the level of command, the actual title and specific functions may vary. Additionally, it should be mentioned that some of these functions may, in fact, be placed under either the flag/general staff or even within the special staff under the cognizance of the chief of staff.

2.2.1.1 Public Affairs Officer. Today’s military leadership is committed to allowing the media as much access as possible without compromising security. The PAO responsibilities typically include:

1. Providing public affairs advice to the commander and assisting him in the formulation of a commander’s public affairs policy

2. Providing overall direction and focus to command public affairs activities to include implementation of policy as prescribed by the commander

3. Coordinating public affairs activities during the planning, development, and execution phases of unit operations and exercises

4. Preparing the public affairs annex to the OPLAN with the intention of using public affairs as a force multiplier

5. Coordinating public affairs activities with higher, adjacent, subordinate, and supported units.

2.2.1.2 Staff Judge Advocate/Legal Officer. Legal support is critical for all operations. The criticality and responsibility correspondingly increase with the level of command. Generally, SJAs are found at the higher level commands while nonlawyer legal officers are found at lower level commands. The responsibilities of the SJA/Legal O may include:

1. Providing legal advice to the commander

2. Advising on the legal aspects of all matters requiring command or staff action

3. Providing specific assistance during the planning and operational process to include providing advice on the legal restraints on operators, the rights to employ force, scope of foreign criminal jurisdiction, and the legal sufficiency of OPLANs and OPORDs

4. Assisting with the development of rules of engagement

5. Keeping abreast of and briefing the commander on the provisions of international law and applicable treaties and agreements that may affect operations.

2.2.1.3 Chaplain. The command chaplain has responsibilities associated with almost all facets of an operation. His/her responsibilities may include the following:

1. Advising the commander on all religious, moral, ethical, and morale matters.

2. Performing ministry according to his or her respective faith group and service practices and standards.
3. Establishing a program to ensure all religious sup-
port personnel in subordinate units receive profes-
sional assistance, program funding, logistics, and
personnel through appropriate staff channels.

4. Assisting with humanitarian and disaster relief
programs.

5. Preparing chaplain’s activities input for OPLANs
or OPORDs.

6. Providing confidentiality and privileged commu-
nications in counseling for command personnel —
imperative for stress management, morale, and
early identification of critical personnel problems.

2.2.1.4 Surgeon. The surgeon is responsible for
establishing, monitoring, or evaluating force health ser-
vice support. The responsibilities of the command sur-
geon typically include:

1. Advising the commander on HSS aspects of the
operation; rest, rotation and reconstitution; preven-
tative medicine and any other medical fac-
tors that could affect operations

2. Informing the commander on the status of HSS
units and assistance required by and provided to
those who need care

3. Advising on humanitarian and civic assistance
activities

4. Coordinating HSS provided to or received from
other nations

5. Establishing and coordinating a comprehensive
medical logistics system

6. Preparing the HSS plan and providing appropriate
input to the commander’s OPLANs or OPORDs.

2.2.1.5 Inspector General. The role of the IG is as
important across the range of military operations as it is
in a shore-based/garrison-type environment. Basic IG
functions are inspecting, assisting, investigating, and
training the force. The responsibilities of the IG typi-
cally include:

1. Checking and instilling discipline, ethics, and
standards in the command

2. Serving as the commander’s unbiased consul-
tant for evaluating management and leadership
procedures and practices

3. Improving the force (while protecting the rights
of individuals) through timely, complete, and im-
partial inquiries, investigations, and inspections

4. Conducting investigations and inquiries to deter-
mine the state of readiness, economy, efficiency,
discipline, and morale of all subordinate units.

2.2.1.6 Comptroller. Financial management sup-
port to the command includes financial services and re-
source management functions. The responsibilities of
the comptroller typically include:

1. Serving as the principal financial management
advisor to the commander

2. Representing the commander in identifying
command financial service needs of the sup-
ported combatant commander, subordinate com-
ponents and others as required

3. Establish command financial management
responsibilities

4. Provide estimates of resource requirements to
the supported combatant commander, subordi-
nate components and others as required

5. Establishing positive controls over funding au-
thority received

6. Provide planning input to the commander’s
OPLANs and OPORDs.

2.2.2 Flag/General Staff. All members of the
staff except the chief of staff, the senior enlisted
representative/advisor, aides, and others specified by
the commander are assigned to the staff divisions. The
numerical order of the divisions has no significance so
far as the grade of the division head is concerned. The
chain of staff authority extends from the commander to
the chief of staff, to the division heads, and down
through each division, but it does not cross from one di-
vision to another. The head of a division, therefore, nor-
mally exercises no control over personnel of another
division except when designated by the chief of staff to
coordinate staff work on a specific project. Conversely,
members of a division normally report to only one su-
perior. Brief descriptions of the specific duties of each
of the principal flag/general or executive staff officers
are described in the remaining paragraphs. It should be
noted that, depending on the level of command, the ac-
tual title and specific functions may vary.
2.2.2.1 Assistant Chief of Staff, Personnel (N-1/G-1). The assistant chief of staff personnel is the principal staff assistant in matters pertaining to manpower management, the formulation of personnel policies, and supervision of the administration of personnel of the command (including civilians under the supervision or control of the command). The N-1/G-1 responsibilities typically include:

1. Individual augmentation
2. Personnel accountability and strength reporting
3. Pay and entitlements
4. Postal operations
5. Enemy prisoners of war
6. Casualty reporting
7. Morale, welfare, and recreation
8. Awards and decorations
9. Civilian employees
10. Additional duties as prescribed by the commander.

2.2.2.2 Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (N-2/G-2). The assistant chief of staff, intelligence is the principal staff assistant in matters pertaining to the enemy and to the area of operation and in matters pertaining to information concerning foreign countries that are significant to military planning and operations. The intelligence division supports the commander by ensuring the availability of reliable information and timely indications and warnings. Within the scope of the essential elements of enemy information, the intelligence division actively participates in staff planning and in planning, coordinating, directing, integrating, and controlling of intelligence efforts on the proper enemy items of intelligence interest at the appropriate time. The N-2/G-2 responsibilities typically include:

1. Ensuring unity of the command’s intelligence effort
2. Directing the overall command intelligence staff in the production of intelligence
3. Directing the timely dissemination of intelligence products
4. Managing the employment of all organic intelligence assets for the commander
5. Requesting additional intelligence support as required
6. Assisting the commander in developing and refining planning products
7. Directing counterintelligence efforts.

2.2.2.3 Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations (N-3/G-3). The assistant chief of staff, operations is the principal staff assistant in matters pertaining to organization, training, and the direction and control of operations, beginning with the planning and follow-through until specific operations are completed. In this capacity, the N-3/G-3 plans, coordinates, and integrates operations. The N-3/G-3 responsibilities typically include:

1. Assisting in the development of plans
2. Exercising staff supervision or cognizance over all operations-related areas, including information operations through command and control warfare (C^2W)
3. Monitoring current operational status of friendly forces and conducting current operations planning
4. Developing tasks for subordinates
5. Recommending force organization
6. Identifying the requirement for additional combat forces
7. Establishing interface with U.S. government and multinational agencies required
8. Assisting the commander in planning, coordinating, monitoring, and directing the execution of both offensive and defensive operations and, where appropriate, all land, air, and maritime operations in the commander’s area of responsibility
9. Responsible to the commander for training combat forces.

2.2.2.4 Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics (N-4/G-4). The assistant chief of staff, logistics is the principal staff assistant in the formulation of logistics plans and with the coordination and supervision of supply, maintenance, repair, evacuation, transportation, engineering, salvage, procurement, health services, mortuary affairs, communications system support, security assistance, host-nation support, and related logistics
activities. The N-4/G-4 is responsible for advising the commander of the logistic support that can be provided for proposed courses of action. In general, they formulate policies to ensure effective logistic support for all forces in the command and coordinate execution of the commander’s policy and guidance. The N-4/G-4 responsibilities typically include:

1. Monitoring current and evolving command logistic capabilities
2. Coordinating logistic support with upcoming operations
3. Advising the commander on the supportability of proposed operations or courses of action
4. Acting as the commander’s agent and advocate to external logistic organizations.

2.2.2.5 Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans and Policy (N-5/G-5) (When Authorized). The assistant chief of staff, plans and policy, assists the commander in the long-range or future planning, preparation of operation plans, and associated estimates of the situation. The division may also contain an analytic cell that conducts simulations and analyses to assist the commander in plans preparation activities, or such a cell may be established as a special staff division or section. When the commander does not organize a plans and policy division, the planning functions are performed by the operations division. There is not normally a separate plans and policy division at the executive staff level. The N-5/G-5 responsibilities typically include:

1. Preparing and coordinating required OPLANs or OPORDs in support of assigned missions
2. Developing courses of action within the framework of the assigned objective or mission and the commander’s intent
3. Promulgating the commander’s decision in planning directives, OPLANs, or OPORDs
4. Conducting analysis and coordination of future operations (generally 48 to 72 hours and beyond) during the execution phase
5. Coordinating planning efforts with higher, lower, adjacent, and combined headquarters as required
6. Determining forces required and available and coordinating deployment planning in support of the selected course of action.

2.2.2.6 Assistant Chief of Staff, Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (N-6/G-6). The assistant chief of staff, C4 assists the commander in all responsibilities for communications, electronics, and automated information systems. This includes the development and integration of C4 architectures and plans that support the command’s strategic, operational, and tactical requirements as well as policy and guidance for implementation and integration of C4 systems to exercise command and control in the execution of the mission. When a commander does not organize a separate C4 systems division, these functions may be performed by the operations division or by a special staff division or section. The N-6/G-6 responsibilities typically include:

1. Providing overall management of all C4 systems supporting the command
2. Exercising staff supervision, operational direction, and management control of all assets and procedures employed in communication systems and networks as required to accomplish the overall mission
3. Planning and estimating the requirements for C4 support of the command’s mission
4. Publishing C4 plans, annexes, and operating instructions to support the assigned mission.
5. Coordinating with higher, lower, adjacent, and multinational authorities in order to efficiently manage force frequency allocation and assignments
6. Planning, coordinating, and monitoring the use of COMSEC procedures and assets
7. Refining OPSEC planning guidance and ensuring communications-related activities are conducted to eliminate OPSEC vulnerability and support military deception.

2.3 INTERRELATIONSHIPS AND DYNAMICS BETWEEN THE COMMANDER AND HIS STAFF

To facilitate planning, the members of the staff work together as a team toward the commander’s objective. Staff members need to have a shared appreciation of problems, a clear understanding of the commander’s policies, and a keen sense of their individual responsibilities for assisting the commander to carry out the responsibilities of command.
To work smoothly and effectively, a staff should provide a means for allocating the work load, fixing responsibility for its accomplishment, and ensuring prompt interchange of information within the staff. A naval force may be composed of a variety of platforms and subordinate units and may be called on to perform a variety of operations each requiring special knowledge and skills and specific plans. The staff of an operational commander must be flexible enough to meet current operational demands and at the same time perform necessary routine administrative duties. Such staff flexibility is essential through all naval command echelons up to the highest commands including the JTF level.

2.3.1 **Command and Staff Channels.** *Command channel* is the term used to describe the chain of command that descends directly from the commander to his immediate subordinate commanders. Through this channel, a subordinate commander always has direct access to his immediate superior. While staff members may act in the command channel for their commander, there are no circumstances that warrant the intervention of a staff member should a subordinate commander desire to contact his superior directly and personally. A direct, personal relationship between commanders is essential to effective command and should be encouraged by the higher commander. The command channel is the direct official link between higher and subordinate headquarters through which command is exercised.

*Staff channel* is the term used to describe the channel by which the commander issues instructions to his staff and through which staff members submit their recommendations and provide information to the commander. It also describes the channel by which staff members contact their counterparts at higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters. These staff-to-staff contacts are for coordination and cooperation only. Higher headquarters staff members exercise no independent authority over subordinate headquarters staffs, although staff members normally honor requests for information.

The commander normally issues orders and instructions to his staff via his chief of staff. Staff members normally submit advice and recommendations to the commander through the chief of staff, who ensures the material has been integrated with all related information and has been properly coordinated with other staff members.

All staff activity must be completely coordinated. This coordination extends beyond the headquarters to include higher, adjacent, supporting, supported, and subordinate units. Recognizing that there is only one official channel of authority between units, staff members will usually be directed and encouraged by their commanders to establish direct and informal contact between staffs in order to achieve coordination. When accomplishing this external coordination with corresponding officers of other units, staff members respect the command authority and prerogatives of the commanders concerned. External staff coordination is a staff function, which in no sense supplants the normal chain of command. When appropriate, matters that have been coordinated between unit staffs should be formalized by official correspondence through the chain of command.

In certain areas, the nature of staff functioning is such that a clear delineation of staff responsibility cannot be accomplished. In certain functions, two or more staff officers may have an overlapping interest in an important activity. This situation necessitates the highest degree of coordination among all members of the staff. Whenever possible, one staff member should be assigned as action officer to ensure proper staffing and coordinating of the matter.

Staff cognizance is the term used to describe the broad coordinating responsibilities over special staff sections assigned to a staff member in his area of primary interest. These responsibilities are intended to facilitate coordination within related areas of staff functioning and to ensure the systematic channeling of information and documents.

Every staff member must know the detailed procedures and techniques of his own particular staff section and task. In addition, he develops a working knowledge of the common tools used by all staff members. Staff members make continuing estimates and analyses as a basis for recommendations to the commander and other agencies. Once the commander has announced his decision and presented his concept of operation, each staff section prepares its appropriate portion of the plan and order implementing the commander’s decision.

All staff activity is completely coordinated. The coordination must extend beyond the headquarters to include higher, adjacent, supporting, supported, and subordinate units. Coordination is developed through understanding, training, and practice. A staff officer should possess a basic knowledge of the organization, operations, administration, capabilities, and limitations of all elements of the command. He must also know all the responsibilities of all staff sections in the command and what kind of information they need and can provide.

2.3.2 **Command and Staff Process.** The nature, scope, and tempo of military operations continually changes, requiring the commander to make new decisions and take new actions in response to these changes. This may be viewed as part of a continuing cycle, which is repeated when the situation changes significantly.
The cycle may be deliberate or rapid, depending on the time available. However, effective decisionmaking and follow-through require that the basic process be understood by all commanders and staff members and adapted to the prevailing situation. Although the scope and details will vary with the level and function of the command, the purpose is constant: analyze the situation and need for action; determine the course of action best suited for mission accomplishment; and carry out that course of action, with adjustments as necessary, while continuing to assess the unfolding situation.

The processes of conducting estimates, making decisions, and publishing directives are iterative, beginning with the initial recognition that the situation has changed requiring a new decision by the commander. The staff assembles available information regarding the enemy, friendly, and environmental situations and assists the commander in analyzing the mission and devising courses of action. The staff then analyzes these courses of action and the commander makes a decision.

Having received and analyzed the mission, the commander determines how it will be accomplished and directs subordinate commanders to accomplish certain tasks that contribute to the common goal. Then the commander is responsible for carrying out the mission to successful conclusion.

2.4 MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

What has previously been mentioned in this chapter has application within joint operations with only slight variations relating to level of command. As has been in the past and continues with even more prevalence today, U.S. military operations are often conducted with the armed forces of other nations in pursuit of common objectives. Joint operations as part of a larger multinational operation require close cooperation among all forces and can serve to mass strengths, reduce vulnerabilities, and provide legitimacy. Effectively planned and executed multinational operations should, in addition to achieving common objectives, facilitate unity of effort without diminishing freedom of action and preserve unit integrity and uninterrupted support.

Coordinated planning for rules of engagement, fratricide prevention, deception, electronic warfare, communications, special weapons, source and employment of reserves, and timing of operations is essential to achieve unity of effort. Actions to improve interoperability and the ability to share information between joint and combined staff members need to be addressed early. Nations should exchange qualified liaison officers at the earliest opportunity to ensure mutual understanding and unity of effort.

Planning is often complicated by participation of all members. Multinational force commanders and staffs should seek to involve all member nations in the decision-making process consistent with previously made arrangements. Member recommendations should be sought continuously by the multinational commanders, but especially during the development of courses of action and rules of engagement and establishment of priorities of effort.

Commanders and their staffs should establish a working rapport with commanders and staffs of multinational forces. A personal, direct relationship can overcome many of the difficulties associated with multinational operations. Respect, trust, and the ability to compromise are essential to building and maintaining a strong team. Moreover, being able to operate together as an effective, combined staff will be significantly influenced by our ability to accommodate language and cultural differences.

Doctrines, operational competence as a result of training and experience, and types and quality of equipment can vary substantially among multinational forces. A commander of a multinational force and his staff should implement measures to assess the capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of member forces to facilitate matching missions with capabilities. Where member forces have unique or special capabilities, they should be appropriately exploited.

In terms of command and control in multinational operations, alliances typically have developed command and control structures, systems, and procedures. Alliance forces typically mirror their alliance composition, with the predominant nation providing the alliance force commander. Staffs are integrated, and subordinate commands are often lead by senior representatives from member nations. Doctrine, standardization agreements, and certain political harmony characterize alliances.

Coalitions, on the other hand, are usually formed on short notice and can include forces not accustomed to working together. Establishing command relationships and operational procedures within the multinational force is often challenging. It involves complex issues that require a willingness to compromise in order to best achieve the common objectives. National pride and prestige can limit options for the organization
of a coalition command, since many nations prefer not to subordinate their forces to those of other nations. Although there are options for structuring command relationships, regardless of the command structure, coalitions require significant coordination and liaison to overcome some of the interoperability challenges. Liaison must be robust and should occur between senior and subordinate commands and laterally between like forces, such as between special operations units or naval forces.

Plans in multinational operations should be kept simple and focused on clearly defined objectives. Plans should be issued far enough in advance to allow sufficient time for member forces to conduct their own planning and rehearsals. Effective liaison and reliable communications can facilitate planning and execution.

2.5 CONCLUSION

Planning is fundamental to leadership. A naval commander must lead and direct actions, not just react or wait for events. He/she is responsible for the success of the unit and the success of its assigned mission. It is through planning that his/her leadership is applied to solve problems. Commanders are provided staffs to assist them in the decisionmaking and execution process. The staff is an extension of the commander; its sole function is command support, and its only authority is that which is delegated to it by the commander. Composed of the smallest number of qualified personnel who can do the job, a properly trained and directed staff will free the commander to devote more attention to directing his subordinate commanders and maintaining a picture of the situation as a whole.
CHAPTER 3

Military Planning Logic

3.1 INTRODUCTION

A commander bears responsibility for accomplishment of the mission and for the movement, support, protection, coordination, and control of forces assigned. The planning process that assists a commander to carry out these responsibilities is divided into four phases, each phase being further divided into a series of steps (see Figure 3-1). In practice, the phases and steps may overlap or may not be accorded equal emphasis, but the description remains valid with respect to their logical and sequential relationships.

3.2 PHASES OF THE MILITARY PLANNING LOGIC

The receipt of a superior’s directive becomes the driver of the military planning process. It is the genesis of all tactical actions and provides the focus for the efficient and effective utilization of military resources.

3.2.1 Phase I. During the estimate phase, the commander analyzes alternative courses of action for accomplishing the mission and, on the basis of that analysis, selects one. The selected course of action is the decision; the process used for this analysis is called the commander’s estimate of the situation.

Figure 3-1. Military Planning Logic
3.2.2 Phase II. During the planning phase, the commander develops a plan for carrying out the selected course of action in sufficient enough detail so as to identify the tasks required, to organize assigned forces, and to determine which tasks each subordinate is to accomplish.

3.2.3 Phase III. During the issuing orders phase, the commander communicates to subordinates the planned force organization, specific force element tasks, and command and control guidance by issuing necessary combat orders.

3.2.4 Phase IV. During the execution phase, the commander monitors/supervises the action(s) to determine whether or not the mission is being accomplished and whether or not revisions to the plan or orders are necessary. It is also during this phase that feedback is provided back to the staff that allows for a “running estimate” to be maintained.

The time available to perform an estimate, to prepare a plan, and to issue combat orders will vary with the situation. Each commander should issue directives early enough so that subordinate commanders can prepare adequately for the operation. To facilitate the planning process, it is a useful procedure for the chief of staff or chief staff officer to:

1. Identify the planning tasks.

2. List them in the sequence in which they should be performed.

3. Identify the responsible staff division.

4. Set a deadline for completion of each task.

Such a schedule can serve as a checklist and ensure that all planning tasks are accomplished in a timely manner.

The use of the procedures and formats in the appendices will assist commanders and planners to exploit their professional skills and imaginative thought processes. Commanders who decide to follow different procedures and formats should ensure that their staffs and subordinate commanders are made aware of the modifications. Staffs can produce a finished product most efficiently when definite guidelines and formats have been established.

The extent to which a commander consciously applies problem-solving steps varies according to judgment, temperament, memory, and experience in problem-solving. A commander confronted with a problem similar to one experienced in the past may reach an effective solution a split second after becoming aware of the problem. Habit and doctrine replace the intermediate steps between recognition of the problem and its solution. A commander who is new to the situation, but equipped by study and familiarity with similar situations, may reach the same solution in only a little more time by going through a mental process of matching and adapting knowledge to the situation.

In complex situations, such as planning for a large-scale operation, the individual members of a commander’s staff prepare studies or estimates on portions of the commander’s overall problem and reach solutions to lesser included problems.

There is a hidden danger that rigid adherence to a specific format will stifle the creative and imaginative thinking necessary for reaching solutions to unusual or unfamiliar problems and for finding new and better solutions to old problems. Studies in problem solving, however, have illustrated the great value of standard formats to communicate estimates and directives because they facilitate understanding by their readers.
CHAPTER 4
Commander’s Estimate of the Situation

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The commander’s estimate of the situation is a logical process (see Figure 4-1) of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting a military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish a mission. The decision reached by this process provides a course of action and concept of operations that are then used as the basis for developing plans and issuing directives, as discussed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. Estimates are used both to assist commanders in selecting their own courses of action and to forward proposed courses of action to a higher authority for approval. A commander’s estimate that considers a military situation so far in the future as to require major assumptions is called a commander’s long-range estimate of the situation.

As a decisionmaking logic, the commander’s estimate process is intended to ensure that a commander adopts a course of action that is:

1. Adequate (accomplishes the mission)
2. Feasible (capable of execution with resources available)
3. Acceptable (worth the estimated costs).

The process is well suited to any military conflict situation within the full range of military operations because its main features are:

1. Task orientation
2. The options open to the enemy are carefully considered
3. The decision is based on both an analysis of the probable outcomes of interactions between opposing courses of action and a comparison of own courses of action.

The steps to be taken in preparing a commander’s estimate of the situation are summarized in the following paragraphs. A more detailed description, to include an expanded thought process for each step, is provided as a workbook format in Appendix A.

Whenever “the commander” is referred to, the term is intended to include the commander’s staff because members of the staff prepare much of the material in the commander’s estimate. Yet the term “the commander” is retained to emphasize that the “logic” of the estimate process applies to both commander and staff, and that only the commander makes the decision as to which particular course of action is selected. The interactions between the commander and the staff are continuous, and the staff estimates may be very influential in shaping the commander’s priorities.

The estimate should be as thorough as time permits and the complexity of the situation warrants. It may vary from a short, almost instantaneous mental estimate to a carefully written document that requires days of preparation and the collaboration of many staff elements. Although the steps follow in logical sequence, some of them can be formulated in final and satisfactory form only after later steps have at least begun. When working on later steps of the estimate, it is frequently necessary to repeat earlier steps in order to revise conclusions that have been found inadequate or to discard material that has later been determined to be irrelevant.

Adherence to the format is not intended to restrict a commander’s method for arriving at a sound solution to a military problem. A commander may expand or condense the scope of the steps in an estimate according to the nature of the problem. The relative importance of each consideration will vary with every operation. To maintain the integrity of the logical process of reasoning, the steps of the estimate should generally be followed when selecting a course of action for any military operation.
Figure 4-1. Commander’s Estimate of the Situation
The relationship of the commander’s estimate with the individual staff estimates is both significant and vital. Staff estimates for intelligence; logistics; and command, control, communications and computer (see formats in Appendix B) provide much of the information for the commander’s estimate of the situation, particularly about factors (space, forces, time) affecting possible courses of action, enemy capabilities, and the logistics and communications feasibility of courses of action. Additional supporting and contributing estimates on such topics as the physical environment, electronic warfare, cover and deception, operational security, and psychological operations may be prepared by the appropriate staff elements. Each estimate should highlight for the commander the key issues that should be considered prior to the selection of a course of action.

The decision reached in the commander’s estimate is used as the basis for operational planning (Chapter 5) and for intelligence, logistics, and communications planning.

4.2 STEP 1: MISSION ANALYSIS

Normally, a commander needs to examine a number of significant factors surrounding a mission to ensure a complete understanding of it. Having identified the source of the mission and the supported/supporting relationships, the commander analyzes the mission in the context of the general background of the operation, the mission of the superior, and the capabilities and limitations of the forces. A recommended procedure for a thorough mission analysis follows (see Figure 4-2).

4.2.1 Study Superior’s Mission. The commander studies the superior’s mission and those of higher echelons of command in order to draw broad conclusions as to the nature of the operation. Care should be exercised not to assume intentions on the part of seniors in the chain of command that cannot be deduced logically from their directives. Carefully examine the extent to which accomplishment of one’s own mission contributes to the accomplishment of the superior’s mission. An understanding of this contribution should influence the manner in which the operation is to be conducted and should provide an insight into the kind of follow-on actions that would be appropriate to exploit successful completion of the task assigned. Where confusion or uncertainty exists, commanders should seek clarification.

4.2.2 Derive the Mission. A commander’s mission consists of tasks and its purpose. A task is a specific act or action directed by a superior, leading to the accomplishment or partial accomplishment of the mission. The task and purpose have either been stated by the superior in some directive or need to be derived from the circumstances. The tasks of a mission are usually found in the superior’s directive in a numbered subparagraph of paragraph 3b (execution-tasks).

In the dynamics of warfare, “purpose” always dominates “task” because, while specific tasks can become irrelevant as conditions change, the superior’s intent remains. A full appreciation of a commander’s mission requires a careful review of both the mission and execution paragraphs of the superior’s directive.

A task can be tactical, operational or strategic. In general, a task is any piece of work that has to be done and which has been imposed by duty or necessity. Hence, a task involves action intended to modify a particular condition that is assumed will exist in the future; if not, the action is not carried out.

While specified tasks are found in the superior’s directive, implied tasks are those actions which become necessary to carry out the specified tasks. For instance, the stated task: “Seize an island by amphibious assault,” generally carries with it the implied task of gaining sea control in and around the amphibious objective area. Self-defense/force protection is considered a standing operating procedure and not an implied task. Therefore, it is normally not listed unless there is a necessity that requires coordination with or support by other commanders for its accomplishment.

The purpose of a mission is normally found in paragraph 2 (mission) of the immediate superior’s order that, along with paragraph 1 (situation), contains the essence of the commander’s decision. The first subparagraph (concept of operations) of paragraph 3 (execution) of that same operation order also provides insight into the purpose by conveying the commander’s intent and commander’s stated vision.

Circumstances may arise in which a commander has been given such broad guidance that all or part of the mission needs to be deduced. Deductions should be based on an appreciation of the general situation and an understanding of the superior’s objectives. The mission deduced should have a reasonable chance of accomplishment and should secure results that support the objectives of the superior.

4.2.3 Formulate a Mission Statement. A mission statement is usually expressed, “This force will...(do something — task) in order to...(accomplish something — purpose).” The wording of tasks should be compatible with the scope and capability of the command. For example, the task, “Seize island ALFA,” may be appropriate for a Joint Task Force Commander who commands all of the forces and logistical assets to carry
Figure 4-2. Mission Analysis
out the task to completion, but such a task is likely to be beyond the capability of the amphibious forces commander. Likewise, the purpose should be consistent with the task assigned to the next immediate superior. For an amphibious force commander, the mission statement, “Seize island ALFA,” in order to drive enemy forces from the South Pacific, would be incorrect because the purpose is appropriate only for a theater commander and conveys no meaningful sense of the intent of the amphibious force commander’s immediate superior. A more appropriate purpose statement for the mission might be, “Seize island ALFA in order to establish a secure base for follow-on operations.” Given such a purpose, the amphibious force commander can devise actions which constructively contribute to the overall plan and the objectives of the superior, the Joint Task Force Commander.

After formulation of the mission statement, the commander and his or her staff must examine other factors that will affect the completion of the mission. These factors include externally imposed limitations, ROE, assumptions, and objectives.

4.2.4 Identify Restraints and Constraints. Restraints and constraints collectively comprise “limitations” on the commander’s freedom of action. Restraints (restrictions) are things a superior commander prohibits subordinate commanders or forces from doing. Constraints indicate requirements or circumstances and limitations under which one’s own forces will initiate and/or continue their actions. Neither include matters of doctrine.

4.2.5 Identify Assumptions. An assumption is a supposition about the current situation (or a presupposition about the future course of events) either (1) assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof or (2) necessary to enable a commander during planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action, or both. An assumption exhibits the following general characteristics:

1. Encompasses issues over which a commander normally does not have control
2. Cannot assume success of actions by one’s own forces
3. Logical, realistic, and justifiable.

If stated by a superior, assumptions must be accepted as facts for further estimation/planning. The subordinate may investigate the validity of an assumption or request clarification from the superior, but for planning purposes it continues to be treated as a fact until changed by the superior. Own assumptions are used to continue with the process when confronted by a lack of information; they frequently become requests for information. The use of assumptions during the development of a commander’s own plan is discussed in more detail later in this chapter, particularly in paragraph 4.10.

4.2.6 Rules of Engagement. ROE are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which U.S. forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement. Such limitations may include restrictions on the use of certain weapons, on the attacking of certain targets, or on the attacking of targets in certain areas; they may also impose specific requirements for identification prior to attack or may impose restrictions on the extent of damage or the number of casualties. Such limitations may force the commander to restrict his or her own courses of action unless the ROE are modified.

4.2.7 Identify the Objective(s). A prerequisite for success in any undertaking is the identification of specific, realistic, and clearly defined objectives. Establishing objectives is basic to the entire military planning process.

The term “objective” is used by military planners in two different senses: intangible and physical. In an intangible sense, the objective of an operation is the aim of the action to be taken. It may also be thought of as the accomplishment of assigned task(s) and implies some form of action. For example, in “Neutralize enemy air forces on the island,” the verb “neutralize” indicates action to be taken, such that when the action is completed, the enemy will be incapable of effectively operating their air forces on that island.

The term “objective” has been defined in the physical sense as the actual objective of the action taken (e.g., a definite feature), the seizure and/or holding of which is essential to the commander’s plan. To avoid confusion, the term “physical objective” is often used by planners for clarity.

A physical objective is the focal point of the military action in an operation. In the example in the previous paragraphs, the (abstract) objective or aim is “Neutralize enemy air forces on island BRAVO.” The physical objective is the object of the action, in this case the enemy air forces. Thus, “Neutralize enemy air forces on island BRAVO” is an (intangible) objective, while the “enemy air forces” is a physical objective. The former describes a situation to be created or maintained by military action; the latter identifies the focal point of the action.
A physical objective may be any of the elements of war — troops, ships, bases, aircraft, supplies, etc. A physical objective can be part of either friendly or enemy forces. It may also be a fixed geographic position of value to own forces or the enemy. For example, in a supporting or protective operation, the physical objective is the friendly force that the commander has been tasked to support or protect. In a strike mission, such as “Neutralize enemy air forces on the island CHARLIE,” the striking force may take extensive action against enemy submarines, ships, and aircraft capable of interfering with the carrier’s arrival at its launch point, but the mission’s physical objective remains the enemy air forces on the island.

Each intangible objective generally contains one or more physical objectives toward which the military efforts of the force could be directed. The commander identifies physical objectives in this step and then develops further information on them during the next step in the estimate.

Identifying physical objectives contributes to a more thorough analysis. In a situation where the aim is an intangible objective, as in the example, “Neutralize enemy air forces on the island BRAVO,” it may be useful to consider the enemy air forces on the island as one physical objective and the airfield on the island as another. Neutralization of either physical objective would achieve the aim, but the methods used and the likelihood of success could be different. If the force were to neutralize the airfield by damaging the runways, enemy aircraft on the island would be neutralized at least until the runways were repaired. If the force were to damage or destroy the enemy aircraft, the objective would be achieved until the enemy repaired or replaced them. The commander needs to have a clear understanding of both intangible and physical objectives so that the development of own courses of action will be focused on mission accomplishment.

Generally, only the specified or implied tasks and their purpose are required to be stated in paragraph 1 of a written estimate. The external constraints and the physical objectives identified in this step are used later during the formulation of one’s own courses of action. The rationale used to derive the mission may be included in an annex if desired, especially when the derivation has been lengthy and complex.

All efforts by a commander and his/her staff should be mission oriented. Losing sight of the mission and its objectives will result in an analysis that is confused, lacks focus, and may ultimately lead to a complex but meaningless operation.

At the conclusion of the mission analysis, the commander may provide the staff with preliminary guidance to allow work to proceed on the staff estimates. Such guidance may include the commander’s measures of effectiveness, governing factors, or other criteria to be applied during the development of estimates.

4.3 STEP 2: ANALYSIS OF FACTORS AFFECTING POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION

Having analyzed the mission and established the criteria by which the adequacy of courses of action will later be judged, the commander should now develop a thorough analysis of the critical factors of space, time, and forces. This step is divided into two primary areas: characteristics of the Area of Operations (factor space) and derivation of the relative combat power of opposing forces (factor forces). Both are affected to varying degrees by factor time.

The commander must (1) identify those factors that might influence the choice of a course of action and (2) draw conclusions about how such factors might favor or hinder own or enemy courses of action. From a consideration of these factors, the commander should be able to identify strengths and weaknesses of each side and to make initial estimates of the adequacy of own forces to accomplish the mission (Figure 4-3).

After identifying each relevant consideration, the commander states the facts and then draws conclusions about their probable influence on enemy or friendly actions. A simple guide is: identify relevant factors (Figure 4-4), tabulate the facts, draw conclusions.

4.3.1 Factor Space. The choice of a course of action usually requires careful consideration of the operating environment in the area of operations. The topics that follow are considered to be a basic list from which to start a thorough examination of the operational environment and is not intended to be all inclusive. Those topics with particular relevance to naval operations have been amplified. Only those that are relevant to the situation being considered should be identified or written into the estimate; paragraphs may be omitted or added to as applicable.

4.3.1.1 Military Geography. The physical environment includes a number of sea, land, and air parameters that affect the safety of operations and the warfighting capabilities of the forces. The staff oceanographer should prepare a physical environment estimate (for incorporation into the intelligence estimate) that outlines...
Figure 4-3. Analysis of Factors

1. Analyze Factor SPACE
2. Analyze Factor FORCES
3. Analyze Factor TIME

- Tabulate STRENGTHS and WEAKNESSES

- Make Initial Determination Of ADEQUACY
Figure 4-4. Space, Forces, and Time Factors
expected environmental conditions and describes what effects they should have on own and enemy equipment, capabilities, and operations.

4.3.1.1 Topography. All power projection operations ashore inherently depend on terrain conditions. Naval surface fire support and airstrike planning require topographic information. Newer types of missile guidance and aircraft navigation systems use digital topographic information. New types of missile guidance and aircraft navigation systems use digital topographic data that requires significant preparation time. Amphibious assaults depend on extensive hydrographic and topographic studies of landing beaches. Further inland, terrain analysis is essential for conducting the follow-on deployment of ground forces. Terrain and vegetation data are also needed to predict the performance of modern electro-optical-infrared sensors and weapons. Detailed information about near-shore features is necessary for planning mine warfare operations.

4.3.1.2 Hydrography and Oceanography. The state of the sea is a fundamental consideration in maritime warfare. Both the mobility of forces and performance of platforms, weapons, and sensors are profoundly affected by ocean conditions. Bottom depth, sea state, tides, currents, sea ice, and similar factors will determine the extent to which naval operations are possible at a particular time and location. Factors affecting acoustic and nonacoustic sensors include thermal structure, bottom depth and composition, the presence of ocean fronts and eddies as well as the extent of biological, geological, and magnetic activity. The degree to which favorable conditions can be identified and exploited will influence target detection and enemy avoidance capability.

4.3.1.3 Climate and Weather. Atmospheric considerations range from general surveys of climatic conditions (historical averages) through detailed weather forecasts to specific predictions for the performance of individual sensors, weapons, or platforms. High winds, extreme temperatures, rain, snow, ice, or permafrost will affect the mobility and performance of personnel and equipment. More subtle factors such as vertical air temperatures and humidity can have a major effect on electronic propagation critical for surveillance and communications. Because visibility is important in most operations, it is often necessary to tabulate the times of sunrise and sunset, moonlight conditions, and duration of twilight.

4.3.1.2 Transportation. Focal points of shipping, channels or restricted passages, air corridors, and other features of sea, land, and air lines of communication may have a direct bearing on the operation.

4.3.2 Factor Forces. The derivation of the relative combat power of opposing forces is critical in determining the adequacy of own forces and in conducting an analysis, in a later step of the estimate, of the interactions between each own course of action against each enemy capability. In preparation for such an analysis and to help determine whether the forces assigned to accomplish the mission are sufficient, information is assembled during this step about the characteristics of opposing fighting forces, beginning with a listing of the number and types of forces as a means of drawing conclusions about relative strengths and weaknesses.

In strike operations, naval forces may be opposed primarily by air forces and/or submarines; in amphibious operations, they may be opposed by coastal gun and missile batteries. Comparisons are generally more meaningful if they are made primarily of forces that will directly oppose each other rather than a comparison of similar types. For example, an enemy’s submarine force is placed in proper perspective when it is compared with the commander’s undersea warfare capability; own airstrike strength is placed in the proper perspective when compared with the enemy’s air defense capability. The commander will reach more valid conclusions on relative combat power by comparisons of this sort rather than by comparisons of similar types of units. The following subparagraphs should be varied by the commander as necessary to visualize effectively the relative combat power of the forces that may oppose each other.

4.3.2.1 Strengths. The strengths of one’s own and friendly forces are initially expressed in terms of the numbers of such categories as combatant ships, aircraft, submarines, ground forces, and missile batteries assigned to the commander as compared with those enemy forces that may oppose them. The purpose is to draw general conclusions about the military power that each side can bring to bear. More specific conclusions about combat outcomes are drawn later, when opposing forces expected to engage each other are analyzed. A convenient form for evaluation is a tabular listing.

4.3.2.2 Compositions. This subparagraph outlines the order of battle of major units.

4.3.2.3 Location and Disposition. This subparagraph describes the geographic location of major units.
4.3.2.4 Reinforcements. This subparagraph describes the capabilities of each side to reinforce.

4.3.2.5 Logistics. This subparagraph summarizes the ability of each side to sustain its forces logistically. The logistics estimate in paragraph B.3 and the logistics estimate of the situation discussion in paragraph 4.11 provide additional information for the completion of the subparagraph.

4.3.2.6 Combat Efficiency. Estimates of the combat efficiency of military personnel are subjective and based on conclusions about national characteristics, combat experience, morale, training, skill, and stamina. Because the personality, doctrine, and methods exploited by an enemy commander are a major factor in the combat efficiency of enemy forces, and in the choice of enemy capabilities, the identity of the enemy commander should be established.

4.3.3 Factor Time. Time and space factors are the basis for the dynamic aspects of the engagement. The commander’s concern is with the relative positions of opposing forces and the time required for possible movements. These factors will weigh heavily in later steps of the estimate, where the commander considers the likelihood of enemy capabilities and the feasibility of own courses of action. Other time and space factors that may also bear on the situation include the time to complete a deployment, when and where it is possible to intercept an enemy force, the time and sea room required for underway replenishment and carrier operations, and the time to load or unload assault or resupply shipping.

4.3.3.1 Tabulate Strength and Weakness Factors. Having surveyed the environment and studied the means available and the means opposed, the commander should review the conclusions reached thus far, and then tabulate the strengths and weaknesses of each of the opposing forces. It is usually convenient to tabulate strength factors in two columns, one column for each force, and then to tabulate weakness factors similarly.

The basic criterion in military operations is the ability of a force to attain its objectives. To be relevant, therefore, a strength or weakness factor must be one that contributes, directly or indirectly, to an ability or inability on the part of either force to achieve its objectives. After reviewing strength and weakness factors, the commander may be able to pinpoint which strength and weakness factors should be exploited or minimized by possible courses of action.

4.3.3.2 Make Initial Determination of Adequacy of Own Force. The commander should now have sufficient information on which to base preliminary judgments about the adequacy of the available forces to accomplish the mission. If the commander is convinced that his/her own forces are inadequate, he/she should report such a conclusion to the superior.

An appreciation of the following points should enable a commander to avoid the more common misunderstandings in identifying factors affecting possible courses of action:

1. This step involves more than the gathering of relevant facts; it should result in the drawing of useful conclusions from those facts.

2. Estimates of relative combat power require an analysis of the forces that may directly oppose each other in combat. The purpose of such estimates is to enable the commander in later steps to draw conclusions as to the ability of one’s own forces to carry out courses of action against expected opposition.

3. The purpose of a commander’s estimate is to assist the commander in choosing a course of action. One of the difficulties in this step is to determine which information is relevant to such a decision. This is a matter of judgment; but so long as the estimate process remains mission oriented, the commander should be able to identify information that is relevant and to judge its sufficiency.

With a basic understanding of the various factors (through detailed study as described above or through prior intimate knowledge), the staff then begins what can be either a serial or parallel review of the courses of action available both to the enemy and own forces. Steps 3 and 4 may be developed concurrently by separate segments of the staff.

4.4 STEP 3: DEVELOP ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

This step focuses on the opponent. The commander has two tasks:

1. Identify the enemy’s capabilities
2. Estimate the likelihood of their adoption.

Enemy capabilities are those courses of action of which the enemy is physically capable, and that, if adopted, would affect the accomplishment of the commander’s mission. The term “capabilities” includes not only the general courses of action open to an enemy, such as attack, defense, or withdrawal, but also the particular courses of action possible under each general course of action. Enemy capabilities are
considered in light of all known factors affecting military operations, including time, space, weather, terrain, and the strength and disposition of enemy forces (Figure 4-5).

Enemy courses of action are stated as broad and conclusive actions (i.e., DRAW-D: defend, reinforce, attack, withdraw, delay) that enemy forces can carry out under conditions favorable to them. The extent to which an enemy’s ability is reduced because of opposition by one’s own courses of action is investigated later during the analysis of opposing courses of action and should not influence the initial formulation of ECOAs. The goal is to develop a list of distinct, mutually exclusive ECOAs that collectively exhaust the enemy commander’s options. An intelligence estimate (see paragraph B.2 for JOPES format and the discussion in paragraph 4.10) is the primary source of information about enemy capabilities.

The term “enemy course of action” is used to represent the major options open to an enemy in the employment of its force as a whole. The commander cannot be confident of identifying which course of action the enemy intends to choose without knowing the enemy’s mission and objective(s), information which is rarely available. Even if the intentions of the enemy are presumed to be known, the commander’s confidence is limited by the enemy’s ability to feign or change them. While considerations of enemy intentions may be useful for estimating likelihood, they do not obviate continued consideration of all enemy capabilities.

4.4.1 Develop Enemy Courses of Action. There are two criteria for determining an ECOA:

1. Can the enemy do it? (Are they physically capable of carrying it out?)

2. Would it materially affect accomplishment of the commander’s mission?

Note

To be retained, an ECOA requires an affirmative answer to both questions.

Accurate identification of ECOAs requires adopting the enemy’s viewpoint. From that perspective, the commander should first postulate alternative enemy objectives and then visualize specific actions, within the capability of enemy forces, that could be directed at these objectives and would affect the accomplishment of the commander’s mission. From the enemy’s perspective, appropriate physical objectives might include the commander’s force or its subdivisions, forces being supported or protected, facilities or lines of communication supporting the commander, geographic areas such as straits, or positions of tactical, operational, or strategic significance. It should be assumed that an enemy will seek to discover and, if possible, attack one’s own “center of gravity.”

Potential enemy actions relating to specific physical objectives normally need to be combined to form statements of ECOAs. These statements should be broad enough so that the fundamental choices available to the enemy commander are made clear.

Examples of properly stated ECOAs are “Destroy Task Force RED One” and “Neutralize advance base RED Two.” Terms such as “destroy” and “neutralize” are preferable to words like “attack” and “strike” because they better describe the objective of the action to be taken against the physical objective. Each ECOA so stated may represent a series of detailed actions (the “how” of each ECOA) that will be explored later during the analysis of opposing courses of action. Here the commander should focus on the general concept of enemy force employment, while considering the strength the enemy could commit simultaneously against several physical objectives.

The enemy may be capable of performing multiple actions that, in combination, would affect accomplishment of the commander’s mission differently. If so, the list of ECOAs should reflect such multiple actions. Some examples are “Deny RED Naval Forces the use of the PURPLE Sea by air attack while conducting an amphibious assault against country GREEN”, and “Destroy Task Force by missile attack and interrupt merchant shipping by submarine attack.” Failure to appreciate multiple enemy capabilities may result in faulty conclusions about the enemy’s ability to affect the commander’s accomplishment of the mission.

In situations where forces directly oppose each other, there will usually be the ECOA, “to destroy or impede the commander’s forces.” At the least, the commander has that ECOA to consider. Other ECOAs may focus on the execution of missions that might reasonably have been assigned to the enemy commander in the existing situation or are capabilities that become apparent from a review of the conclusions drawn while identifying the considerations that could possibly affect courses of action during the previous steps. An enemy is usually able to adopt to more than one ECOA.

Once all ECOAs whose accomplishment would affect the commander’s mission have been identified, the commander should eliminate any duplication and combine them when appropriate.
Figure 4-5. Develop Enemy Courses of Action

- List Possible Enemy Objectives
- Review Critical Factors
  - Strengths / Weaknesses
- Deduce Own Cog
- List Own Critical Vulnerabilities
- List Decisive Points
  - Geographic/Force-Oriented

Review Individual Enemy Capabilities

- Naval
- Aerospace
- Land
- Doctrine
- SOF
- WMD
- Etc.

Develop ECOAs

- General
- Particular

List Vulnerabilities

List Possible ECOAs in Relative Probability of Their Adoption

** Draw-D **
Defend
Reinforce
Attack
Withdraw
Delay
4.4.2 List ECOAs in Relative Probability of Adoption. The commander lists the retained ECOAs in the order that they are likely to be adopted. To establish such an order requires an analysis of the situation from the enemy’s perspective together with what may be known of the enemy’s intentions. Consideration of enemy intentions is frequently prudent in view of the limited resources available to both one’s own and enemy forces. However, to apply enemy intentions uncritically — that is, to consider only what one believes an enemy will do — can be an extremely dangerous practice. The danger is that the commander may eliminate from further consideration some viable enemy capabilities on the basis of estimates of enemy intentions.

Continued consideration of all ECOAs should not preclude the study and analysis of reliable intelligence or particular knowledge of the enemy in an effort to understand enemy intentions. Proper exploitation of intelligence may reward the commander with great success and economy. However, the fruits of such an analysis ought to be applied to an estimation of the relative probabilities of adoption, not as a justification for eliminating improbable ECOAs from further consideration. As a general rule, consideration of enemy intentions should influence the ordering but not the number of retained ECOAs. Retained ECOAs are now listed in the order of their probability of adoption, but a commander should continue to be alert for indications that the probabilities have changed or that an ECOA has been overlooked.

When identifying ECOAs, it is necessary to adopt the perspective of the enemy. The analysis should not be limited only to the most likely or most threatening ECOA, nor should an ECOA be excluded merely because it is considered unlikely or uncommon. If it affects your mission, retain it; list it low in probability if you consider it so, but do not discard it. In short, do not overlook an enemy capability.

4.5 STEP 4: DEVELOP OWN COURSES OF ACTION

An own course of action is a possible option open to a commander that would accomplish the mission. In each COA, the commander visualizes the employment of the force as a whole, considering the external constraints, the factual data, and the conclusions previously developed during the mission analysis and identification of considerations. During this step, several distinct alternatives should be developed to provide scope for analysis and comparison (Figure 4-6).

A course of action statement should be expressed in broad terms of the accomplishment of the final results desired, using simple, unmistakable language. Basically, a course of action consists of two parts — (1) the objective, what is to be accomplished, and (2) what military action(s) will be taken to accomplish it — connected by the word “by.” Examples of properly stated courses of action are:

1. Force ROMEO will destroy the Northern Force by coordinated air attacks.
2. Seize, occupy, and defend a lodgment on an island ECHO.

Each COA statement should identify a definite objective and state the necessary action or the means employed to attain it. The “by action” clause may be omitted if it causes redundancy. For example, “Provide escort for Convoy XYZ,” is a properly stated course of action for an escort group commander, although it could be stated, “Protect convoy XYZ from air and submarines attack by providing escort.”

4.5.1 Develop Tentative Courses of Action. As the first task in developing own courses of action, the commander should once again review the mission to ensure a complete understanding of its objectives. After an examination of the capabilities of the force and with the mission in mind, the commander formulates own courses of action by (1) concentrating on the physical objective(s) identified earlier and (2) visualizing action by the force that would create the effect directed by the superior.

At successively lower echelons, there may be fewer physical objectives, courses of action, or sequences for taking action. Nonetheless, it is quite unusual to find a military problem of any complexity in which there is only one way to employ assigned forces to accomplish the mission.

After a thorough analysis, a commander should develop several COAs that are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. Each COA ought to be fundamentally different from the others, and the COAs taken together should exhaust the possibilities for meaningful action. Viable alternatives can be developed by emphasizing distinctions in the following areas: focus or direction of the main effort, the scheme of maneuver, the defeat mechanism, or the task organization. A pitfall to be avoided is the development of only one viable (favored) course of action plus a few other “throw away” courses of action that are not really serious alternatives.

If an assigned mission allows the commander no freedom of action, it is said to constitute a predetermined course of action. Even when the course of action...
Figure 4-6. Develop Own Courses of Action
is predetermined, the commander should continue the estimate because it will develop much of the information needed to develop the plan, prepare the directive, and to supervise the action. The following points should be kept in mind when developing COAs:

1. Strive to develop imaginative COAs that take full advantage of the situation and all available forces.
2. Develop alternative COAs that are clearly alternatives to one another and that are not simply minor modifications to the same basic course of action.
3. Give careful attention to time and space factors; concept statements drawn without them usually prove to be shallow or not feasible.
4. Ensure that each COA statement is not just a rewording of the mission statement drafted in the first step. Unless the mission predetermines the course of action, each COA statement will be more focused on the objective than is the mission statement.
5. Reconcile each COA with external limitations and ROE.

The commander next examines each COA separately to determine its validity. In determining validity, the commander applies three basic tests: adequacy, feasibility, and acceptability.

4.5.2 Test of Adequacy. A COA is considered adequate when, if successful, it would by itself accomplish the mission. If the statement of a COA appears to be only partly adequate, the commander should expand the COA to make it adequate. The test for adequacy is a yes/no test, and can be applied once the COA is identified. Any COA that does not meet this test must be modified until it does or be discarded at this point in the estimate process.

4.5.3 Make Preliminary Tests for Feasibility and Acceptability. A COA is considered feasible if it can be carried out with the forces, support, and technology available, within the constraints of the physical environment, and in the face of expected enemy opposition. The test for feasibility requires visualization of the execution of each COA in the face of each ECOA, a process that is undertaken during analysis of opposing COAs, the next step. Therefore, any assessment of feasibility at this point in the estimate can be only tentative. However, it may be possible to declare a COA infeasible for which resources are obviously insufficient.

A COA is considered acceptable if the estimated results are worth the estimated costs. The basis for this test consists of an estimation of losses of one’s own forces and resources as well as losses in time, position, and opportunity. The commander weighs possible losses in light of the purpose of the mission.

Acceptability needs to be considered from the perspective of both the commander and the commander’s superior. A review of the contribution to the superior’s objective should be helpful. Like the test for feasibility, the test for acceptability requires visualization of the execution of each course of action in the face of each enemy capability, a process to be undertaken during the analysis of opposing COAs, the next step. Even prior to that analysis, it may be possible to recognize that a COA would incur heavy losses. Yet the prospect of sustaining losses should not necessarily deter the commander from adopting an appropriately aggressive COA when the mission inherently entails the prospect of losses. Some level of risk — the possibility but low probability of very great losses — is also inherent in most military situations. The prospect of risk needs to be taken into account and may have to be accepted.

The mission analysis may have disclosed that the superior has been quite explicit about the importance, urgency, or priority of the tasks assigned. In other cases, the superior may define the limits of acceptable risk, as Admiral Nimitz did prior to the Battle of Midway, when he instructed his on-scene commanders to avoid exposure of their force to attack by superior enemy forces “without good prospect of inflicting, as a result of such exposure, greater damage to the enemy.”

Each own course of action should be tested against these criteria as early as possible in the estimate process. It is pointless to continue consideration of a COA without modification once it is recognized that it fails to meet one of the tests. To develop a sound basis for the determination of the feasibility and acceptability of a COA requires the kind of interaction analysis undertaken during the analysis of opposing courses of action step with the final test for feasibility and acceptability being accomplished after the comparison of own COAs is completed; but adequacy can be tested at this time.

4.5.4 List Own Courses of Action Retained. After testing each own course of action, the commander may find it advantageous to combine into a new course of action two or more courses that individually proved only partially valid to develop a concept for this new course of action, and then to test it. This step is completed when the commander lists the courses of action that will be retained for further analysis.

4.5.5 Define a Concept of Operations for Each Course of Action. After listing retained courses of action, the commander should develop for each a brief tentative concept of operations. These concepts are
developed to gain an appreciation of the problems that will need to be solved in order to position, sustain, and defend the forces to achieve the objective(s). In drafting the tentative concept of each own course of action, the commander should state in broad but clear terms: what is to be done, the size of the forces deemed necessary, and the amount of time they need to be brought to bear.

4.6 STEP 5: ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION

Until this point in the estimate, enemy capabilities and own courses of action have been considered separately. During this step, the commander conducts a dynamic analysis to determine the probable effect of each enemy capability on the success of each own course of action. The purpose of this analysis is to develop a sound basis for testing courses of action for feasibility and acceptability and then for comparing the advantages and disadvantages of retained courses of action. Predicted outcomes may also highlight the need to consider additional actions that would improve outcomes or would serve to encourage an opponent to select an enemy capability less favorable to himself (Figure 4-7).

4.6.1 Decide on a Measure of Effectiveness.
Prior to attempting a prediction of outcomes, it is necessary to decide what terms will be used to express these outcomes. Because the purpose of predicting outcomes is to provide a basis for comparing and testing courses of action, a “measure (or measures) of effectiveness” is chosen that facilitates this comparison and testing.

Measures of effectiveness should satisfy several criteria. They should:

1. Clearly reflect the criteria for success established during the mission analysis
2. Provide a reasonable basis for comparing the relative merits of the courses of action under consideration
3. Focus on the physical objectives identified earlier and on aspects of the interaction that lend themselves to prediction
4. Be quantifiable and measurable.

It is best to start by reexamining the mission statement and reviewing the physical objectives identified during the mission analysis so that the measures of effectiveness focus the analysis on vital objectives. An MOE is usually some quantitative measure that facilitates comparison of the effectiveness of alternative COAs in achieving mission objective. For example, if the objective is to destroy submarines, the “number of submarines sunk per month” might be a suitable MOE. However, if the objective is to protect shipping, the MOE needs to represent the amount of shipping that passes safely. In each case, there should be a distinct correlation between measures of effectiveness and the mission.

There is no set form for expressing outcomes in terms of the measures of effectiveness; each military situation is different. Probability of mission success may be expressed as a percentage or as an adjective (low, high); rate of advance may be expressed as kilometers per day or as an adjective (rapid, slow); exchange ratios may be expressed as fractions or a range of fractions; losses or attrition may be expressed in terms of either losses or forces remaining or in terms of relative losses. It is important, though, to use consistent terminology through any given analysis.

4.6.2 Predict Outcomes for Each Interaction.
The outcomes of engagements, battles, and campaigns are dependent on the decisions made by the many players on both sides. The analysis of the interactions between own courses of action and enemy capabilities may be thought of as a mental war game in which own and enemy decisions are sufficiently played out over time so that conclusions can be drawn as to the probable outcomes of the interactions.

To visualize the interactions, it is useful to construct a matrix with a row for each own course of action and a column for each enemy capability. Label each own course of action and each enemy capability by a title of one or two words, such as its physical objective. In recording the estimate, identify the own course of action/enemy capability (COA/ECOA) combination at the beginning of each analysis. For example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECOA No. 1</th>
<th>COA No. 1</th>
<th>PREDICTED OUTCOME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;RED forces will destroy BLUE forces threatening the island.&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;BLUE forces will capture island ALFA by amphibious assault.&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;80% probability that the BLUE assault will put enough troops ashore to capture the island, despite the damage done by RED forces.&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 4-7. Analysis of ECOAs Versus COAs

- Review
  - Restated Mission
  - Physical Objective(s)

- Determine MOE

- Conduct Analysis and Predict Outcome of Each Interaction

- Interpret the Results of Analysis

- List COAs Retained
The outcomes of each interaction should be expressed in a way that predicts the likelihood that the commander’s mission would be accomplished and estimates the probable losses that could be expected on each side. Separate matrices may be used to summarize the likelihood of success and the estimated losses. When the mission includes several major tasks, separate matrices may be used for each such major task to show how the likelihood of their accomplishment will vary with each COA/ECOA combination.

4.6.3 Interpret the Results of the Analysis. Comparisons of the advantages and disadvantages of the individual courses of action will be conducted during the next step, but if it becomes readily apparent during this analysis that any COA is either unacceptable or not feasible, the commander should modify or discard it and concentrate on the remaining courses of action. The need to create additional combinations of own courses of action may become apparent at this point.

The analysis may reveal to the commander what factors might indeed become the keys to success. The systematic analysis of each interaction should provide the commander some valuable insights into the dynamics of the action.

An assigned task that is a predetermined course of action should also be analyzed in the described manner, since the analysis may reveal weaknesses and a need to seek modification of the assigned task.

4.6.4 List Own Courses of Action Retained. When the analyses of the interactions are completed, the commander lists all retained own courses of action, including those that have been combined.

This analysis is the very heart of the commander’s estimate process. Greater insights will be achieved and the process will be expedited if each interaction analysis is limited strictly to the specific COA/ECOA combination that is “war gaming” and by applying consistent measures of effectiveness to all interactions.

Note

The use of MOE alone should not be the sole criteria for discarding or retaining of a particular COA.

4.7 STEP 6: COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON

During the comparison step of the estimate, the advantages and disadvantages of retained courses of action are evaluated in terms of whatever governing factors the commander wishes to apply. The objective is to identify the course of action that offers the greatest prospect of accomplishing the mission (Figure 4-8).

4.7.1 List and Consider Advantages and Disadvantages. In the selection of a COA, the commander tabulates the specific advantages and disadvantages of each own course of action retained. A review of the interaction outcomes predicted during the previous step should be of assistance in this tabulation. The “measure of effectiveness” developed earlier and any “governing factors” established by the commander can be used as the basis for comparison.

To assist in identifying advantages and disadvantages, the commander may consider own courses of action in the light of a few governing factors, such as selected principles of war — mass, surprise, security, or similar factors. Governing factors are those aspects of the problem that the commander considers decisive to mission success. For example, in the situation where the objective is to “neutralize enemy air forces in the WHISKEY area,” the intention to use the airfield for friendly operation in the future could become a governing factor. At the Battle for Midway, Admiral Nimitz’ specific guidance about exposure of the force became a governing factor during the on-scene commander’s choice of a course of action.

4.7.2 Identify Actions To Overcome Disadvantages. When reviewing disadvantages of each course of action, consider what additional actions, if any, could be taken to reduce or overcome any disadvantages made apparent by the analysis. Any additional action must be applied to all of the COAs retained after the analysis of the opposing COA step.

4.7.3 Make Final Tests for Feasibility and Acceptability. Before selecting an own course of action, the commander applies the final tests for feasibility and acceptability based on the results of the analysis in the previous step.

As a result of the final tests for feasibility and acceptability, the commander may find none of the own courses of action analyzed to be valid; consequently, new courses of action should be created. These new courses of action should then be tested for adequacy and then analyzed against each retained ECOA.

If no COA can be found that is adequate, feasible, and acceptable, the commander should present such a conclusion together with supporting facts in an estimate of the situation to his or her superior, pointing out what could be accomplished under the current circumstances and estimating what additional forces would be required to accomplish the original mission.
CONSTRUCT DECISION MATRIX
- DETERMINE GOVERNING FACTORS
- DETERMINE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE
- DETERMINE RELATIVE WEIGHTS
  (THEN)
- FILL IN MATRIX FOR EACH COA
- EVALUATE MATRIX RESULTS
- COMPARE EACH COA

LIST ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF EACH COA RETAINED

IDENTIFY ACTIONS TO OVERCOME DISADVANTAGES

MAKE FINAL TEST FOR FEASIBILITY

MAKE FINAL TEST FOR ACCEPTABILITY

IDENTIFY RELATIVE MERITS OF EACH COA

Figure 4-8. Comparison of COAs
4.7.4 Weigh Relative Merits of Own Courses of Action and Select One. The commander weighs the relative merits of the various courses of action and selects the course of action that, in good judgment, best satisfies the requirements of the mission. The commander will need to rely heavily on professional judgment and experience. Before selecting a COA, the commander should ask one final question: “Is this the utmost I can do to carry out my mission?” The selection requires an affirmative answer.

4.8 STEP 7: THE DECISION

In an estimate of the situation, the decision is a clear and concise statement of the line of action intended to be followed by the commander as the one most favorable to the successful accomplishment of the mission. The commander translates the course of action selected in step 7 into a concise statement of what the force as a whole is to do and so much of the elements of when, where, how, and why as may be appropriate. When the task assigned is a predetermined course of action, it becomes the decision; the wording of the task may be altered, but its essence should remain unchanged (Figure 4-9).

The wording of the decision is not bound by rigid form. It should be a brief statement that clearly and concisely sets forth the course of action selected and provides only whatever information is necessary to develop a plan for the operation. Observe two general rules in wording the decision:

1. Express it in terms of what is to be accomplished, if possible.
2. Use simple language so the meaning is unmistakable.

4.9 THE LONG-RANGE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION (CAMPAIGN PLANNING)

A commander’s estimate that considers a military situation so far in the future as to require major assumptions is called a commander’s long-range estimate of the situation. Long-range estimates are used to support the course-of-action decisions that precede the writing of a campaign plan (a series of related major joint operations designed to achieve strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space). The long-range estimate process is used to develop the theater strategy. A long-range estimate of the situation uses the same logic and follows the same sequence of steps as in the commander’s estimate described earlier in this chapter, but the individual steps of the estimate need to be somewhat modified to take into account the longer time scale, the need for phasing, and the increased uncertainties that characterize such a long-range estimate.

A campaign plan is primarily a “plan for military action planning” of the major joint operations that will constitute the phases of the campaign. In addition, a campaign plan will identify those decision points where major decisions will need to be made as the campaign progresses. The following is devoted to redefining the individual steps of a commander’s estimate as they apply to a long-range estimate of the situation used to develop a campaign plan.

4.9.1 Step 1: Mission Analysis. In addition to the derivation of a mission statement from the strategic guidance, the mission analysis for a long-range estimate involves the identification of those objectives or military conditions whose achievement will be necessary to accomplish the mission. The procedure is to establish first the “ultimate objective” whose achievement would constitute mission success. Then, working back from the ultimate objective, the commander establishes “intermediate objectives,” prior conditions whose fulfillment is necessary for achieving the ultimate objectives or other intermediate objectives. This backward process for identification of prior objectives continues until a set of intermediate objectives has been identified that can form the basis for initial military operations — the first phase of the campaign. Note that during this step of the long-range estimate, it is the objectives and conditions that are identified, not the actions to be taken to achieve them.

4.9.2 Step 2: Analysis of Factors Affecting Possible Courses of Action. The considerations that are relevant to the making of a decision about the course of military action for a major operation or campaign are of a higher order than those that are relevant to the making of a decision about the course of action to be pursued during a single operation. In addition to considering the environment and the relative strengths of forces that may engage each other, a commander developing a long-range estimate needs to anticipate the major changes in strengths that may occur over time as a result of attrition, new production, and transfers to or from other efforts. There are also likely to be environmental aspects of the situation that could vary significantly over time. It is often necessary to make a number of assumptions about the situations that will exist in the latter phases covered by the estimate.

4.9.3 Step 3: Develop Enemy Courses of Action. Identification of enemy courses of action in a long-range estimate of the situation requires estimating the enemy’s ultimate and, if possible, intermediate objectives, so that the broad options open to the enemy can
Figure 4-9. The Decision

Commander Selects COA

Step 7

The Decision

DECISION STATEMENT

COA ELEMENTS
• What
• Who
• When
• Where
• How
• Why

THE DECISION

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

COMMANDER’s INTENT
be appreciated. In a long-range estimate that extends over a considerable period of time, it is important to realize that the enemy may change or abandon a strategy or a course of action should it determine that such a change is in its best interest. The likelihood that an enemy course of action will be adopted is subject to change over the duration of a major operation or campaign.

4.9.4 Step 4: Develop Own Courses of Action. For a long-range estimate of the situation, each own course of action is made up of a series of related military operations that advance from the existing situation through achievement of specific intermediate objectives to the achievement of the ultimate objectives. Provided that the identification of both intermediate and ultimate objectives during the mission analysis has been completed, each such series of related military operations may be evaluated as suitable.

4.9.5 Step 5: Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action. Predicting outcomes that would result from the interactions of each course of action against each enemy course of action is much more difficult and tentative in a long-range estimate for a campaign than in a commander’s estimate for a specific operation. The logistics capabilities of each side to support its campaign plan need to be carefully considered. In a campaign, the forces that will be available to each side for military operations in later phases will necessarily depend on the outcomes of earlier phases. Furthermore, the tactics, techniques, and even the objectives of each side may undergo a change during the course of the campaign as each side applies lessons learned and adapts to changing circumstances.

4.9.6 Step 6: Course of Action Comparison. Because of the uncertainties about outcomes in the latter phases of a campaign, the tests for feasibility and acceptability provide very tenuous results. Yet it shouldstill be possible to identify and eliminate those campaign courses of action that are unlikely to be feasible or whose losses are likely to be unacceptable. Courses of action that have been retained after testing for feasibility and acceptability are compared against each other in light of whatever governing factors the commander considers most germane, among which is likely to be “freedom of action.”

4.9.7 Step 7: The Decision. A long-range estimate of the situation is intended to support a decision by the commander that will identify the ultimate and intermediate objectives that will be the focus of each phase of the campaign. The decision establishes these ultimate and intermediate objectives and identifies whatever additional major decisions remain to be made during the course of the campaign.

4.10 INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

Despite today’s extensive intelligence systems for collection, analysis, production, and dissemination, a commander will still face unknowns. Because of the uncertainties about what the enemy is doing, what it intends to do, and how it will respond to the commander’s actions, all combat operations entail some risk of surprise. Reducing that risk can be accomplished (though not eliminated) by using the intelligence estimate process.

The intelligence estimate of the situation is the formal mechanism which the commander and the staff use to reduce uncertainty about future enemy actions. It provides much of the information for the commander’s estimate of the situation. The intelligence estimate describes the enemy’s possible courses of action and estimates the probable order of their adoption. It helps the commander understand the range of options open to the enemy and the factors that may influence what the enemy will do.

The intelligence estimate is, in essence, a commander’s estimate from the enemy’s point of view. The intelligence estimate attempts to probe the mind of the enemy commander in an effort to understand what factors are affecting the enemy commander’s decision-making process. The better a commander is able to view the situation through the enemy’s eyes, the more realistic will his/her own operational plans be. By appreciating the range of enemy options, a commander is mentally prepared to develop plans that cope with possible enemy actions and is less likely to be surprised.

The staff intelligence officer (J-2/N-2) is responsible for furnishing an intelligence estimate to the commander and the staff. The intelligence estimate is an independent document, requiring constant revision as new information is acquired, gaps in knowledge are filled, and changes in the enemy situation and capabilities are detected. Throughout the estimate process, a continuing staff dialogue is necessary to ensure that the commander’s estimate is based on the latest evaluation of enemy capabilities, that the intelligence estimate directly supports the commander’s decision-making process, that all staff planners are aware of changes in the enemy situation, and that the intelligence officer is fully aware of operational plans.

Even after the intelligence estimate is incorporated into the commander’s estimate, the intelligence estimate needs to be continually updated and revised in the form of a “running” intelligence estimate. Changes in the probabilities of adoption of enemy courses of action are particularly important. When changes in such probabilities
are great enough to require the commander to reconsider his/her decision about the course of action selected, the running intelligence estimate can be used as the starting point for a new, formal intelligence estimate. The running estimate becomes particularly valuable to the commander during the supervision of the planned action.

4.10.1 Purposes of the Intelligence Estimate.
The primary purposes of the intelligence estimate are to identify and weigh enemy capabilities, predict the relative order that these capabilities might be adopted, and inform the commander and his/her staff of the conclusions. Enemy capabilities are those courses of action of which the enemy is physically capable and, if adopted, would affect the accomplishment of the commander’s mission. Enemy capabilities include general courses of action open to the enemy (i.e., defend, reinforce, attack, withdraw, or delay) and all the particular courses of actions possible under each general course. In other words, enemy capabilities are all those actions that the enemy commander can choose to adopt, given the forces at his/her disposal, and that are not restricted to the actions that the enemy is expected to adopt.

In addition to its primary purpose of identifying and weighing enemy capabilities, the intelligence estimate is used to identify gaps in knowledge concerning the enemy. Critical gaps will be identified as essential elements of information and will require more research or intelligence collection efforts by the commander, his/her subordinates, or by the intelligence system.

The intelligence estimate can also be used to disseminate intelligence information to senior, subordinate, and lateral commanders, providing them the commander’s view of the enemy situation and capabilities.

The estimate, however, will not provide an adequate basis for determining all EEIs. Many EEIs cannot be determined until the CES is completed and the operation plan is in development. Nor can it include all the information and intelligence required by senior, lateral, or subordinate commanders. Such an estimate would be too lengthy and unwieldy.

For campaigns and major operations that will take place many months in the future, paragraph 2 (enemy situation) of the intelligence estimate should depict conditions predicted to exist as of the date of the future operation. This prediction can be accomplished only through the use of assumptions as described in the next paragraph. Factors to be considered in a long-range intelligence estimate include enemy mobilization, equipment production, attrition, changes in mission, and major shifts in the deployment of forces.

4.10.2 Assumptions in the Intelligence Estimate. An assumption is defined as a supposition about the current situation or a presupposition about the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action. Assumptions are typically used to bridge gaps in knowledge. They should be reasonable and realistic. Moreover, they should be used sparingly. An intelligence estimate loses its usefulness if it becomes nothing but a long list of assumptions.

Typical assumptions include the prerequisites for enemy courses of action (including availability of forces, favorable environmental conditions, and establishment of certain military conditions) or the assumed outcomes of intervening enemy operations and the effect these operations are likely to have on the enemy situation.

Examples of such assumptions are:

1. If current shipbuilding programs continue uninterrupted, the enemy will have an additional three cruisers and seven destroyers by January 199X for use in the Black Sea.

2. If warming trends continue, the Sea of Okhotsk will be free of ice by the end of April and allow the enemy to disperse his ships more widely.

3. The enemy requires air superiority 50 nm beyond the present forward line of troops before he can go on the offensive.

Caution should be reflected upon in the use of assumptions. Assumptions about the enemy should be clearly identified in the intelligence estimate to ensure that they are not presented as fact. Assumptions, when carried into the commander’s estimate, can affect the course of action decision by the commander. Identifying assumptions alerts the commander to consider the possibility that the assumption may be wrong and to provide for alternatives early in the process. Unidentified assumptions could result in decisions based unknowingly on false premises.

A long-range intelligence estimate deals primarily with the enemy situation that is expected to exist in the long term. A long-range intelligence estimate typically will employ many assumptions to bridge the gap between existing and future situations. Therefore, the long-range estimate cannot be precise, but instead should express conclusions about enemy strength, disposition, and capabilities in terms of a range of values. The long-range intelligence estimate is
normally prepared when developing strategic estimates and campaign plans.

4.10.3 Preparation of the Intelligence Estimate. The intelligence estimate consists of five fundamental steps:

1. Review the mission.
2. Describe the enemy situation.
3. Identify enemy capabilities.
4. Analyze enemy capabilities.
5. Draw conclusions as to effects of enemy capabilities.

The prescribed JOPES format for a written intelligence estimate, taken from Joint Pub 2-0, is shown in Appendix B. The format contains detailed information concerning the content of the estimate. The following paragraphs provide amplifying information to assist in preparation of an intelligence estimate.

4.10.3.1 Step 1: Review the Mission. The review mission step of the intelligence estimate is based on the mission analysis step of the commander’s estimate. Refer to paragraph A.2 where this process is described in greater detail. The purpose of this first step is to focus the attention and efforts of the intelligence staff on the commander’s mission that the intelligence estimate is to support. If intelligence tasks are assigned or implied by the mission statement, they should be made explicit during this step.

4.10.3.2 Step 2: Describe the Enemy Situation. This step is critically important to the rest of the intelligence estimate and to the commander’s estimate process because it is the principal means by which the situation facing the commander is understood. All relevant facts about the environment and the enemy are collected and analyzed so that conclusions can be drawn.

The intelligence estimate format lists the factors to be considered under two main categories: characteristics of the area of operations and enemy military situation. Individual factors may be added to the list or omitted as appropriate to the situation. Much of the analysis in this section is described in paragraph A.3 of the commander’s estimate process (factors affecting possible courses of action) and will not be repeated here. Only certain key aspects of the analysis will be addressed below.

The information concerning each individual factor discussed in this section of the intelligence estimate should be organized as follows:

1. Existing situation
2. Effect on enemy capabilities
3. Effect on friendly courses of action.

The most important aspect of this section is that conclusions should be drawn from the facts available as to how each factor might contribute to or limit what the enemy could do with enemy forces, and what the commander could do with friendly forces. Without such conclusions, this part of the estimate becomes a sterile compilation of data, shifting the burden to the commander and other staff divisions to do the analysis themselves. The process of drawing conclusions requires a broad level of knowledge about the enemy’s equipment, tactics, personnel, and organization. For example, if high sea states are anticipated in the area of operation, knowledge of enemy patrol boat capabilities may result in a conclusion that the enemy patrol boats cannot operate in the area or cannot fire missiles until the sea state subsides.

The effect on friendly forces may be similar or different, depending on detailed knowledge of friendly forces. Since the intelligence officer normally does not have the expertise necessary to draw accurate conclusions on the effects of the environment upon friendly forces, other members of the staff should be consulted to take advantage of the breadth of staff knowledge and experience. A physical environment estimate of the situation will be prepared by the staff oceanographer and the mapping, charting, and geodesy officer for incorporation into the intelligence estimate.

The purpose of the “enemy military situation” section is to provide data on all forces available to the enemy to accomplish its mission. This data will be used to determine the relative combat power of enemy and friendly forces, evaluate the effects of time and space factors, consider strengths and weaknesses, and determine the adequacy of friendly forces.

The main goal of the preceding analysis is to identify those factors that may influence the enemy’s selection of a course of action. Such factors may be the enemy mission (if known), terrain, weather, weapons capabilities, time, force levels, or a combination of these. Conclusions about the extent of influence of each of these factors can be reached only after exhaustive collection and careful analysis of data about the area of operations and the enemy force.
4.10.3.3 Step 3: Identify Enemy Capabilities.
This step accomplishes the primary purpose of the intelligence estimate, which is to identify the major alternatives open to the enemy commander, known as enemy capabilities. Enemy capabilities are based on two criteria:

1. The enemy is physically capable of the action
2. If adopted, the action would affect the accomplishment of the commander’s mission.

Care should be taken to differentiate between capabilities and intentions. Capabilities are what the enemy can do; intentions are what the enemy is planning to do. While estimates of enemy intentions may be useful, they should not prevent consideration of all enemy capabilities.

Enemy capabilities express the general courses of action open to the enemy (defend, reinforce, attack, withdrawn, or delay) and the particular courses of action possible under each general course (attack in area A, B, or C; defend over water, defend over land; etc.). Enemy courses of action cannot be identified without knowing the enemy’s mission and objective(s), information which is available only in unusual circumstances. Enemy capabilities are identified by considering the factors identified during step 2 of the intelligence estimate.

An enemy capability is deemed valid for consideration during the intelligence estimate process only if it would have a material effect on the commander’s mission. For example, consider the case of a commander of an amphibious force whose mission is to “Seize Island ZULU.” An enemy capability to “Defend Island ZULU” is valid since the enemy defense would materially affect the commander’s mission. An enemy capability to “Defend Island YANKEE” may not materially affect the commander’s ability to seize ZULU and should not be considered a valid enemy capability.

During the collection and analysis of intelligence data, information concerning enemy intentions may be obtained. The intelligence officer should consider the possibility that enemy intentions have been deliberately revealed in order to confuse and deceive or to mask the enemy’s true intentions. The intelligence officer then estimates the degree to which the information about enemy intentions ought to affect the probability of an enemy capability being adopted. Intelligence information on enemy intentions is a double-edged sword; it could reduce uncertainties and contribute to successful planning and execution of a military operation, but if the intelligence information is part of a deception, relying upon it could also risk failure and defeat.

The Battle of Midway illustrates both the benefits and risks of basing action upon conclusions about enemy intentions. Admiral Nimitz was able to commit his meager carrier force resources to the battle in a way that made up for the imbalance between his own force and the Japanese force because of his conclusions about Japanese intentions to invade Midway Island. However, those conclusions were based on fragmentary intercepts of enemy communications. Had his conclusions been wrong, or had the intercepted communications been part of a Japanese deception plan, Nimitz’s force might have been seriously out of position.

Normally, an enemy capability is an action that would interfere with the commander’s mission, but in some cases, it may actually assist the commander. For example, consider the case of a commander of a carrier battle group with a mission to “Destroy Surface Action Group ALFA.” An enemy capability to “Evade the carrier battle group” would hinder the commander’s mission. However, an enemy capability to “Seek out and destroy the carrier” would aid the commander (to some degree) in his/her mission since the SAG would not be attempting to avoid engagement.

Enemy capabilities are formulated by:

1. Identifying the enemy’s physical objective(s)
2. Visualizing specific actions within the capability of enemy forces that may be directed at these objectives
3. Identifying which actions would affect the accomplishment of the commander’s mission.

From the enemy’s perspective, appropriate physical objectives include the commander’s force, supported forces being protected, facilities ashore, geographic areas such as chokepoints, or positions of tactical or strategic significance.

Enemy capabilities should be mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. That is, each ECOA should be truly different from the others, and the full range of options available to the enemy should be explored. A common fault in developing ECOAs is to focus on only one enemy capability, then slightly modify it to create other ECOAs. Since this flawed procedure produces enemy capabilities that are fundamentally the same, the commander may fail to become fully aware of all the options available to the enemy. On the other hand, enemy capabilities that are grossly disadvantageous, insignificant, or entirely unreasonable should be eliminated from consideration (e.g., “Enemy will surrender”). Finally, enemy capabilities should not be rejected or eliminated.
because of anticipated opposition by own courses of action. The effect of own courses of action on enemy capabilities is touched on later in the final step of the intelligence estimate, but is treated more fully in the analysis and comparison of courses of action steps of the commander’s estimate.

Enemy capabilities are stated as broad actions that the enemy force can carry out under favorable conditions. Statements of enemy capabilities should be concise and without discussions of orders of battle, doctrine, tactics, or strategy. However, each statement of an enemy capability should answer these four questions:

1. What can the enemy do? That is, what is the enemy capability that will affect the assigned mission?

2. Where can they do it? This question usually requires identifying the place at which the enemy will initiate action, its route to the scene of action, and where the action will occur.

3. When can the enemy execute this capability? The earliest time the enemy can initiate each capability is estimated. Time calculations for the conduct of the operation are based on factors viewed in the most favorable light from the enemy standpoint.

4. What strength can the enemy devote to the task? For naval forces, give number of combatant vessels. For air forces, give initial strike and sustained sortie rates.

In the intelligence estimate, a general enemy capability such as “Attack BLUE surface forces” would be stated more specifically, using the four questions as a check. For example, “Starting now, attack BLUE surface forces in the Philippine Sea area with four cruisers and three destroyers from bases in Country TANGO.” Other examples of enemy capability statements can be found in the intelligence estimate format in paragraph B.2.

Ideally, enemy capabilities should be described in terms of combined arms operations. Identification and analysis of separate ground, air, and naval capabilities may be required before a comprehensive statement of enemy capabilities can be written. Normally, enemy nuclear, chemical, biological, and unconventional warfare capabilities are discussed separately.

The scope of enemy capabilities in an estimate will depend on the level of command (friendly and enemy) and the intelligence available. An estimate by the CJCS (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff) would consider enemy capabilities on a global basis. A unified commander could consider enemy capabilities on a theater or regional basis. A joint task force or naval force commander would consider enemy capabilities limited to his/her area of operations. The scope of enemy capabilities in an estimate will depend in the same way upon the level of command of the opposing enemy commander. National, theater, or local enemy commanders will have differing capabilities commensurate with their force levels and areas of responsibility.

To achieve clarity, each enemy capability should be reworded until it is clear and concise, using only enough words, phrases, and sentences to ensure that the commander is in no doubt about the enemy capability. Each enemy capability should be stated separately in a lettered subparagraph of paragraph 3 of the intelligence estimate.

### 4.10.3.4 Step 4: Analyze Enemy Capabilities.

During this step, the intelligence officer predicts the relative likelihood that each enemy capability will be adopted by the enemy. The intelligence officer should assume, in the absence of positive evidence to the contrary, that the enemy will select the course of action that it feels will best accomplish its mission (in terms of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability) and will use optimum tactics and execute movements in the shortest possible time.

Throughout the analysis, the intelligence officer should be alert for indications that the enemy will or will not adopt a particular capability. In arriving at conclusions about relative likelihood, the intelligence officer should consider and specifically articulate the following three items for each identified enemy capability:

1. Factors which favor adoption of the capability
2. Factors which militate against adoption of the capability
3. Any indications of whether or not the enemy intends to adopt the capability.

### 4.10.3.5 Step 5: Draw Conclusion as to Effects of Enemy Capabilities.

In this step, the intelligence officer lists enemy capabilities in relative order of adoption. Predicting the relative probability of enemy capabilities should be justified on the basis of known facts, thorough analysis, and sound judgment, all of which should have been developed during steps 2, 3, and 4. The key reasons for predictions of relative order of enemy capabilities should be stated.
Next, the intelligence officer concludes from the available evidence what effect the choice of each enemy capability might have on the commander’s accomplishment of the assigned mission. The final part of paragraph 5 lists any exploitable enemy critical vulnerability. Critical vulnerabilities that may be exploited are listed without specific recommendations for their exploitation.

4.10.4 Format and Distribution of the Intelligence Estimate. The format for the intelligence estimate is provided in paragraph B.2. Each estimate should be a complete document; readers should not be required to search other documents to find details essential to understanding the estimate. Annexes may be used for voluminous factual material and graphic presentation.

The intelligence estimate should be distributed to other staff divisions. Therefore, it should be produced at the lowest classification level feasible, commensurate with security requirements and the clearance levels of other staff members. Special intelligence annexes may require limited distribution, but these should be kept to an absolute minimum.

In some instances, the intelligence estimate might be included as an appendix to the intelligence annex of the OPLAN or OPORD, but generally only those portions of the estimate dealing with the enemy situation and enemy capabilities are extracted from the estimate for inclusion in the intelligence annex.

4.11 LOGISTICS ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

The logistics estimate of the situation serves two purposes. It provides the commander with an assessment of the logistics feasibility of tentative courses of action and forms the basis for preparation of the logistics plan.

In order to provide the commander with an assessment of the logistics feasibility of tentative courses of action, the logistics officer will gather, analyze, and evaluate large quantities of information, much of which can be used in developing the plan for logistics support of the selected course of action. The amount of information to be gathered, analyzed, and evaluated will depend upon the size and scope of the mission. The logistics data necessary to formulate an area campaign plan by a fleet commander in chief will be of an entirely different order from the data for an OPORD developed by a battle group commander for a single operation. The procedure and considerations are the same, but the depth of information can be vastly different.

4.11.1 Definitions of Logistics Planning Terms. The following definitions of logistics planning terms apply.

Logistics is defined as the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, logistics includes those aspects of military operations that deal with:

1. Design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel
2. Movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel
3. Acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities
4. Acquisition or provision of services.

The logistics estimate of the situation is an appraisal resulting from an orderly examination of all logistic factors influencing contemplated courses of action to provide conclusions concerning the degree and manner of that influence. The logistics estimate of the situation, which is a supporting estimate, is done concurrently with the commander’s estimate of the situation. The JOPES format in paragraph B.3 serves as a guide for recording the logistics estimate of the situation.

In order to accomplish a detailed analysis, the logistics planner uses planning factors, statistical facts, usage data, and staff studies. Planning factors are selected values used to project the future requirements or capabilities of a given organizational unit in terms of personnel, material, or services. Planning factors establish the quantitative relationships between requirements and capabilities. Usage data are the rates of production or consumption of a commodity by a specific unit under certain, known conditions.

A thorough understanding of the level of interoperability of the force is also critical. Armed with this knowledge, the logistics planner can factor in the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and to accept services from other systems, units, or forces, and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together thus eliminating needless duplication of capabilities and resources.

4.11.2 General Logistics Planning Procedures. While the CES is being developed, the logistics officer concurrently prepares the logistics estimate of the situation as a means of informing the commander of the logistics factors that the commander should bear in mind when selecting a course of action. The starting point for the logistics estimate is a review of the derived mission statement, the product of the mission analysis step of the commander’s estimate. This is followed by a review of such basic logistical information as the forces
to be supported, specific logistics operations directed by higher authority, available logistics forces assigned by higher authority, available logistics facilities, general area of operations, and target dates for the contemplated operation.

Logistics planners then accumulate, develop, and analyze additional data from logistical information sources and from the specialized knowledge of subordinates and of other staff divisions. The logistics planner provides the commander and other staff members with an analysis of the logistical implications of the situation, and the relative logistics capabilities of opposing forces. This information is used by the other staff divisions to assist in their determination of overall strengths and weaknesses of the opposing forces.

On the basis of this information, the logistics planner then examines the logistical implications of each tentative course of action. The logistics estimate of the situation is a detailed analysis of the logistics implications of each tentative course of action and forms the basis for conclusions about their logistics feasibility. The logistics estimate and the estimates prepared by other staff divisions provide conclusions and recommendations that assist the commander in selecting the course of action that will best accomplish the mission.

4.11.3 Steps in the Logistics Estimate. Like the logic of the commander’s estimate, the logistics estimate’s logic applies both in relatively simple and in very complex operations. It may or may not be reduced to writing, but the more complex the operation, the more useful is a formal record of each step. Like the estimates of other staff divisions, the logistics estimate is not a one-time effort, but requires constant review throughout the planning process.

The logistics estimate has five separate but integrated steps:

1. Mission analysis
2. Identification of logistics considerations affecting possible courses of action
3. Logistics analysis of own courses of action
4. Comparison of own courses of action
5. Conclusion about logistics feasibility.

4.11.3.1 Step 1: Analyze the Mission. The logistics planner first analyzes the commander’s mission in terms of its logistics implications. The commander’s own analysis of the mission may identify some general logistics responsibilities, but it is usually necessary for the logistics planner to identify the logistics tasks that are only implied in the commander’s mission and to include them in the mission analysis of the logistics estimate.

4.11.3.2 Step 2: Logistical Considerations Affecting Possible Courses of Action. Logistical considerations that will affect possible courses of action include (1) all aspects of the situation facing the commander that are predominantly logistic in nature and (2) those that are not logistic in nature but which have some logistical implications. The staff logistics officer presents the logistics view of the situation facing the commander in the intelligence estimate of the situation. Considerations are normally grouped according to the following six categories.

4.11.3.2.1 Own Forces. The present disposition of own forces is usually displayed on a situation map or chart that shows the phases of the planned operation and attachments and detachments.

4.11.3.2.2 Enemy. Enemy capabilities are developed by the intelligence division or the commander. The degree to which each enemy capability might affect logistics support and the enemy’s ability to conduct sabotage or raid to reduce logistics support are particularly relevant.

4.11.3.2.3 Characteristics of the Area. Although planning for some aspects of an operation may be done without much reference to the characteristics of the area of operations, logistics planning usually requires an intimate, detailed knowledge of the physical scene and the environmental conditions. The intelligence estimate will include some of the information about the area required for a logistics estimate and need only be referenced, but specialized logistics studies may also be required.

4.11.3.2.4 Assumptions. In general, the logistics planner is governed by the same considerations in formulating logistic assumptions as are other staff officers. However, because logistics factors are considered in greater detail and at a lower level, more assumptions may be required upon which to base logistics planning.

4.11.3.2.5 Strengths to be Supported. Use of a tabular listing, by places or periods, of all forces that are to be supported will enable the logistics planner to visualize the total requirements for logistics support. The status of readiness and any special needs can be included in the listing.

4.11.3.2.6 Special Features. Other aspects of logistics that have not previously been specifically identified may be worthy of consideration. For instance, the training and replacement of logistics support personnel
and the material condition of logistics support ships and equipment are areas that may have an important bearing on the ability of a commander to provide logistics support.

4.11.3.3 Step 3: Analyze the Logistics Features of Own Courses of Action. The logistics planner next analyzes each tentative course of action to determine the requirements, availability, and limiting features of the logistics activities listed in the paragraphs that follow. The objective is to determine the feasibility of logistics to support the requirements of each of the proposed courses of action.

The logistics planner determines for each course of action (1) the amount of supplies required to bring units of the force up to desired supply levels and (2) the levels to be maintained during phases of the operation. When reviewing the availability of supplies, consider such sources as captured enemy material, material recovered by salvage and repair, and material from local resources.

4.11.3.3.1 Maintenance. Maintenance demands may vary extensively for each tentative course of action. The logistics planner should establish such maintenance requirements as those necessary to:

1. Keep the force in condition to carry out its mission
2. Keep logistics facilities in a high condition of readiness
3. Keep material in a combat serviceable condition
4. Cope with combat damage.

Maintenance requirements include those for inspection, testing, servicing, repair, packaging for further shipment, rebuilding, salvage, and reclamation. Extensive modifications to ship or aircraft are not normally undertaken by field agencies except to meet unforeseen emergencies.

4.11.3.3.2 Medical Services. The logistics planner should estimate casualties on the basis of previous experience, the opposition expected, and the weapons that might be employed by enemy forces. Weigh also the health and sanitation conditions. Establish requirements and identify available methods and facilities for evacuation and medical treatment for each course of action.

4.11.3.3.3 Transportation. The determination of transportation requirements normally includes detailed computations of tonnage, means of movement to staging areas and objective areas, and movements within the areas. The capacities and capabilities of both lift and nodal points are very important in estimating the availability of transportation to supported forces. Transportation requirements need to be addressed for each tentative course of action.

4.11.3.3.4 Base Development. The requirements for base construction (or augmentation of existing facilities) may vary for each tentative course of action. The use of mobile support facilities should be considered prior to augmenting logistics facilities with fixed base development. Weigh carefully the cost and vulnerability aspects of base development against the effort necessary to provide adequate support using mobile facilities.

4.11.3.3.5 Personnel. Personnel requirements for both combat and logistics forces should be developed for each component operation or for each phase of a campaign, placing particular stress on critical categories of personnel. Requirements for replacement personnel should be estimated on the basis of expected attrition rates and the evacuation policy. Consider other requirements, such as military police and recreation and welfare services. When estimating availability of personnel, note the availability of indigenous labor, since this source can reduce the need for normal procurement.

4.11.3.3.6 Foreign Military Assistance. The determination of foreign military assistance requirements includes aid to allies within the area of operations and the availability of reciprocal military assistance programs.

4.11.3.3.7 Finance, Legal, and Civil Affairs. The requirements under these headings will vary broadly with the extent and scope of operations.

4.11.3.3.8 Host Nation Support. Where applicable, determine the availability of supplies and services from local sources and determine whether prior mutual agreements have been concluded.

4.11.3.4 Step 4: Comparison of Own Courses of Action. The logistics analysis (step 3) should give the logistics planner a basis for evaluating the capability of logistics forces to provide the required support for each course of action. The extent to which available logistics support would limit accomplishing the basic mission by each course of action should be made evident. The assessment should consider the enemy’s ability to interdict logistics flow. The logistics planner should then tabulate the logistic advantages and disadvantages of each course of action.

4.11.3.5 Step 5: Draw Conclusions About Logistics Feasibility. The evaluation in the previous step should provide the basis for conclusions during this step as to the logistics feasibility of each course of action.
action. While the final determination of overall feasibility of each course of action will be made by the commander, logistics estimate will furnish the commander with conclusions about logistics feasibility together with the staff’s necessary factual information on which they are based. Specific conclusions should include those listed below.

4.11.3.5.1 Mission Support. The logistics officer should state an opinion about:

1. Whether the commander’s mission can be supported logistically
2. Whether each proposed course of action is logistically feasible
3. If the mission cannot be supported by any proposed course of action, why not.

4.11.3.5.2 Major Logistics Features. The logistics officer should identify any major logistics features that require the commander’s attention. Include positive recommendations for action to correct deficiencies. When, in the judgment of the logistics officer, there exist alternative or modified courses of action that better lend themselves to effective logistics support, they may be recommended at this point. When the commander has been given a predetermined course of action, the logistics analysis (step 3) and evaluation (step 4) will discuss only this one course of action, but if alternatives for providing the logistics support become evident, they should be identified at this point. Unavoidable logistics limitations and deficiencies together with their implication for the mission must be highlighted. Any logistic assumptions should be specifically pointed out to the commander.

4.11.4 Relationships to Other Estimates. The logistics estimate is not an isolated effort; its primary objective is to inform and advise the commander and staff on the logistics aspects of the problem and the impact of logistics on the operations necessary to accomplish the commander’s mission.

4.11.4.1 Commander’s Estimate. The paragraphs that follow indicate the ways in which the logistics officer assists in the development of the various steps of the commander’s estimate of the situation.

4.11.4.1.1 Mission Analysis. During this step of the commander’s estimate, the commander may seek advice from the logistics officer about the identification of physical objectives or about significant logistic aspects or assumptions that are immediately evident. This is particularly the case where the commander’s tasks are logistical in nature, such as to provide logistics support or to seize an area to make more secure the supply lines of communication.

4.11.4.1.2 Factors Affecting Courses of Action. Information on the general situation and the characteristics of the area from step 2 (logistics considerations) of the logistics estimate may be incorporated into the CES. The logistics officer will provide information for the logistics section of the paragraph on relative combat power. In the tabulation of strength and weakness factors, the logistics officer may be able to pinpoint own logistics strengths and enemy logistics weaknesses for the commander to exploit.

4.11.4.1.3 Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action. During the analysis step of the commander’s estimate, the ways in which enemy capabilities might interfere with own logistics support may become an important consideration. The analysis of opposing courses of action during the commander’s estimate may reveal possible interactions that adversely affect logistics. The logistics estimate may suggest alternative courses of action that offer advantages from the logistics point of view.

4.11.4.1.4 Comparison of Own Courses of Action. Logistics feasibility is part of the feasibility test for each own course of action and is derived from step 5 of the logistics estimate. Logistics considerations could influence the final selection of the best course of action if one course is clearly more supportable logistically than the others. The logistics analysis identifies the logistics advantages and disadvantages of the various courses of action.

4.11.4.1.5 The Decision. The commander selects the best course of action as his decision; the logistics officer then develops a logistics plan to support that decision.

4.11.5 Other Estimates. The logistics officer may also be called upon to provide additional information for the commander’s estimate beyond that normally contained in the logistics estimate, such as criteria on which to judge the enemy’s ability to sustain logistics support.

The logistics planner can provide invaluable assistance to the intelligence officer by providing information about supply requirements, seaport and airport capabilities, and transit time over different kinds of terrain, which can often provide clues about enemy capabilities.
Logistics analyses may be valuable in assessing the strategic abilities and tactical behavior of the enemy and in identifying opportunities for exploiting enemy weaknesses in such areas as vulnerable points of transportation and shortages of critical items.

**4.12 COMMUNICATIONS ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION**

To assist the commander in the evaluation of proposed courses of action, the staff communications officer may prepare a separate communications estimate of the situation. Such an estimate provides staff advice about the relative feasibility from a communications standpoint of each course of action under consideration and identifies communications factors that ought to be considered during the selection of a course of action. A communications estimate involves identification of significant communications considerations that bear on the military situation, leading to an assessment of the relative communications feasibility of each course of action being considered during the development of the commander’s estimate.

The JOPES format for a command, control, and communications estimate is contained in Appendix B. Whether the scope of the estimate extends to C3, or includes only communications considerations, the logic and procedures remain the same. Although the term “communications” is used, it may be expanded to “command, control, and communications” if that is the actual scope of a specific estimate. The steps of a communications estimate follow with a brief description of the purpose or product desired in each.

**4.12.1 Step 1: Mission Review.** The first step of the communications estimate is to review the mission statement formulated during the first step of the commander’s estimate, a review that emphasizes communications considerations.

**4.12.1.1 Communications Tasks Implied in the Exercise of Command.** A commander has a requirement for communications to support his/her exercise of command over forces as well as to sustain command relationships with his/her superior commander and with adjacent and supporting commanders. Even though these communications requirements are not explicitly tasked to the commander, they need to be identified in the communications estimate and their satisfaction provided for during communications planning.

**4.12.1.2 Communications Tasks Assigned to a Commander.** The tasks assigned to a commander may include specific communications tasks. In such an event, the commander’s ability to carry out such tasks should be addressed specifically in the communications estimate.

**4.12.2 Step 2: Significant Communications Considerations.** The communications planner next compiles and analyzes information about communications requirements and capabilities that will affect the commander’s ability to carry out the mission. Although the communications requirements of individual naval operations vary in detail, they always reflect the universal need for reliable, secure, and rapid communications.

**4.12.2.1 Physical Characteristics of the Area of Operations.** Such factors as terrain, weather, radio propagation, and satellite footprints affect the range and reliability of communications. The communications planner obtains information on communications problems unique to the operational area from the intelligence estimate or other sources in order to estimate the effect that area characteristics will have on communications. The impact of area characteristics and distances on communications reliability can be compensated for by providing intermediate relay stations or by selecting radio frequencies that will assure reliable communications over the distances involved.

**4.12.2.2 Potential Enemy Actions Against Communication Facilities.** The communications planner uses information from the intelligence estimate to evaluate the enemy’s capability to exploit or deny own communications circuits or facilities. Threats to electronic equipment may develop from electronic warfare, deception, and/or the physical destruction of key systems and facilities.

**4.12.2.3 Organization of the Forces Available to the Commander.** If the assignment of forces and their task organization have not yet been decided, the communications planner will have to estimate how the force will be subdivided into groups and units in order to estimate the type and number of command and reporting circuits needed.

**4.12.2.4 Communication Facilities Available to the Commander.** The communications planner compiles data about communications support facilities available both within the force and throughout the area of operations. The commander will be able to task the communications facilities of ships, aircraft, and ground units of the force, as well as the shore-based and space-based communications facilities assigned for specific or shared use. With this data on facilities, the communications planner will be able to evaluate the quality of service and the level of interoperability that can be achieved and to develop and define requirements for additional or special communication facilities, if they should be necessary.
4.12.2.5 Other Significant Factors. The communications officer includes in the communications estimate whatever communications information is relevant and significant to the mission. Each situation is different. The JOPES estimate format (Appendix B) contains a list of commonly used considerations.

4.12.3 Step 3: Analysis of the Course of Action. In the third step of the communications estimate, the communications planner uses the information gathered in the previous steps to conduct a detailed evaluation of the ability of communications to support each retained course of action. Such an evaluation should focus on the limitations imposed on each course of action by communications considerations as well as on any other information that may assist the commander in the selection of a course of action.

The procedure for this step is to visualize how the communications assets available would have to be configured and tasked to satisfy the requirements of each course of action. Any deficiencies derived during this analysis are then examined for possible resolution. The factors previously identified should also be considered: climate and weather, terrain, distance, enemy capabilities, and whatever other factors are significant for communications in the situation.

4.12.4 Step 4: Comparison of Courses of Action. List the communications advantages and disadvantages of each course of action that have become apparent from the analysis of the previous step. This comparison should make clear how well or how poorly each course of action could be supported from a communications standpoint.

4.12.5 Step 5: Conclusions. The conclusions from the preceding analysis should be summarized in a way that answers the following questions:

1. Are communications assets adequate to support accomplishments of the commander’s mission?

2. Which course of action can best be supported from a communications standpoint?

3. What communications deficiencies require the commander’s attention?

The commander’s course of action decision becomes the basis for further planning and for preparation of the directive, together with its supporting annexes for communications, logistics, intelligence, and other key aspects of the operation.
CHAPTER 5

Planning

5.1 INTRODUCTION

During Phase II of the military planning logic, the commander refines the CES decision into a plan of action. Plans provide for the coordinated action required to carry out the decision of the commander for the conduct of a future or anticipated combat action. Planning is a continuous process. It involves a detailed and methodical review of all aspects of contemplated military action. The larger the unit, the greater the need to foresee and plan for the long-range future. While the integrity of a plan depends upon the soundness of its essential details, the plan is properly formulated as a directive or the directive is projected in detail only as far into the future as the commander’s estimate of the situation can reasonably assure him freedom of action. Figure 5-1 describes some of the characteristics of a good plan.

1. Provides for accomplishing the mission that is the objective of all military planning.

2. Based on facts and valid assumptions.

3. All pertinent data has been considered for their accuracy and the number of assumptions have been reduced to a minimum.

4. Strives for simplicity by reducing all essential elements to their simplest form and eliminates those elements not essential for success.

5. Provides for the use of existing resources both organic to the organization and those available from higher headquarters.

6. Clearly establishes relationships and fixes responsibilities.

7. Provides for control, in that adequate means exist or have been provided for, to carry out the plan according to the commander’s intent.

8. Provides for direct contact, thus allowing coordination between all command echelons.

9. Provides for decentralization by delegating authority between all levels to the maximum extent possible.

10. Provides for personnel, material, and other arrangements for the full period of the contemplated military action.

11. Is flexible, in that there is room for adjustments necessitated by changing conditions and, where necessary, an alternate COA is stipulated.

12. Eliminates all the possibilities for misunderstandings.

13. Is coherent; all elements fit together, control measures are complete and understandable and mutual support requirements are identified and provided for.

Figure 5-1. Characteristics of a Good Plan
In the plan, the commander determines the most suitable way to organize subordinate forces to carry out the selected COA, establishes the tasks each subordinate must accomplish, prescribes the means for coordinating their efforts, and establishes the command relationships. The commander clearly states the missions and tasks of each subordinate, allocates forces and assets to immediate subordinates, and delegates authority commensurate with his subordinates’ responsibilities. Subordinates are provided all available information and must be informed in a timely manner of modifications to their missions, tasks, and allocated forces and assets as dictated by changing situations.

During planning, major considerations affecting the development of a concept of operations are identified, a command structure is established, and the identified tasks are allocated. Figure 5-2 shows the steps in the development of a plan. These steps are intended to assist the commander in transforming the decision reached through the CES into a plan that identifies tasks and an appropriate organization to accomplish those tasks. The plan is used during the next phase of the military planning logic to prepare the directive of the plan for transmission to those who will carry it out. The following paragraphs describe the steps commonly used in the development of a plan.

5.2 STEP 1: REFINE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

With the mission in mind, the commander first reviews the CES decision and refines the concept of operations, adding the precision and reformulating necessary to provide the staff a firm foundation for subsequent development of the plan. Particular attention is paid to major considerations affecting the concept of operations, the establishment of the command structure, and the allocation of tasks, such as:

1. What are the major tasks?
2. Will we use forces sequentially and/or simultaneously?
3. What is the overall time scale?
4. Where are we now? Where do we have to be?
5. What forces are available?
6. Do we keep the force together or divide it? How/what do we synchronize?
7. How do we incorporate a deception effort?
8. What kind of support is available from friendly forces?
9. What support do others expect of us?
10. How will intelligence, logistics, and communications be handled?
11. What’s the weather going to be? How will it affect us?

5.3 STEP 2: ESTABLISH OBJECTIVES

The commander’s review should place particular emphasis on objectives and assumptions. Both intangible and physical objectives identified in the first step of the CES should be reviewed and then combined with additional objectives that may have become apparent during subsequent discussions.

An assumption is used when information essential to the preparation of a plan is missing. The need for an assumption may be evident in the analysis of the mission or at later stages of the planning. An assumption should make clear the conditions that are necessary to make the plan valid. To be necessary, an assumption needs to express a condition without which the plan would be invalid. Unless the plan would be invalidated when an assumption proves false, the assumption is not necessary.

Assumptions should be as few in number as possible and worded so they clearly identify the conditions that would render the plan invalid. Whether an assumption is factually accurate should not be confused with whether it is necessary. The factual accuracy of an assumption will be determined by the course of future events; whether or not an assumption is necessary will depend on whether or not the commander’s plan would be invalid should the assumption prove false.

While it is permissible to include assumptions in operation plans, they are not stated in operation orders. Whenever a plan relies on an assumption, an alternate course of action within the plan or an alternate plan based on the failure of that assumption needs to be prepared. Should the assumption prove to be false, the original plan will have to be modified or abandoned. The number of assumptions (and alternate plans) can be reduced, if not eliminated, by the development of a truly flexible plan that is capable of being executed with only slight modifications as events unfold during the planned action. Because reliance on assumptions requires the formulation of alternate courses of action or alternate plans, the commander should at this point provide for their preparation.
Figure 5-2. Development of the Plan
5.4 STEP 3: IDENTIFY COMPONENT OPERATIONS

A commander frequently finds it useful or necessary to subdivide a course of action into component operations for any one of several reasons:

1. To provide for concurrent actions against multiple or widely separated physical objectives.

2. To provide for the efficient fulfillment of certain tasks. Many of the tasks necessitated by security, logistic, and intelligence requirements can best be performed by separate operational or tactical units.

3. In order to promote efficiency within large forces. A carrier striking force may be less effective if tactically integrated with its logistic support ships. In amphibious operations, a movement group may be divided into fast and slow transport groups to reduce the risk from submarines that faster units would face by being at sea longer than necessary.

At this point, the viability of component operations should be considered and, if appropriate, they should be identified.

5.5 STEP 4: IDENTIFY TASKS TO ACCOMPLISH COMPONENT OPERATIONS

The purpose of this step is to identify all the tasks that need to be accomplished in order to carry out the entire mission and to identify the means by which each task might be carried out. If component operations were identified in the previous step, tasks should be grouped by each component operation. A recommended procedure for determining the tasks associated with the component operations is to consider each of the following broad categories of action:

1. Offensive
2. Defensive
3. Support
4. Logistics
5. Intelligence
6. Movement
7. Training
8. Coordination.

It is not necessary that all the tasks identified during this step be incorporated into the directive to subordinate commanders, but the identified tasks need to be considered in sufficient detail to ensure that their accomplishment is feasible. Tasks that the commander need not assign specifically include:

1. Tasks that are appropriate for assignment by a subordinate commander to lower echelon commanders. For example, a commander who intends to subdivide a force into separate movement groups would leave the assignment of warfare tasks within each movement group to the group commanders.

2. Tasks that are matters of standing operating procedure or tactics need not be assigned. For example, ships do not need to be assigned the specific task of protecting themselves against air attack.

The commander may identify some tasks as suitable counteractions against the less probable enemy capabilities. Instead of organizing forces permanently to oppose every enemy capability, the commander may create additional organizations whose forces are assigned on a “when formed” basis. The commander should consider tasks of this type as carefully as other tasks; it is a good planning procedure to list such tasks and complete the planning process for them just as for any other task, even though the subdivisions to carry them out bear the notation “when formed.”

The identification of tasks is complete when there is a comprehensive list of all tasks that need to be performed in order to carry out the course of action together with the means by which each task could be performed.

5.6 STEP 5: DETERMINE ORGANIZATIONAL SUBDIVISIONS

A review of the tasks to be performed and the means available for performing them should suggest several kinds of subdivisions that could be used to conduct the operation. The commander should consider the basic principles of sound command organization listed below when deciding on organizational subdivisions:

1. Unity of effort
2. Centralized direction
3. Decentralized execution.

Unity of effort is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized direction is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of the forces. Decentralized execution is essential because no one commander can
control the detailed actions of a large number of units or individuals.

The commander has the responsibility and authority for planning, preparation, conduct, and sustainment of major operations and campaigns. This authority is vested in a single commander. In planning, the commander should apportion, as necessary, to subordinate commanders the tasks that collectively will accomplish the plan. Each of these immediate subordinate commanders is responsible to the common superior for the accomplishment of those assigned tasks.

The following types of command relationships can be established in organizing joint forces:

1. Combatant command
2. Operational command
3. Operational control
4. Tactical control
5. Support
6. Administrative control
7. Coordinating authority
8. Direct liaison authorized.

5.6.1 Command Authorities

5.6.1.1 Combatant Command. COCOM is the command authority over assigned forces vested only in the theater CINCs. It is defined as the “authority of a combatant commander to perform the functions of command over assigned forces that involve organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command.” COCOM gives full authority to organize and employ forces that the CINC considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. COCOM includes the authority of OPCON. COCOM is exercised only by the commanders of unified and specified combatant commands. COCOM is not transferable to other subordinate commanders.

A combatant commander can exercise COCOM through:

1. Service component commanders
2. Functional component commanders
3. Subordinate unified commander
4. Single-service force commander
5. Joint task force commander
6. Directly to a specific operational force.

5.6.1.2 Operational Control. OPCON is exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below COCOM. It is exercised through the commanders of assigned organizational units or through the commanders of subordinate forces established by the commander exercising OPCON. However, in practice, OPCON is normally exercised through the service component commanders. OPCON can be limited by function, time, or location. In contrast to COCOM, OPCON is transferable within a combatant command on order by the CINC or by agreement between the respective combatant commands and Secretary of Defense.

Specifically, OPCON is the authority delegated to a commander to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces that involve the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission, to include directive authority for joint training. It does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction over logistics or matters such as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training. When applied within NATO, OPCON does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of a unit.

5.6.1.3 Operational Command. OPCO (NATO) allows judicial authority over subordinate forces. It is exercised only by unified or specified commanders. This authority cannot be delegated. When applied within NATO, operational command is the authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational/or tactical control, if required.

5.6.1.4 Tactical Control. TACON is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. It may be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below COCOM and is inherent in OPCON. TACON provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets. It is typically exercised by functional component commanders.
5.6.1.5 Support. Support may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. In general, support could be mutual, general, direct, or close. Mutual support is defined as the actions that units render each other against an enemy because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities. General support requires a force to provide support to a supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. Such a force is authorized to respond directly to the supported force’s request for assistance. Close support is the action of the supporting force against targets near the supported forces. It requires detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force. Direct support is a mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance.

5.6.1.5.1 Supporting Relationships. When the SECDEF or a superior commander decides that one force should aid, assist, protect, or sustain another force, a support relationship will be established between the forces. Two basic components of this relationship exist: “supporting force” (operate “in support of”) and “supported force.” The directive establishing the supporting relationship indicates the purpose of the support in terms of effect desired and the scope of the action to be taken. Normally, it includes the following points:

1. The strength of forces allocated to the supporting mission
2. The time, place, and duration of the supporting effort
3. The priority of the supporting mission relative to other missions of the supporting force
4. The authority, if any, of the supporting force to depart from its supporting missions in the event of an exceptional opportunity or emergency.

The supported commander has primary responsibility for all aspects of a specified contingency or crisis. He is normally a combatant CINC within whose geographic area the contingency is anticipated or the crisis occurs. In general, the supported commander has a degree of authority over the supporting forces that is less than that associated with OPCON.

Unless limited by the directive, the commander of the supported force will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort. This includes the designation of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency. The supported commander should consider the accepted tactical practices of the service of the supporting force. Normally, the forces operating “in support of” will retain their tactics, methods, communications, and procedures.

The supporting commander has the responsibility to ascertain the needs of the supported force and take such action as to fulfill them within his existing capabilities and consistent with the priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks. He can also provide an augmentation force to a designated supported commander. Such support may include the preparation of plans supporting the joint operation plan of the supported commander.

5.6.2 Other Authorities

5.6.2.1 Administrative Control. This is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support. ADCON may be delegated to and exercised by commanders of service forces assigned to a combatant commander at any echelon at or below the level of service component commander. It is synonymous with administration and support responsibilities identified in Title 10, U.S. Code, and is the authority necessary to fulfill Military Department statutory responsibilities. ADCON is subject to the command authority of combatant commanders.

5.6.2.2 Coordinating Authority. This is exercised at any level at or below COCOM. It is used to coordinate functions/activities between two or more services or forces of the same service. It includes the authority to require consultation between various federal agencies; however, that authority in itself cannot compel agreement among the interested parties. The common task to be coordinated will be specified in the establishing directive without disturbing the normal organizational relationships in other matters.

Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship between commanders, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to employment of combat forces.

5.6.2.3 Direct Liaison Authorized. This is that authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. DIRLAUTH is more applicable to planning than operations. It is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised.
5.6.2.3.1 Forces’ Subordination. U.S. forces and assets can have the following types of relationships in respect to higher authority:

1. **Organic** is a unit or force that forms an essential part of a single-service force. It is listed in the respective table of organization and equipment (TO&E).

2. **Apportioned** forces are those made available for deliberate planning. They may include forces and assets in being and those anticipated to be assigned through mobilization. They are apportioned to each CINC in strategic planning documents such as the joint strategic capabilities plan for use in developing joint operations plans and may be more or less than those provided for execution planning or actual execution.

3. **Allocated** forces are those provided for execution planning or actual execution. The allocation of forces and assets is accomplished through procedures established for crisis action planning. In actual execution, allocated, reinforcing forces become assigned forces when they come under the operational command of the receiving commander.

4. **Assigned** forces are those in being that have been placed under the operational command or operational control of the commander. With the advice and assistance of the CJCS, the President prescribes the force structure of the combatant commands.

5. **Reassigned** forces assigned to a combatant command may be transferred from that command only by authority of the SECDEF under procedures approved by the President. When transfer of forces between CINCs is permanent or the broadest level of command and control is required (or desired), forces are reassigned.

6. **An attached** force is a unit/force placed in an organization on a temporary basis. The commander to whom forces and assets are attached will exercise the same degree of command and control over the attached forces as over units and persons organic to his command. When the forces are attached, the establishing directive normally will specify that the gaining CINC will have OPCON over these forces. However, the parent CINC will retain responsibility for administration (including Uniform Code of Military Justice and promotion of personnel) and logistics support for forces attached to another CINC.

5.7 STEP 6: ASSIGN TASKS TO SUBDIVISIONS

During this step, the tasks identified are assigned to the subdivisions decided upon. For each subdivision, list the specific tasks to be assigned and any instructions that apply to it alone. If the tasks to be assigned to each subdivision are expressed in formal language, they can later be copied directly into paragraph 3 (execution) of the directive and into the annexes or OPGENs/OPTASKs that support them. Assign tasks in terms of accomplishment, using the imperative mood rather than the future tense. State task assignments in brief, positive language that cannot be misunderstood.

When wording each task, the commander should allow subordinates maximum latitude for decisionmaking consistent with the need for coordination of operations. A commander should direct how a task is to be accomplished only to the extent that may be required for complete understanding and effective coordination among subordinates. A commander who desires to provide some guidance as to how certain phases of an operation ought to be conducted, but does not wish to assign detailed tasks for every conceivable action may indicate these desires in the Operations Annex. For example: a commander who concludes that airstrikes should be conducted at about X miles from the target, but realizes that conditions may be such that the strike may have to be conducted at some other distance should not assign as a task, “Conduct airstrikes from a position X miles from base Y,” but should instead indicate the desirability of the “X-mile” distance in the Operations Annex.

In order to measure progress and to provide information by which to judge whether the operation will lead to the accomplishment of the mission, the commander determines what information and reports will be required from subordinate commanders. The reporting system should monitor relevant activity and provide meaningful evidence of progress or lack of it.

5.8 STEP 7: ASSIGN FORCES TO SUBDIVISIONS

Having decided upon the manner in which the force is to be subdivided and having assigned tasks to each subdivision of the force, the commander then assigns forces to each subdivision as necessary to execute its assigned tasks. Evaluations of the feasibility (capability of executing the task with the resources assigned) and acceptability (execution estimated results are worth the estimated costs) are also made at this time.
A primary consideration is a balance of force assignments and task assignments so that the feasibility of executing tasks is proportional to their importance. Many other factors influence the assignment of forces to particular subdivisions, such as speed and endurance limitations, states of readiness, current locations or employment, and the presence or absence of teamwork between forces.

From an organizational perspective, the commander is primarily interested in assuring that the subordinates to whom tasks are assigned can accomplish them with the forces allocated. Therefore, the task organization needs to be carried to the point where sufficiency of forces allocated can be judged.

5.9 STEP 8: PROVIDE FOR COORDINATION

In addition to assigning adequate forces to each subdivision, the commander is responsible for providing direction of the mutual support between subdivisions and for coordination of interrelated tasks between two or more subdivisions or between subdivisions and friendly forces. Coordination fosters teamwork, ensures cooperation, and avoids interference and repetition. Coordinating instructions include such items as direction to: correlate own and friendly operations with respect to clock time; prescribe routings; designate rendezvous and operating areas; exchange liaison officers to ensure cooperation; specify measures to prevent mutual interference; security, time, duration of events; and, when applicable, a cancellation date and authority to destroy the directive. The terms of this mutual support and coordination are spelled out in subparagraph 3X (coordinating instructions) of the OPORD. The commander should also consider how to effect coordination with forces of a parallel or superior command. Commanders of tactical units need to provide whatever instructions are necessary to bridge the gap between the superior’s instructions and existing doctrine or standing operating procedures.

Rules of engagement are constraints issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and legal limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement. Consideration of the ROE is an integral part of operational planning whether in peace or war or during transition between peace and war. A clear understanding by all participants of the ROE in effect for an operation is absolutely necessary, and the procedures for their observance should be carefully planned. Reference to ROE should be included in the OPLAN or OPORD.

With the approval of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff promulgate the basic ROE to be used by U.S. Forces and also prescribe procedures for amending the ROE with supplemental measures during crisis or contingency situations. Unified and specified commanders issue ROE for their areas of responsibility based on JCS guidance and, when circumstances require, amend the ROE by activating supplemental measures or by developing specialized ROE tailored to the situation.

Amended ROE and supplemental measures received from higher authority may also contain statements of national and military policy approved by the National Command Authorities. Such policy statements need to be compared carefully with tasking received via operational directives and, when inconsistencies are apparent, clarification should be requested.

Naval forces operating under the operational command of Allied or combined commanders will use rules of engagement promulgated by the Allied or combined higher authority. Requests for amendments or supplemental measures shall be made through the Allied or combined chain of command.

5.10 STEP 9: ESTABLISH COMMAND STRUCTURE

Having assigned forces to the subdivisions and provided for the coordination between the subdivisions, the commander identifies the command structure that will: continue the necessary planning; provide the essential cohesion between component operations; provide for the communications and reports essential to the exercise of command; and execute the operation.

Decisions concerning the command arrangements are included in paragraph 5 (command and control) of the directive. These decisions include:

1. Specifying the location of the commander during the operation
2. Designating the second in command of the overall operation and identifying his location
3. Amplifying command relationships or division of responsibility, if required, including the transfer of command responsibility to enable the command to continue effective operations after command, control, and communications facilities have been destroyed
4. Identifying the communication plan (the communication annex or OGEN ROMEO/OPTASK COMMS)
5. Establishing recognition and identification policy
6. Establishing electronic emission policy
7. Selecting code words and code names
8. Establishing any requirements for liaison officers.

5.11 TYPES OF PLANS

A plan is a method or a scheme of how the commander will synchronize military actions. It is a proposal to carry out a command decision or project. It also helps the staff to synchronize the commander’s decisions and concepts for future or anticipated actions. Since plans concern future actions, they are changeable. As the commander and staff change or adjust their estimates to reflect the analysis of the situation, they must also change, modify or update the associated plans. The essential elements of a plan are a definite COA and a method of execution. A plan may be written or oral. Military plans fall in broad groups.

5.11.1 Operation Plan. An operation plan is a plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based on stated assumptions and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation “plan” is usually used instead of “order” in preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time or on signal, at which time, it is converted to an operation order format.

For the joint operation planning and execution system, an operation plan has been defined in Joint Pub 5-03.1 (JOPES Volume I) as any plan for the conduct of military operations in a hostile environment prepared by a unified or specified commander in response to a requirement established by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and by commanders of subordinate commands in response to requirements tasked by the establishing unified commander. Operation plans in JOPES are prepared in either complete or concept format.

5.11.1.1 Operation Plan in Complete Format. OPLAN is an operation plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as the basis for development of an OPORD. It pertains to a single operation or series of connected operations that the force performs simultaneously or in succession. It is used by a higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. An OPLAN identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the CINC’s strategic concept and a movement schedule of these resources to the theater of operations. The forces and supplies are identified in time-phased force and deployment data files. OPLANs will include all phases of the tasked operation. The plan is prepared with the appropriate annexes, appendices and TPFDD files as described in the JOPES manuals containing planning policies, procedures, and formats. (Refer to format in paragraph C.1.)

5.11.1.2 Operation Plan in Concept Format. CONPLAN is an OPLAN in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. It is prepared when a contingency is not sufficiently critical to require detailed prior planning and flexibility in planning is desired. A CONPLAN contains the CINC’s strategic concept, Annexes A through D and J and K, and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the CINC to complete planning. CONPLANs can be prepared with or without the TPFDD files required for implementation. (Refer to format in paragraph C.2.)

5.11.2 Campaign Plan. A campaign plan is a plan for a series of related joint major operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. Based on a long-range estimate of the situation, a campaign plan expresses the commander’s vision and intent as to the line or lines of action to be followed. Its purpose is to convey the strategic decisions made by the commander so that planning can proceed on an orderly basis and in sufficient time to assemble the means to achieve the assigned objective. The joint format is shown in paragraph C.3.

5.11.3 Functional Plan. A functional plan is a plan involving the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or permissive environment developed by combatant commanders to address requirements such as disaster relief, nation assistance, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, logistics, communications, surveillance, protection of U.S. citizens, nuclear weapon recovery and evacuation, and continuity of operations or similar discrete tasks. They may be developed in response to the requirements of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, at the initiative of the CINC, or as tasked by the supported combat commander; Joint Staff; Service, or Defense agency.
5.11.4 Outline Plan. An outline plan is the general term for a preliminary plan that outlines the salient features or principles of a course of action prior to the initiation of detailed planning. The term “outline” is used to indicate the degree of completeness of a plan; it may be an outline campaign plan, an outline operation plan, an outline logistic plan, or an outline base development plan. It usually follows the format of the type of plan that it outlines; it is more comprehensive than a simple listing of the essential elements but less comprehensive than a complete plan. An outline plan is used most frequently by commanders and their staffs to delineate and test a concept in general form prior to initiating detailed planning. It may also be used to initiate concurrent planning by subordinate commands for complex or extended operations.

5.11.5 Contingency Plan. A contingency plan is a general term used for a plan for major events that can reasonably be anticipated in the principal geographic area of the command. Its purpose is to accelerate the actions that the commander can take to meet a foreseen contingency. It is usually in the form of an operation plan or an outline plan.
CHAPTER 6

Directives

6.1 INTRODUCTION

During Phase II of the military planning logic a plan will be developed from the commander’s estimate of the situation. Then in Phase III that plan, when approved by the commander, is transformed into an order that will be issued to subordinate commanders for execution and to superiors for information. Figure 6-1 displays the flow of information from the CES through the planning process and finally to the appropriate directives.

Broadly speaking, a directive is the principal means used by a commander to state his intentions. It is any communication, written or verbal, that initiates or governs action, conduct, or procedure. Usually it is a military communication in which policy is established or a specific action ordered. It may be transmitted by any means of communication and should be in a format, language, and style familiar both to the originator and to the recipients. Writing a directive that accurately communicates the commander’s desires requires thought and practice. This can be achieved only by practicing the art of writing directives. It is critically important to draft and redraft orders during peacetime exercises. This will make it easier in wartime to write and improvise orders on short notice.

A directive communicates in a formal manner those decisions made earlier during the estimate phase and the planning phase. It provides a common source for the decisions, tasks, and information essential for an operation. If the development of the plan has been carried through completely, preparation of the directive requires only that the substance of the plan be placed in a standard format and that the clerical chores of printing and distributing be undertaken. Because a shared understanding by all participants is basic to the success of any operation, adherence to format is required.

In issuing a directive, a commander should ensure that subordinate commanders understand the situation by providing them with all pertinent information which is available. He must state clearly the tasks to be accomplished by the entire force as well by each subdivision of that force. The commander must provide subordinate commanders sufficient forces and assets to accomplish the assigned task. He must allow subordinate commanders appropriate discretion within their area of responsibility. Moreover, the commander should always take into consideration the personality and ability of each subordinate commander in determining the degree of discretion that can be entrusted to him. (It should be noted that “appropriate discretion” may entail not listing all tasks identified as part of the estimation and planning process, allowing the subordinate commander maximum latitude in developing their section of the mission. This is a choice the commander must weigh carefully.)

Directives should be issued by using the normal chain of command. Bypassing a subordinate commander will not only reduce his prestige in the eyes of his subordinates but also his effectiveness as a leader. On occasion a direct intervention by the higher commander is necessary or unavoidable in an attempt to avoid loss of time or life. If this occurs, the bypassed commander should be informed concurrently or as soon as circumstances allow as to the content and intent of those orders.

6.2 TYPES OF DIRECTIVES

There are two basic types of directives: plans and orders. Plans represent the commander’s preparation for action in the event a particular contingency arises, orders express the commander’s guidance and decision for execution of a particular course of action. The two primary differences between plans and orders are:

1. Orders are based on facts, while plans are based on assumptions that are included in the plan.

2. The time for execution of an order is known and specified, while the situation at the time of a specified occurrence or contingency will govern decisions to be made in the execution of a plan. An order is effective on receipt and could place into effect a plan previously issued or a new plan that the commander intends to issue immediately to his subordinates.
6.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF A GOOD DIRECTIVE

A careful examination of the contents and wording of every directive is necessary in order to deduce what is certain, what is probable, and what is only possible. A well-written directive possesses several key characteristics that ensure the accomplishment of the individual tasks and the overall mission.

1. Clarity — Each executing commander should be able to understand the directive thoroughly. As has been aptly observed, an order which can be misunderstood will be misunderstood. Avoid highly technical language when there is any danger of misinterpretation. Use accepted military terminology and phraseology as an aid to understanding. Avoid the use of jargon. Acronyms should be used sparingly, especially in the textual part of an order as they can be easily mistyped in the transmission and, hence, misunderstood. Write in simple, understandable English and use proper military (doctrinal) terminology and phraseology. Use the terms pertaining to a specific command echelon for whom the directive is intended. If joint doctrinal documents or service manuals are available which define specific terms, do not redefine them.

2. Brevity — A good directive is concise. Avoid superfluous words and unnecessary details, but do not sacrifice clarity and completeness in the interest of brevity alone. State all major tasks of subordinates precisely, but in a manner that will allow each subordinate latitude to exercise initiative. Short sentences are more easily and quickly understood than longer ones. Only when
concurrent operations will require extremely close coordination or timing should a subordinate be told how to perform the task assigned.

3. Positiveness/Authoritative — In the interest of simplicity and clarity, the affirmative form of expression should be used throughout all combat orders and plans. Positiveness of expression suggests the commander’s firmness of purpose and will with consequent inspiration to subordinates to prosecute their tasks with determination. The use of indefinite and weakening expressions leads to suspicion of vacillation and indecision and a lack of confidence on the part of subordinates. Such expressions also tend to impose upon subordinates the responsibilities that belong to and are fully accepted by a resolute higher commander.

6.4 REQUIREMENTS OF A GOOD DIRECTIVE

In addition to the preceding characteristics, a good directive must be written to satisfy the following specific requirements:

1. Simplicity — This requires that all elements are reduced to their simplest forms. All possibilities for misunderstanding must be eliminated.

2. Flexibility — A good plan leaves room for adjustments that unexpected operating conditions might cause. Normally, the best plan provides the commander with the most flexibility.

3. Timeliness — Orders and plans must be disseminated in enough time to allow adequate planning and preparation on the part of subordinate commands. When time is short, the commander may need to accept less than optimum products in the interest of timeliness. Arriving at a 100-percent solution close to the deadline may have less than optimum value; a 100-percent solution that comes too late has no value. Through the use of warning orders, subordinate units can commence their preparation before the receipt of the final order or plan. Concurrent planning saves considerable time.

4. Completeness — The order or plan must contain all the information necessary to coordinate and execute the forthcoming action. It also must provide control measures that are complete, understandable, and that maximize the subordinate commander’s initiative. Only those details or methods of execution necessary to ensure that actions of the subordinate units concerned conform to the concept of operation for the force as a whole should be prescribed. Subordinates should not have to ask for additional data. Avoid unnecessary duplication, particularly when it is known that the annexes of a senior’s directive are held by subordinate commanders. It is usually unnecessary for a commander to include annexes from a senior’s directive.

5. Provides for the Necessary Organization — A good plan clearly establishes command and support relationships and fixes responsibilities.

6. Provides for Control — A directive must ensure adequate control means (headquarters and communications) to carry out the plan according to the commander’s intent.

7. Provides for Centralized Planning — The commander’s mission, intent, and concept of operation underlie all plans and orders. Subordinate and supporting commanders at each command echelon develop plans and orders to fully support their commander’s plan or orders. This ensures the synergy that maximizes combat power of one’s own and friendly forces.

8. Provides for Decentralized Execution — The commander delegates authority to subordinate and supporting commanders and tells them what he wants accomplished. He expects subordinates to seize and retain the initiative by aggressively and creatively executing his plan. The commander’s control over subordinate commanders enhances synchronization and minimizes exposure to fratricide. In turn, subordinate and supporting commanders ensure the plan provides for decentralized execution at the next lower echelon. This unfetters subordinate commanders, stimulating them to do what they must, when and where they must, while accomplishing the mission in keeping with the commander’s intentions. They can then seize opportunities while the higher commander reviews courses of action to exploit success.

9. Balance — A good directive provides balance between centralization and decentralization. It is essential to decentralize decisionmaking authority to the lowest practical level. Overcentralization slows action, leads to inertness, and contributes to loss of initiative. However, decentralization can cause loss of precision. Hence, the commander must constantly balance competing risks while recognizing that loss of precision is usually preferable to inaction.
10. Provides for Coordination — A well-coordinated plan provides for direct contact among subordinates; fits together all combat power elements for synchronized, decisive action; imposes only necessary and doctrinally correct control measures; and helps identify and provide for mutual support requirements while minimizing the force’s exposure to fratricide.

11. Addresses Critical Facts and Assumptions — The commander and staff evaluate all facts and assumptions. They retain for future reassessment only those critical facts and assumptions which directly affect success or failure of a given military action.

12. Provides for the Decisive Employment of Forces — A plan or order must include resources organic to the organization and those available from higher headquarters. A good plan also provides subordinate commanders with sufficient resources to accomplish their missions.

13. Recognizes Subordinate Commanders’ Prerogatives — The order or plan should not except on rare occasions (e.g., saving lives) violate subordinate commanders’ prerogatives.

6.5 FIVE-PARAGRAPH FORMAT

Directives frequently use what is known as the standard five-paragraph format. The directive body consists of a task organization and five numbered paragraphs: situation, mission, execution, administration and logistics, and command and control. It may also contain two free text paragraphs preceding Paragraph 1 and titled operation description and narrative. There is an additional (optional) free text paragraph entitled objective that follows paragraph 5 of the basic order or plan. The format, particularly the numbering of the paragraphs, will vary when in message text format; however, the basic structure will remain the same. Examples of various plan and order formats are provided in Appendixes C and D, respectively, to include an expanded discussion of each paragraph’s content and use.

The format of the plan/order is not the most important aspect. It is the way an order or plan has been written that is critical. A former President of the Naval War College, Admiral Knight, said in so many words: “Back of all these features of convenience, however, lies something which is of vastly greater value. This is the spirit of which the form is the vehicle — a spirit which dictates a relation between superior and subordinate in which the one avails himself of the intelligence, initiative, and loyalty of the other to forward the ends which we may assume that both have equally in view.”

6.5.1 Paragraph 1, Situation. The commander summarizes whatever information about the general situation is necessary to permit subordinates to understand the background for the planned operation. Paragraph 1 will often contain the following subparagraphs:

1. Enemy forces
2. Friendly forces
3. Attachments and Detachments
4. Assumptions (used in plans only).

6.5.2 Paragraph 2, Mission. Here the commander inserts his own mission statement, developed during the first step of the commander’s estimate.

6.5.3 Paragraph 3, Execution. This paragraph contains the commander’s concept of operations for the course of action chosen as a result of the commander’s estimate and then sets out the task assignments developed during the planning phase. The commander’s intent and vision that define the purpose of the operation is also stated in this paragraph.

6.5.4 Paragraph 4, Administration and Logistics. This paragraph contains directions and essential information about administrative and logistics arrangements and procedures.

6.5.5 Paragraph 5, Command and Control. This paragraph describes command arrangements, including the location of the commander, the name and location of the second in command, and the plan for communications.

6.5.6 Subparagraphs. There is no restriction on the number of subparagraphs. All paragraphs and subparagraphs will be given headings. Underlining of headings is optional.

6.5.7 Paragraph Integrity. Paragraphs 1a, 1b, 1c, 2, 3, 4, and 5 and their headings will always appear in an operation order. Terms such as “No Change,” “See Intelligence Summary No. _____,” and “Nil” (no information to enter) after a paragraph heading should be used as necessary to maintain the integrity of the paragraphing and the brevity of the order.
6.5.8 Annexes. To keep the directive as simple and understandable as possible, details are placed in annexes. Annexes contain detailed procedures and amplifying information. Typical annexes include plans for evolutions (such as for battle, search, movement, undersea warfare, and air warfare), instructions necessary for command and control (such as the communications plan), and information too complex to be covered completely in the basic plan (such as the detailed concept of operations, the logistics plan, and the complete task organization). Each annex will be listed under Annexes in the ending and may be referenced in the appropriate part of the body. Annexes should not include matters covered in an SOP, where appropriate reference could be made to an SOP. Annexes also allow for the selective distribution of certain information.

6.6 CHANGES TO DIRECTIVES

Changes to directives may be promulgated by any means that provides the necessary security. Changes are customarily numbered serially and a record of changes entered is kept in each copy of the directive. The number and extent of changes should be held to a minimum by careful planning. Some changes are inevitable, but every effort should be made to reduce the clerical work involved in entering them. This can be done by replacing whole pages and by correcting copies to the extent possible before the directive is first distributed.

Page change is preferable to a pen change. It is generally more economical, provides neater, more legible copy, and reduces the time expended in making changes and the probability of error. Pen changes should not be used when the time required for a single addressee to enter all changes on a single sheet (two sides) of paper would exceed that required to remove a superseded sheet and insert a new one. Paste-ins shall not be used.

When a revised page contains only a few significant changes from the superseded page, a vertical line shall be placed in the outside margin opposite each change. When a page contains a more significant change, a vertical line shall be placed alongside the first line or heading of the paragraph or other appropriate heading to identify the changed material.

The change number shall be entered in parentheses immediately following the page number. The word “change” shall be abbreviated as “CH” and followed by a hyphen and the change number. For example: “371 (CH-1)” (page 371, Change 1). No other entry of the change number on each individual page is necessary.

Advance and interim changes are sometimes necessary for rapid promulgation of vital information. They may be attached to the basic publication in lieu of incorporating the change, pending receipt of the normally promulgated change, provided that a notation is made at the appropriate page or paragraph. Interim changes are customarily numbered serially and also to indicate the normally promulgated change within which they will be incorporated. For example, “Interim Change 2/3” is the second of the series of interim changes that will later be incorporated within change number three.

Directions for distribution of a directive apply also to the distribution of a change to the directive.
CHAPTER 7
Orders

7.1 INTRODUCTION

An order is defined as a communication, written, oral, or by signal that conveys instruction from a superior to a subordinate. In a broad sense, the terms “order” and “command” are synonymous. However, an order implies discretion as to the details of execution, while a command does not. An order expresses the commander’s guidance and decision as well as approved branches and sequels. It includes annexes only when absolutely necessary and when they are pertinent to the entire command.

Continuous communication between the higher commanders and subordinate forces or units is maintained through orders from above and messages and reports from below. In general, a commander should always know where his subordinate units are and what orders they have. Hence, comprehensive knowledge of the situation is an absolute prerequisite for issuing correct and appropriate orders. The lower command echelons are duty bound to unconditionally report to the higher commander on the situation as soon as possible. If everyone understands the situation, then the orders will be issued easier, more clearly, and provide more uniform cooperation.

A commander should issue no more orders than necessary. Planning beyond the situation that can be anticipated should be avoided because the situation changes rapidly in combat. Very rarely will orders issued be able to anticipate far in advance and in any detail of the real situation. If that situation differs considerably from the one envisaged in the basic order, the confidence of the subordinate commander in a higher commander will be undermined. The higher the authority, the shorter and more general orders should be. The next lower command adds what further precision appears necessary. The detail of the execution is left to the verbal orders of command. Each level thereby retains freedom of action and decision within his authority.

The first and foremost duty of the commander is that he commands. He should not allow things to proceed as chance leads them. Clearly, the commander must personally see how his orders are being carried out.

7.2 TYPES OF ORDERS

Orders can be combat or routine. Combat orders pertain to combat employment of forces at any level and attendant combat service support. They may be issued initially as a plan, to become an order at some future time, either specified or as stated contingencies arise. Routine (administrative) orders deal with normal administrative matters, such as general, special, and letter orders; court-martial orders; bulletins; circulars; and memorandums. Specifically, an administrative order is an order covering traffic, supplies, maintenance, evacuation, personnel, and other administrative details.

7.2.1 Warning Order. A WO is a preliminary notice of an order or action that is to follow at some future date. It may be issued to alert subordinate commands to impending operations and to give subordinates time to make necessary plans and preparations. These orders are intended to provide subordinates maximum planning time, provide essential details of the impending operation, and detail major timeline events that will occur with mission execution. In crisis action procedures, a CJCS warning order initiates development and evaluation of courses of action by a supported commander and requests that a commander’s estimate be submitted. The JOPES format for a warning order is shown in paragraph D.2.

The amount of detail a WO includes depends on several factors, but primarily on the available time, communications, and the information subordinate commanders need for proper planning and preparation. The WO must clearly inform the subordinate commander of what tasks he must do now as well as possible future tasks. A WO may include the following information (in sequence):

1. Required maps or charts (if changed from the current OPORD)
2. The enemy situation, events, and probable mission, tasks and procedures
3. The higher headquarters’ mission
4. The commander’s intent statement (when available)

5. The earliest time of movement or deployment or degree of notice the commander gives to the main body (this includes the “no move/deploy before” period)

6. Orders for preliminary action, reconnaissance, surveillance, and observations

7. Service support instructions

8. The rendezvous point or time for assembling or concentrating friendly forces.

7.2.2 Planning Order. In crisis action procedures, a planning order is an order issued by the CJCS to the supported commander to initiate execution planning. The planning order will normally follow the CES and may take the place of a CJCS alert order. NCA approval of the selected COA is not required. The JOPES format for a planning order is shown in paragraph D.3.

7.2.3 Alert Order. An alert order is an order issued by competent authority that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of execution planning. In crisis action procedures, an alert order is a directive authorized by the Secretary of Defense and issued by the CJCS that provides essential guidance for planning and directs the initiation of execution planning for the selected COA. The JOPES format for an alert order is shown in paragraph D.4.

7.2.4 Operation Order. The choice of a COA and the subsequent planning to carry out that action with available forces culminates in the issuing of an “operation order.” An operation order is a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Since it is an order to conduct an operation, it normally does not contain assumptions. Unless otherwise stated, an operation order is effective from the date and time it is signed. An operation plan already issued that contains appropriate tasking may be implemented as an order with changes as necessary; in which case, the promulgation of a separate operation order is not required.

All OPORDs have the following commonalities:

1. Use the standard five-paragraph format

2. Provide a mission statement (WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, and WHY)

3. Convey the commander’s intent, concept of operation, and decisions to subordinates

4. Specify an execution time and date

5. Explain the scheme of maneuver

6. Provide subordinates with sufficient forces and assets

7. Provide a completed overlay that graphically illustrates many of the operation’s details, including the mission statement (paragraph 2); the commander’s intent and concept of operation (paragraph 3a)

8. Enhance initiative

9. Allow for synchronization and agility while minimizing exposure to fratricide

10. Provide major subordinate elements in the task organization that are critical to understanding the commander’s intent.

Subordinate commanders may issue an OPORD in cases when:

1. The situation requires deliberate execution.

2. The enemy force is capable of a major, strong, effective, and synchronized action.

3. There is sufficient time available for planning.

4. The friendly forces are not familiar with each other’s SOPs.

The JOPES format for an operation order is shown in paragraph D.1.

7.2.5 Execute Order. An execute order is an order issued by competent authority to initiate military operations as directed. In crisis action procedures, an execute order is issued by the CJCS at the direction of the Secretary of Defense to initiate an NCA decision to initiate military operations. The JOPES format for an execute order is shown in paragraph D.5.

7.2.6 Fragmentary Orders. A series of FRAGOs may be issued after the basic OPORD to change or modify the desired sequence of events. They are usually issued in the form of a brief oral or written messages and contain timely changes of existing orders to subordinate and supporting commanders while providing notification to higher and adjacent commands.

A FRAGO addresses only those parts of the original OPORD that have changed. The sequence of the OPORD is used and all five paragraph headings must be used.
After each heading, the issuing commander or headquarters will send either “No Change” or the new information, regardless of the paragraph. This ensures that subordinate commanders know (especially if the message is sent over the radio) they have received the entire FRAGO.

In general, a FRAGO should provide:

1. The mission statement
2. The commander’s intent and concept of operation
3. Pertinent extracts taken from more detailed orders
4. Task organization if modified
5. Minimal control measures that promote initiative, synchronization, and agility while minimizing exposure to fratricide
6. Timely changes to existing orders.

When possible, the FRAGO includes a brief outline of the situation. It also refers to previous orders and provides a brief and specific set of instructions. The issuing command designates FRAGOs with the proper classification and requests acknowledgment from the command to which it is issued.

During the execution phase of a military action, it might be necessary to issue supplementary orders to address a new or changed situation. Because modern means of communication allow this to be done quickly, commanders are frequently tempted to intervene. However, excessive use of FRAGOs tend to confuse the execution of even the best of plans.

7.2.7 Letter of Instruction. The term “letter of instruction” is applied most often to documents prescribing guidance and control of the operations of a large command over a considerable period for an impending operation. Normally, an LOI states the concept, mission, command relationships, and area of operations; gives special instructions such as communication requirements; assigns forces; sets forth planning responsibilities; and specifies reports that are required. It may also be used to convey general policy guidance of an operational nature that is not suitable for promulgation by formal operation plan or operation order.

7.2.8 Standing Operating Procedures. SOP are a set of instructions covering those features of operations that lend themselves to a definite standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. The procedure is applicable unless ordered otherwise.

7.2.9 Initiating Directive. In amphibious operations, the initiating directive is an order to the commander amphibious task force to conduct amphibious operations, issued by the commander delegated overall responsibility for the operation. An initiating directive may take the form of a campaign plan, an operation plan, or an order to execute an already existing plan or order.

7.2.10 Maritime Tactical Messages (OPGEN/OPTASK/OPSTAT). The formatted messages included in the maritime tactical message system provide a standardized method for conveying operational instructions for Allied naval forces (refer to APP 4 and ATP 1 Vol 1). The MTMS messages provide a method for ordering specific tasks and/or exchanging information required to control a force at sea. They are used for naval operations but not for joint operations. The following message types are used in the MTMS:

1. OPGEN — General matters of policy, instructions, and aspects common to all forms of warfare and detailed instructions for warfare responsibilities retained by the officer in tactical command.
2. OPTASK — Detailed information for specific aspects within individual areas of warfare and for tasking of resources.
3. OPSTAT — Aspects of information exchange, particularly reporting of operational status.

7.2.11 Administrative/Logistics Orders (ADMIN/LOGO). Provide for coordinated combat service support for the command.
CHAPTER 8

Supervision of the Planned Action

8.1 INTRODUCTION

Rarely will an operation be executed exactly as planned. No matter how carefully planning has been done, the action as it unfolds will differ from the action as planned because of a variety of factors. For example, the directive from higher authority may have been misunderstood; some of the facts that formed the basis for the original estimate or the subsequent plan may have been wrong; the enemy may have chosen an unexpected course of action; the effect of a course of action may have produced results different from those expected; the effects of enemy action may have hampered own forces in unexpected ways; or there may have been misunderstandings, mistakes, and errors of judgment. As these factors are recognized, their effects on mission accomplishment need to be estimated and adjustments to organization and tasking of subordinate commanders developed and considered.

The process of recognizing differences, estimating effects, and considering adjustments in a timely manner is known as supervision of the planned action (see Figure 8-1). Supervision of the planned action falls naturally into two phases: planning for supervision before the action begins and supervision as the action unfolds.

8.2 PLANNING FOR SUPERVISION OF ACTION

Preparation for supervision of the planned action is a process that begins in the estimate phase and continues through the planning phase. During the mission analysis in the estimate phase, it should be possible to identify which indicators the commander’s superior will monitor as evidence of the commander’s progress, success, or failure. During the planning phase, the commander should determine what reports he will need from subordinates in order to evaluate progress toward accomplishment of the mission.

The reporting that permits a commander to supervise a planned action is often called “feedback.” The commander should first examine the feedback system in place to determine whether it will support the information needs of the specific operation. Standard, routine reports may or may not suffice. A brief summary of the standard operational reporting system used for reporting information about the planned initiation, termination, and results of military operations is provided later in this chapter. To ensure that the feedback system is relevant, the commander should review the objectives of the tasks assigned to subordinate commanders, identify indicators that should show progress toward these objectives, and make provision for monitoring them. Unless the feedback system provides true indications of achievement, the commander may be burdened with irrelevant data and yet lack information on which to base decisions about modifying the plan.

8.3 SUPERVISION OF UNFOLDING ACTION

Once a commander has organized and tasked assigned forces, the essential decision is whether or not to change the organization and tasks. As the action unfolds, the commander needs to make timely use of information received to decide whether or not to reappropriate strength to meet new conditions. Decisions could range from a simple modification of a single task to a radical departure from the selected course of action that involves reorganization of the forces and the assignment of new tasks. Making such a decision is facilitated by continuous planning known, for convenience, as the running estimate.

A running estimate requires no fixed form; it can be a chart overlay on which the commander keeps track of own forces and all current intelligence or a detailed record of all that occurs. The essence of the running estimate is a continuing focus on those aspects of the mission, the situation, and the enemy’s capabilities that were crucial in the commander’s course of action decision and in his subsequent plan. The currency of a running estimate depends on relevant feedback, on reliable communications, and on an effectively organized, well-trained command center team that can provide the commander with an accurate and uncluttered picture of the unfolding action.
8.4 INTRODUCTION OF CHANGES

The commander should ask himself three questions in deciding whether a change in tasking and/or organization should be made:

1. Is the mission being accomplished?
2. If not, what factors or assumptions have changed?
3. Do the changed factors require modification to the course of action or to the plan?

Figure 8-1 shows how the answers to these questions determine where the modification planning should begin. If the mission is being accomplished, the answer to the first question is “yes,” and the commander continues to monitor the execution of the plan. The answer to the second question indicates the extent to which the basic factors have changed. When the factors that determined the course of action have changed, a new commander’s estimate may be required. When only the organization and/or tasking of subordinates need to be reconsidered, the point of reentry is the start of the development of the plan. Identifying which factors have changed and how these factors were used during the planning process should indicate the proper place at which to recommence planning. In any case, the fact that subordinate commanders are already executing tasks previously assigned becomes an important factor in the planning and consideration of the dislocation and confusion that would be caused by any changes needs to be taken into account.

8.5 OPERATIONAL REPORTING

The OPREP system has been developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the reporting of essential information concerning the planning, initiation, termination, and results of military operations. The OPREP system also provides for the reporting of any event or incident that may attract national level interest, whether or not it is related to possible military involvement.

There are two general categories of operational reports: operational status reports (OPREPs 1, 2, 4, and 5) and event/incident reports (OPREP 3).

8.5.1 Operational Status Reports. The initiation of OPREPs 1, 2, 4, and 5 may be implemented at the direction of the commander of a unified command, a service headquarters, or a lower command when and where operations may justify. Implementation directives identify which reports are required and contain
specific information on their content. Implementing instructions also specify submission times and report frequency. The four operational status reports are:

1. **OPREP 1: Operations Planning Report** — This report is used to describe planned operations for specific situations.

2. **OPREP 2: Operations Start Report** — This report is used to execute a plan or fragment of a plan or to advise in conjunction with an OPREP 1 that an operation has started.

3. **OPREP 4: Operations Stop/Results Report** — This report is used to advise of the completion of an operation or phase of an operation and its results or estimated results.

4. **OPREP 5: Operations Summary Report** — This report is designed to provide summarized statistical data.

### 8.5.2 Event/Incident Reports

An OPREP 3 is normally the first indication received by a senior authority that an incident has occurred that is of national interest or of high U.S. Navy interest. OPREP 3 includes two series: PINNACLE, for reporting incidents of interest at a high national level; NAVY BLUE, for reporting incidents that are not of national interest but are of great concern to the Chief of Naval Operations and other senior naval commanders.

### 8.5.3 References

The basic reference for operational status reports is Joint Pub 1-03.3 and for event/incident reports, Joint Pub 1-03.6. Additional information on the joint reporting system can be found in other publications in the Joint Pub 1-03 series. Navy users may refer to OPNAVINST 3100.6 series. Combat readiness reporting requirements (UNITREP) are prescribed in OPNAVINST C3501.66 series. Other operational reports, including casualty reports and movement reports are prescribed in NWP 1-03.1.

### 8.6 RUNNING ESTIMATES

#### 8.6.1 Intelligence Running Estimate

Until the operation begins, the work of the intelligence officer may be regarded as essential but not proven. As the action unfolds, the accuracy of intelligence estimates and the utility of intelligence planning will become apparent. Assessment of enemy capabilities and planning for collecting, recording, processing, and disseminating intelligence do not end with the promulgation of the intelligence annex. It is essential that the intelligence officer be ready to revise intelligence estimates, plans, and products based on new information.

Any perceived changes in the nature of an enemy capability or the probability of its adoption should be communicated immediately to the commander. The initial intelligence estimate as well as the intelligence annex promulgated in the plan are not final statements of enemy capabilities; they are best estimates only at the moment when they are made. The intelligence officer, therefore, keeps abreast of all the changing factors of the operation and maintains a running estimate to update enemy capabilities and to reassess the likelihood of their adoption. The running intelligence estimate simply continues the intelligence process that was set in motion by the assignment of the mission. The intelligence estimate and the intelligence annex may be regarded as interim reports during a continuing running estimate.

#### 8.6.1.1 Format

Forms can be devised for the preparation of a running estimate, but they serve as guides only. More important than format is the identification of the key factors on which the commander has based his decisions. The most useful format is one that serves to remind the commander and the staff of these factors. Overlays, plots, and short summaries are the most flexible and probably the best vehicles for presenting the running estimate, presentation being less formal than in other steps of the intelligence process. If the running estimate is maintained in a looseleaf binder, material can be inserted or deleted without modifying the entire document.

#### 8.6.1.2 Revisions

Any revisions to the relative order in which an enemy is expected to adopt courses of action are particularly important because such revisions may result in extensive changes to the commander’s plan. If the intelligence officer is familiar with the friendly situation as well as the enemy’s capabilities, he is in a better position to appreciate what choices the enemy is likely to make. In a sense, the running intelligence estimate is an attempt to duplicate the enemy’s staff work: The intelligence officer views the situation from the perspective of the enemy commander, and analyzes courses of action available as if writing the enemy commander’s estimate.

#### 8.6.1.3 Communications

Extensive reporting of information during an operation, just when the need for precise facts about the enemy becomes more detailed and exacting, may be difficult because of the great increase of operational traffic. An intelligence officer who has planned well will have received and processed all background and long-term information before the operation becomes intense. Message requests should be held to a minimum during the action and should be brief and precise, requesting only significant information that was clearly unobtainable during the preaction phase. Communications loading considerations also will affect the intelligence process.
officer’s dissemination of intelligence during the conduct of the operation.

8.6.1.4 Postoperation Intelligence Assessment. The intelligence officer’s responsibility during an action is primarily to provide a continuing assessment of enemy capabilities. The first task after the operation has ended is to determine the damage inflicted on the enemy to assist the commander in determining the extent to which the assigned mission was accomplished.

More vital to subsequent operations, however, is a detailed assessment of the accuracy of earlier intelligence estimates. The intelligence officer, no less than other division heads, has the duty of identifying errors and omissions once the operation is completed. If intelligence estimates failed to take into account some enemy capability, whether or not it was chosen, that fact should be noted as well as any failures in the collection schedule and any significant criticisms of the intelligence annex.

8.6.1.5 Action Reports. Upon the conclusion of the operation, the most immediate duty of the intelligence officer is the preparation of an intelligence annex to the commander’s action report. It should discuss the effects of the intelligence provided to the command, including its accuracy, utility, and shortcomings, as well as any pertinent recommendations that might affect similar operations in the future. The intelligence officer should regard the operation as a part of the basic body of intelligence to be used by other intelligence officers in planning for future operations. The intelligence officer should also evaluate and disseminate any new information regarding either the enemy or the area of operations that has been acquired as a result of the operation.

8.6.1.6 Intelligence Recommendations. The intelligence officer should use the period between operations for a comprehensive assessment and review of techniques. The aim should be to improve management of the intelligence cycle and to provide others in the intelligence organization with the benefits of practical experience. Any factual intelligence that has been learned, whether it deals with enemy tactics, techniques, capabilities, or potentialities, becomes a part of the Navy’s permanent intelligence reference files.

The intelligence officer’s responsibility is a dual one: first, to provide the commander with intelligence necessary for the successful conduct of operations; second, to channel suitable material into the naval intelligence system. Any recommendations regarding the practicability of particular intelligence arrangements or techniques resulting from battle experience, provided they are not too complicated or do not involve a fundamental revision to intelligence policy, should be recommended in the action report. In cases requiring fundamental revisions or lengthy discussion, a special report should be submitted.

8.6.1.7 The Intelligence Cycle. With the final step of dissemination, whether it is the issuance of the action report or the forwarding of special recommendations, the intelligence cycle automatically renews itself. For a specific operation, the intelligence cycle commences upon receipt of a mission and ceases when action is completed and final reports have been made; yet the intelligence cycle for one operation is merely one phase of a continuing strategic intelligence cycle. Recording and processing invariably suggest new collection possibilities. The process constantly repeats as each step in the cycle leads inevitably into the next.

8.6.2 Logistics Running Estimate. As is the case with the supervision of planned operational and intelligence action, logistics supervision begins in the planning stage. The ability to deliver the right kind of support at the right place at the right time is usually dependent upon how well requirements were anticipated during the planning phase. During the execution phase, the information needed to supervise the action will be derived or deduced from incoming reports.

Reports required for supervision of the logistics action need to be reviewed carefully to ensure they will contain timely, accurate, and pertinent information upon which necessary logistic decisions can be made. Communications limitations can be expected in a wartime environment, so it is imperative that only essential reporting be made mandatory.

The logistics officer may recommend to the commander that reporting limits be established for critical war fighting items such as specific ammunition, fuels, and stores. No reports need be required until the established limit is reached. The commander is really not interested in daily ammunition status reports from ships that have not expended ordnance, but he becomes increasingly interested when a ship has reached the “limit” level established. Limit-level reporting will eliminate needless reports as well as produce timely action when received.

Operational reports from units contain a wealth of explicit and implicit logistic information from which the logistician can anticipate future requirements. Only by being operationally attuned to the situation can the logistician achieve and maintain the logistic flexibility necessary to assist in the successful accomplishment of the mission. Besides monitoring the operational and reporting traffic and taking the appropriate action for the
logistic support of the forces, the logistician should remain fully cognizant of the support provided by supporting commanders. If planned resupply does not materialize, options or alternatives need to be developed for the commander, including new courses of action. Both the commander and the logistician need to remain aware that logistics imposes outer limits on available course of action.

8.6.3 Communications Running Estimate. No communications plan, no matter how well prepared, can possibly provide for every eventuality that may arise during an operation. The communications planner assists the commander in the supervision of planned action and subsequent amendment of the plan, if required, by maintaining a running estimate of the communications situation. To be in a position at all times to advise the commander and key staff members concerning the state of communications, the communications officer may need to receive reports on the status of circuits and facilities and to monitor changes in the operation itself in order to recognize when requirements have changed or their priorities have shifted.

Effective communications support requires close, continuing supervision. The communications planner needs to remain sensitive to the changing needs of command for communications support as well as to the performance of the communications system. If the running estimate of the communications situation discloses serious communication inadequacies, the communications officer should initiate changes to overcome them. He needs to recognize, however, that once a directive has been issued, the benefit from changing it needs to exceed the disruption that the change will cause.

As in all areas of planning described in this publication, the execution phase becomes the “moment of truth” when the adequacy (or inadequacy) of prior planning becomes apparent. Whatever adjustments are required to accomplish the mission must be undertaken, and the lessons learned from the operation need to be captured for their value to planners of subsequent operations.
APPENDIX A

Commander’s Estimate of the Situation
Instructional Worksheet

Joint Military Operations Department
Naval War College
PREFACE

This document is intended to provide a generic, that is, universally applicable commander’s estimate of the situation for any military problem requiring the employment of combat forces. It is based on the Navy’s NWP 5-01, Operational Planning; U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College Warfighting Book Academic Year 1991-92; MCDP-6, Command and Control; the series of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College publications: ST 100-9, The Tactical Decision Making Process (July 1991 and July 1993 editions) and ST 101-5, Command And Staff Decision Processes (February 1996), Battle Command: Leadership and Decision Making for War and Operations Other than War (Draft 2.1), and the U.S. Army FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations. A conscious decision was made to keep the worksheet as generic as possible. Therefore, any reference to various decisionmaking and planning methods at the operational and strategic level has been avoided. However, the format of the worksheet was changed to accommodate the requirements of conducting the estimate regardless of the size of the forces and the physical environment and the scale of the objectives to be accomplished. The new format of the estimate is also intended to be applied across the full range of military operations from military operations other-than-war to a war.

The most significant changes to this edition of the worksheet are:

1. Increased discussion of the commander’s intent
2. Increased discussion of risk assessment
3. Revised Step 5: Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action, increased discussion of measures of effectiveness.

Electronic copies of this worksheet are available through the Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, commercial phone 401-841-6458, DSN 948-6458.

Note

Wherever the term “own” is used throughout this workbook, it is assumed to include “friendly” (i.e., alliance/coalition) considerations as well.
A.1 COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

Military commanders constantly make decisions. Everyday, they and their staffs resolve many simple, routine, and/or complex problems. To help them think through their options, while applying their knowledge, experience, and judgment, military commanders use a decisionmaking tool called the commander’s estimate of the situation.

A.1.1 Purpose. The estimate of the situation is a logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting a military situation as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish a mission. Joint Pub 1-02 defines the CES as “a logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission.”

In the estimate, the commander evaluates all the elements of a situation that affect the employment of forces and assets. The decision to select a certain COA is the basis for the development of plans and the issuing of combat orders. The commander’s estimate also transmits the decision to the next higher command echelon for approval.

While the commander’s estimate process provides a framework to ensure that no matter of importance is omitted, rigid adherence to the form, or faulty application of the commander’s estimate may lead to a strictly formal process of rationalization. Consequently, clarity of thinking could be undermined if most of the mental effort is spent on the formalities rather than on the estimate itself. The result may or may not be a decision that is sound.

A.1.2 Criteria. The commander’s estimate should lead to the adoption of a COA that is:

1. Adequate (one that accomplishes the mission)
2. Feasible (one that allows for the accomplishment of the assigned mission with forces and assets available)
3. Acceptable (one that is worth the estimated cost or risks).

A.1.3 Type. The commander’s estimate is the first and most critical phase in the military planning process. It is conducted at all command echelons: tactical, operational, and theater-strategic. The estimate at the tactical level is used to prepare, plan, and conduct a tactical action (battle, engagement, etc.). Operational commanders use the estimate to plan and conduct campaigns and major operations in a war (or MOOTW if so directed by the respective combatant commander). Normally, a geographic combatant commander (CINC) will also prepare a strategic estimate during peacetime as an integral part of the deliberate planning process. In time of crisis or on the outbreak of large-scale hostilities, the theater CINC will also conduct a strategic estimate. This could also be used as a basis for eventual planning for a campaign or series of campaigns (for war or MOOTW). The commander’s estimate is also one of the CINC’s principal tools for sending necessary guidance to his staff and subordinate commanders.

A.1.4 Scope. The CES should be, within available time constraints, as comprehensive as possible. It may vary from a short, almost instantaneous mental estimate to a carefully written document that requires days of preparation and the collaboration of many staff officers. Time available to complete the estimate is an important factor in the CES process. Normally, the commander should consider allocating one-third of the available planning time to the staff and two-thirds to subordinate and component commanders who also must complete their planning process before the execution of a given military action.

A.1.5 Format. The format of the estimate should not prevent a commander from selecting the best method of arriving at a sound solution to a military problem. The steps in the commander’s estimate may be expanded or condensed according to the nature of a problem. However, to maintain the logical sequence of reasoning, the steps of the estimate should be generally followed.

Most of the staff divisions (i.e., J-1, J-2, J-3, etc. or service counterparts) prepare their own estimates of the situation. Pertinent parts of these staff estimates are then inserted, verbatim or in modified form, into the CES.

A.1.6 Generic Estimate of the Situation. While JP 5-03.1, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures), discusses the requirement for submission of a CES, it does not provide guidance for conducting one. For instructional purposes, this worksheet provides a discussion of how to conduct an
estimate of the situation regardless of the scope of military action to be taken. It includes most of the elements used in the commander’s estimate at all command echelons. Where appropriate, references to formats or guidance contained in joint doctrine publications, or recommended formats are provided. The CES conducted by the other Services may differ in format and detail, but all address similar issues.

The generic commander’s estimate consists of seven principal steps:

Step 1: Mission Analysis
Step 2: Analysis of Factors Affecting Possible Courses of Action
Step 3: Enemy Courses of Action
Step 4: Own Courses of Action
Step 5: Analysis of Enemy Courses of Action and Own Courses of Action
Step 6: Comparison of Own Courses of Action
Step 7: The Decision.

Note that in practice these steps may not take place in the sequence listed, but might occur almost simultaneously with each other. Additionally, subordinate — or even superior commanders — will be conducting their own CES that require inputs from your own command’s CES process. These steps are described and analyzed here sequentially for instructional purposes only.

A.2 STEP 1: MISSION ANALYSIS

The mission analysis is a part of the problemsolving technique that a military commander uses to study the assigned mission and to identify all tasks necessary to accomplish the mission. Understanding the mission analysis process is critical because it provides the proper direction to the commander and the staff, enabling them to focus effectively on the problem at hand. Mission analysis and subsequent restatement of the commander’s mission are necessary because the command’s contribution to the achievement of the superior’s mission will be, at a minimum, affected by forces assigned and available, their capabilities and readiness, and other limitations imposed by higher authorities.

The mission is the primary factor in the estimate because it is an integral part of each subsequent step in the commander’s mental process of reaching a sound decision. The commander is solely responsible for analyzing the mission and restating the mission for subordinate commanders to begin their own estimate and planning efforts.

During the mission analysis process, it is essential that the task(s) and its (their) purpose are clearly stated; limitations (constraints or restraints) on actions that the commander or subordinate forces may take are understood; intangible physical objectives are identified; specified and implied tasks are determined; and the correlation between the commander’s mission and those of superior and other commanders are understood.

When the commander receives the mission tasking — normally through a warning order or planning guidance — analysis begins with the following questions:

1. What tasks must my command do for the mission to be accomplished?
2. What is the purpose of the mission received?
3. What limitations have been placed on my own forces’ actions?

Once these questions have been answered, the commander can thoroughly understand the mission. The commander should be familiar with the area and the situation before initiating analysis and issuing planning guidance, particularly if this is a mission not anticipated by the command. An initial staff briefing sets the stage for the impending
action and the beginning of preliminary estimates. Pertinent and significant facts are identified, and the assumptions to be used in the estimate process are checked with the staff to decide their current validity.

Mission analysis normally contains the following steps:

1. Determine the source(s) of the mission.
2. Determine who is supporting and who is the supported commander.
4. State superior’s intent.
5. Derive elements of own mission.
6. Formulate the mission statement.
7. Identify externally imposed limitations affecting the mission.
8. Consider effects of ROE.
9. Identify (planning) assumptions.
10. Identify physical objective(s).
11. Restate the mission.
12. Issue warning order and/or planning guidance to subordinate commands.

1. The Source(s) of the mission:

2. Am I the “Supported” or “Supporting Commander?”

3. State the Superior’s Mission: The mission stated by the superior — normally contained in the superior’s directive — and the capabilities and limitations of one’s own forces must be studied. The commander must draw broad conclusions as to the character of the forthcoming military action. However, the commander should not assume intentions of the superior commander that cannot be logically deduced. If the superior’s directive is unclear, ambiguous, or confusing, the commander should seek clarification.

**SUPERIOR’S MISSION:**
4. State the superior’s intent: A main concern for a commander during mission analysis is to study not only the superior’s mission but also his intent. Within the range and depth of the today’s battlespace, effective decentralized command and control cannot occur without a common vision. Without a commander’s intent to express that common vision, unity of effort is difficult to achieve. In order to turn information into decisions and decisions into actions that are “about” right, commanders must understand the higher commander’s intent. While the commander’s intent had previously been considered to be inherent in the mission and concept of operations, current direction is to explicitly detail it in the plan/order. Successfully communicating the more enduring intent allows the force to continue the mission even though circumstances have changed and the plan/concept of operations is no longer valid.

So what is this “commander’s intent”? Commander’s intent is generally accepted to be a concise, freeform expression of the purpose of the force’s activities, the desired results, and how actions will progress toward that end. It is a broad vision, stated clearly and succinctly, of how the commander intends to conduct the action. In short, it links the mission and the concept of operations. The intent expresses the broader purpose of the action that looks beyond the why of the immediate operation to the broader operational context of that mission and may include how the posture of the force at the endstate of the action will transition to or facilitate further operations (sequels).

Commander’s intent is not a summary of the concept of operations. It does not tell specifically “how” the operation is to occur; it must be crafted to allow subordinate commanders sufficient flexibility and initiative in accomplishing their assigned mission(s) even in the “fog of war.” Nor does the intent contain “acceptable risk.” Risk is stated in the commander’s guidance and is addressed in all courses of action. The intent consists on three components:

1. Purpose: the reason for the conduct of the military action with respect to the mission of the next higher echelon. The purpose explains within the context of the mission of the next higher echelon why the military action is occurring. This helps the force pursue the mission without further orders, even when actions do not unfold as planned. Thus, if an unanticipated situation arises, participating commanders will understand the purpose of the forthcoming action well enough to act decisively and within the bounds of the higher commander’s intent. This understanding is crucial to command.

2. Method: the “how,” in doctrinally concise terminology, explains the offensive form of maneuver, the alternative defense, or other action to be used by the force as a whole. Details as to the specific subordinate missions are not discussed.

3. Endstate: the relationship (“military landscape”) between own force, the enemy, and the factor space that describes the posture of the force at the completion of the operation.

The commander is responsible for formulating the single unifying concept for a mission. Having developed that concept, the commander then personally prepares his/her intent statement from mission analysis, the intents of his/her higher commanders, and his/her own vision to ensure his/her subordinate commanders are focused on a common goal. The task here is to clearly articulate the intent so it is understandable two echelons below. The intent statement is usually written, but could be given verbally when the time is short. (Overall, the higher a command echelon is, the more likely that the commander’s intent will be provided in writing.) When possible he/she delivers it, along with the order (or plan), personally. Face-to-face delivery ensures mutual understanding of what the issuing commander wants by allowing immediate clarification of specific points. While intent is more enduring than the concept of operations, the commander can and should revise his/her intent whenever changing circumstances nullify his/her previous intent.

The superior’s intent is normally found in paragraph 3, Execution, of the tasking order. The gist of the intent statements of the higher echelon commanders are contained in paragraph 1, Situation, of the OPORD or OPLAN to ensure that the staff and supporting commanders understand the intent two echelons up. Each subordinate commander’s intent must be framed and embedded within the context of the higher commander’s intent. Intents must be “nested” both vertically and horizontally to achieve a common endstate throughout the command. The intent statement at any level must support the intent of the next higher commander. For any OPORD or OPLAN, there is only one commander’s intent — that of the overall commander.
5. Derive Elements of Own Mission: Any mission consists of two elements: the task(s) to be done by one’s own forces and their purpose. The identification of the tasks and their purpose establishes the criteria by which the adequacy of possible own COAs will be evaluated. If a mission has multiple tasks, then the priority of each task should be clearly expressed. Usually this is done by the order in which the tasks are presented. If there are intermediate tasks (assigned or deduced) necessary to the accomplishment of the mission, such tasks should be listed as well. The basis for one’s own mission is normally found in the superior’s directive. There might be a situation in which a commander has been given such broad guidance that all or part of the mission would need to be deduced. Deduction should be based on an appreciation of the general situation and an understanding of the superior’s objective. Consequently, deduced tasks must have a reasonable chance of accomplishment and should secure results that support the superior commander’s objective.

a. State the Task(s): The task is the job or function assigned to a subordinate unit or command by higher authority. A mission can contain a single task, but it often contains two or more tasks to be done. If there are multiple tasks, they normally will all be related to a single purpose. Or, they may, in certain combinations, be connected separately to appropriate purposes.

Depending on the objective to be accomplished, tactical, operational, and strategic tasks are differentiated. Examples of tactical tasks are: destroy enemy convoy TANGO; seize enemy naval base (airfield) ZULU; destroy enemy submarines in the combat zone ROMEO; seize hill BRAVO, etc. Examples of operational tasks are: obtain and maintain sea control in maritime area operations ECHO; obtain air superiority in air area of operations HOTEL; conduct amphibious landing operation in BRAVO amphibious objective area; conduct a blockade of the CHARLIE strait; cut off the enemy maritime traffic in PAPA SEA; conduct amphibious defense in the ALFA area of the coast, etc. Examples of strategic tasks are: destroy Purple armed forces; seize control of country RED; destroy RED sea-based nuclear deterrent forces, etc.

(1) Specified Task(s): Tasks listed in the mission received from higher headquarters are specified or stated (assigned) tasks. They are what the higher commander wants accomplished. The commander’s specified tasks are normally found in paragraph 3b (execution – Tasks) section of the order, but could also be contained elsewhere (as for example in coordinating instructions or annexes).
(2) Implied Task(s): After identifying the specified tasks, the commander identifies additional major tasks necessary to accomplish the assigned mission. These additional major tasks are implied tasks that are sometimes deduced from detailed analysis of the order of the higher commander, known enemy situation, and the commander’s knowledge of the physical environment. Therefore, the implied tasks subsequently included in the commander’s restated mission should be limited to those considered essential to the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Implied tasks do not include routine or standing operating procedures that must be performed to accomplish any type of mission by one’s own forces. Moreover, tasks that are inherent responsibilities of the commander (providing protection of the flank of own unit, reconnaissance, deception, etc.) are not considered implied tasks. The exception occurs only if such routine tasks to be successfully accomplished must be coordinated or supported by other commanders.

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<th>IMPLIED TASKS:</th>
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(3) Review the Specified and Implied Tasks: Ensure tasks carried forward into the CES process are essential tasks — those required to achieve the conditions that define success. Only essential tasks should be included in the mission statement and subsequent CES analysis. Tasks should answer the “who,” “what,” “when,” and “where” questions.

b. State the Purpose: The purpose is stated as “in order to.” Purpose is normally found at the beginning of the “execution” section of the superior’s directive. If the superior’s directive also contains an intent statement, that should also be reviewed to help analyze the “purpose” of the operations. *The purpose always dominates the task*. A task or tasks can be changed because of unforeseen circumstances, but the purpose remains essentially the same if the original mission remains unchanged. Purpose should answer the “why” question.

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<th>PURPOSE:</th>
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6. Formulate the Mission Statement (preliminary) [list essential task(s) and purpose]:

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<th>PRELIMINARY MISSION STATEMENT:</th>
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The commander and staff should further examine external guidance that will affect the completion of the mission. This is necessary to enable the commander to provide proper planning focus to the staff and subordinate commands before they commence development and evaluation of COAs. These items include externally imposed limitations (restraints and constraints), rules of engagement, and planning assumptions. More importantly, this focus should address the “who,” “what,” “when,” and “where” questions of the operation.

7. Identify Externally Imposed Limitations:

a. Restraints: Restraints or restrictions are things the higher commander prohibits subordinate commander(s) or force(s) from doing (for example, not conducting reconnaissance flights beyond the phase line COPPER, not to approach the enemy coast closer than 30 nautical miles, etc.).

   Note

   ROE are considered separate from restraints and constraints.

   **RESTRAINTS:**

b. Identify Externally Imposed Constraints: The superior’s directive normally indicates circumstances and limitations under which one’s own forces will initiate and/or continue their actions. Therefore, the higher commander may impose some constraints on the commander’s freedom of action with respect to the actions to be conducted. These constraints will affect the selection of COAs and the planning process. Examples include tasks by the higher command that specify: “Be prepared to . . .”; “Not earlier than . . .”; “Not later than . . .”. Likewise, the imposition of radio silence or the nonavailability of support means (e.g., airstrikes) are constraints to one’s own forces. Time is often a constraint because it affects the time available for planning or execution of certain tasks.

   **CONSTRAINTS:**

   Note

   Constraints and restraints collectively comprise “limitations” on the commander’s freedom of action. Remember restraints and constraints do not include doctrinal considerations!

8. (Planning) Assumptions (stated by the superior and one’s own): An assumption is a supposition on the current situation (or a presupposition on the future course of events), either or both (1) assumed to be true without positive proof and (2) necessary to enable the commander, during planning, to complete an estimate of the situation and decide the course of action (Joint Pub 1-02). An assumption encompasses the issues over which a commander normally does not have control.
Assumptions are made for both own and enemy forces. The commander can assume the success of friendly supporting actions that are essential for success, but cannot assume success for the actions of his/her own forces. Planners should assume the worst-case scenario. In other words, they must assume that the opponent will use every capability at his/her disposal and will operate in the most efficient manner possible. To dismiss enemy possibilities as unlikely could dangerously limit the depth of planning. Again, planners should not assume away an enemy capability. They cannot assume a condition simply because of a lack of accurate knowledge of friendly forces or a lack of intelligence about the enemy.

Key characteristics of assumptions are that they are reasonable suppositions — logical and realistic; they must be justifiable and must be essential for planning to continue. Existing capabilities should not be treated as assumptions. Examples of inappropriate assumptions include: “necessary bases, facilities and services will be made available”; “necessary logistics resources, including support available to operational forces . . . will be provided from CONUS as required”; “communications will be provided as required”; etc.

Assumptions are used in the commander’s estimate conducted at each command echelon. Usually, commanders and their staffs should make assumptions that fall within the scope of their battlespace. Overall, the higher the command echelon, the more assumptions that will be made. Assumptions enable the commander and the staff to continue planning despite a lack of concrete information. They are, in fact, artificial devices to fill gaps in actual knowledge, but they play a crucial role in planning. A wrong assumption may partially or completely invalidate the entire plan; to account for a possible wrong assumption, planners should consider developing branches to the basic plan.

Assumptions given by the superior must be treated as facts by subordinate commanders. If the commander or staff does not concur with the superior’s planning assumptions, they should be challenged before continuing with the planning process. If they are not changed, they must be treated as facts — but all assumptions should be reverified at time of execution. Assumptions must be kept at a minimum. For examples of planning assumptions see, Annex A to this Appendix.

Note

Assumptions are not unchangeable. They must be continuously checked, revalidated, and changed until they are proven to be a fact or are overcome by events.

ASSUMPTIONS GIVEN BY THE SUPERIOR (TO BE TREATED AS FACTS):

Tests for an assumption:

1. Is it logical?

2. Is it realistic?

3. Is it essential for planning to continue?

4. Did it become an (essential element of information), a (priority intelligence requirement), or a Request for Information to be addressed in the Intelligence estimate?
9. Consider Effects of Rules of Engagement: ROE are normally stated in the “execution” section of the superior’s directive. The commander and staff should consider the impact of stated ROE on their ability to accomplish the mission. Any requirement to change the ROE — either relaxation or more restrictive — should be considered in this estimate.

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<th>OWN ASSUMPTIONS:</th>
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<th>RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ISSUED IN THE SUPERIOR’S DIRECTIVE (OR KNOWN FROM OTHER SOURCES):</th>
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<th>DESIRED CHANGES IN RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (FROM SUPERIOR OR MORE RESTRICTIVE ROE FOR SUBORDINATES):</th>
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10. Identify Objectives: A prerequisite for a good estimate of the situation is identification of a specific, realistic, and clearly defined objective. Theoretically, intangible and physical objectives are differentiated. However, in practice, this distinction is usually ignored and the overall objective is expressed in a single sentence containing both intangible and physical objectives. An intangible objective is expressed in terms of the aim of the action to be taken. Examples of intangible objectives are “to weaken,” “to hamper,” “to cut off,” “to prevent,” “to blockade,” “to destroy,” “to neutralize,” “to annihilate,” “to suppress,” etc. However, these terms should not be used interchangeably, because each of them has a definite meaning. For example, a force or target could be considered neutralized if one’s own forces inflict between 30 and 40 percent damage on it; the target or force is destroyed by inflicting damage of 50 to 60 percent; or the target is annihilated if damage inflicted is greater than 70 percent. Equally important is what this means in the context of current and future operations to “neutralize” or “destroy” a target or opposing force. A force (or weapon system) can be considered neutralized when it has a equal chance of continuing its action, while one that is destroyed cannot continue its action or operation. To achieve a specific degree of damage or degradation of a target, a specific action and forces and assets are required.

A physical objective is the focus of the action by one’s own forces. It is usually, but not necessarily, linked with the enemy’s center of gravity. Examples of physical objectives at the operational level are a major city or an area of concentration of enemy forces; an important strait, canal, a large island; etc. At the tactical level, physical objectives are individual units, weapon platforms, naval bases, airfields, logistical supply dumps, bridges, roads, communications centers, repair facilities, etc.

One must be careful not to confuse objective(s) with target(s). These are not identical or synonymous terms. To accomplish a single objective, normally several targets must be destroyed, annihilated or neutralized, suppressed, etc.

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<th>IDENTIFY OBJECTIVES</th>
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<td>PHYSICAL</td>
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11. Restated Mission: The product of the mission analysis is the restated mission. It must be a clear, concise statement of the essential (specified and implied) tasks to be accomplished by the command and the purpose(s) of those tasks. Multiple tasks are normally listed in the sequence to be accomplished. Although several tasks may have been identified during the mission analysis, the restated mission includes only those that are essential to the overall success of the mission. The tasks that are routine or inherent responsibilities of a commander are not included in the restated mission. The external limitations, ROE, assumptions and the physical objectives identified in this step are used later during the formulation of COAs. The restated mission becomes the basis of the commander’s and staff estimates. It is contained in paragraph 1 of the commander’s estimate and paragraph 2 of the basic (OPLAN) or (OPORD).

All efforts by the commander and the staff should be mission oriented. Losing sight of the assigned mission will result in a confused analysis, which may ultimately lead to failure.
12. Warning Order: Once the commander approves the restated mission and evaluates the factors affecting mission accomplishment, a warning order will normally be issued to subordinate commanders. It serves as a preliminary notice of a forthcoming military action with an understanding that more information will follow after the COA is selected. It is normally issued as a brief oral or written message that lists the available information and required instructions.

13. Commander’s Planning Guidance: The commander approves the restated mission and provides the subordinate commanders and their staffs initial planning guidance. This guidance is essential for timely and effective COA development and analysis. The guidance should precede the staff’s preparation for conducting their respective staff estimates. The commander’s responsibility is to implant a desired vision of the forthcoming combat action into the minds of the staff. Enough guidance (preliminary decisions) must be provided to allow the subordinates to plan the action necessary to accomplish the mission consistent with his/her intent and the intent of the commander two echelons above. The commander’s guidance must focus on the essential military tasks and associated objectives that support the accomplishment of the assigned mission.

The commander may provide the planning guidance to the entire staff and/or subordinate commanders or meet with each staff officer or subordinate unit commander individually as the situation and information dictates. The guidance can be given in a written form or orally. No format for the planning guidance is prescribed. However, the guidance should be sufficiently detailed to provide a clear direction and to avoid unnecessary efforts by the staff or subordinate commanders. The more detailed the guidance is, the more specific staff activities will be. And, the more specific the activities, the more quickly the staff can complete them. Yet, the more specific the activities, the greater the risk of overlooking or inadequately examining one or more details that may affect mission execution.

The content of planning guidance varies from commander to commander and is dependent on the situation and time available. Planning guidance should include:

1. Situation
2. The restated mission, including essential task(s) and associated objectives
3. Purpose of the forthcoming military action
4. Information available (or unavailable) at the time
5. Forces available for planning purposes
6. Limitations (constraints and restraints), including time constraints for planning
7. Planning assumptions
8. Tentative COAs under consideration
9. Preliminary guidance for use (or nonuse) of nuclear weapons
10. Coordinating instructions.

Planning guidance can be very explicit and detailed or it can be very broad, allowing the staff and/or subordinate commanders wide latitude in developing subsequent COAs. However, regardless of its scope, the content of planning guidance must be arranged in a logical sequence to reduce the chances of misunderstanding and to enhance clarity. Moreover, it must be recognized that all the elements of planning guidance are tentative only.

The commander may issue successive planning guidance during the decisionmaking process. The focus should remain upon the framework provided in the initial planning guidance. There is no limitation as to the number of times the commander may issue his/her planning guidance.
14. Commander’s Initial Intent: The commander will normally issue his/her initial intent (see discussion in paragraph 4 above) with the planning guidance and in the warning order. The commander’s intent should focus on the aim of the forthcoming action for subordinate units two levels down. The intent statement in an OPORD or OPLAN is placed in paragraph 3, Execution.

Remember, the commander’s intent must be crafted to allow subordinate commanders sufficient flexibility in accomplishing their assigned mission(s). It must provide a “vision” of those conditions that the commander wants to see after the military action is accomplished. The commander must define how his/her “vision” will generally be accomplished by forces and assets available, and the conditions/status of own and enemy forces with respect to the battlespace as the endstate.

A.3 STEP 2: ANALYSIS OF FACTORS AFFECTING POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION

The next step in the estimate of a situation is to identify those factors that might influence the choice of a course of action and to draw conclusions about how these factors might favor or hinder own or enemy courses of actions. The aim is to identify and tabulate strengths and weaknesses for own and enemy forces and to make an initial determination of the adequacy of one’s own forces. These factors are normally identified and analyzed in the Intelligence estimate prepared by the J-2/G-2/N-2 section of the staff (see Annex B of JP 2-0 for a sample format) and J-3/G-3/N-3 section of the staff. Traditionally, the principal factors affecting the possible courses of action of both sides in a conflict are the factors space, forces, time, and their interactions. They are critical to mission accomplishment regardless of the level of war and the scope of the objective to be accomplished. However, the higher the level of war, the more critical these factors are.
1. Factor Space: Generally, only those characteristics of the area of operations should be considered that affect the preparation, planning, and employment of the enemy’s or of own forces and assets. (Paragraphs may be omitted or added as applicable). The scope and extent of this analysis at each level of war differ considerably. For example, the tactical commander is rarely concerned with the economic, political, and technological aspects of the situation, whereas the theater of operations and theater of war CINCs are concerned with these aspects. Moreover, weather is normally of greater concern for the tactical commander, while the climate receives greater attention at the operational and theater-strategic level. This does not mean, however, that the weather is not taken into account in determining the time and place of attack by the operational commanders (especially in planning and execution of an amphibious landing operation).

The focus in this step of the estimate is to describe briefly the most important features of the situation and their effect on enemy capabilities and on own courses of action. While all the aspects of a given element are fully considered, only those aspects that have an impact on the tactical, operational, or strategic mission are highlighted. Use Figure A-1 to record the results.

**Note**

Items listed below are applicable to the entire range of military operations, from the peacetime competition to crisis, MOOTW, and war. Hence, describe and analyze only those aspects of factors space, time, and forces that are applicable to the mission of your own forces.

a. Military geography: The physical environment includes many parameters that affect the combat capabilities and execution of actions of one’s own forces and assets. In describing these features, the commander and staff should be aware that there are generally accepted descriptions of related conditions as defined by Universal Joint Task List # (UJTL), Version 3.0 13 SEP 1996 (Section 3). See Figure A-2 for examples.

(1) Area: Total area (in square miles/kilometers) in which the planned combat action is to take place; length and width of the area (in miles/kilometers); geographical boundaries (land, maritime, river, lakes).

(2) Position: Land or maritime position; insular, peninsular position; exterior or central position, etc.

(3) Distances: Distances from home bases to the area of combat employment; distances between base of operations to the concentration or assembly area; distances between various physical objectives, etc.

(4) Land Use: The main characteristics of the land use (arable land; permanent crops, irrigated land, etc.).

(5) Environment: Provide an overview of the environmental issues that potential can affect the employment of military forces on both sides (pollution — air, water, land; natural hazards; destructive earthquakes, volcanoes, etc.).

(6) Topography: Provide the main features of relief (flat, mountainous, swampy, desert, etc.) and the effect the topography has on the movement and employment of military forces on both sides.

(7) Vegetation: The main characteristics of vegetation in the area (barren, woodland, meadows and pastures, hedgerow, rice paddies, etc.) and its effect on the movement and employment of military forces on both sides.

(8) Hydrography/Oceanography: Characteristics of sea/ocean areas (size of the area; coastal indentation, coasts and offshore islands/islets; archipelagoes, deltas, straits, narrows, bottom’s topography; water depths, salinity, bioluminescence, currents, tides, etc.), and rivers/estuaries, streams, lakes, and artificial inland waterways (canals, lakes, etc.).

(9) Climate/Weather: The main features of the climate (temperate, cold, arctic, tropic, subtropics); change of seasons; thaw; duration of the day (sunrise, sunset, twilight, etc. and their general affects on the preparation execution of the forthcoming military action; cloud cover, low ceiling/visibility, fog, precipitation (rainfall, snow, etc.); winds, waves (high seas — sea state 5 and higher), surf height; temperatures (sea, air, mean, and extreme temperatures, etc.), humidity and its affect on the use of weapons/equipment and fatigue of personnel; precipitation (rainfall, snow, etc.) and its effect on off-road trafficability; sea ice, icebergs, currents, tides, etc.
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<th>SITUATION</th>
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Figure A-1. Analysis of Factor Space
b. Demography: Provide the analysis of the main aspects of the demographic situation; total population; age structure; racial composition; regional distribution; urban vs. rural population; average density (per square mile/kilometer); net migration rate; growth rate; life expectancy at birth; total fertility rate; degree of urbanization; birth rate; mortality rate; infant mortality rate; health and medical, etc.

(1) Ethnicity: Ethnic composition; national groups and national minorities; ethnic problems or conflicts, etc.

(2) Religion: Main religions; relations with the state; religious holidays; religious differences or problems; etc.

(3) Languages: Dominant languages; dialects; languages of the ethnic minorities; alphabet used, etc.

(4) Literacy: Provide general overview; illiteracy of adults; illiteracy among urban and rural population, etc.

c. Politics: The main characteristics of the political system (system of government; executive, judiciary, legislature, etc.); form of government; administrative divisions; legal system; constitutional system and constitutional issues; ruling regime; political parties and leaders; other political or pressure groups; trade unions; human rights; political stability; internal threats (political extremism, terrorism, insurgency, serious crime/drugs, etc.), external threats (border disputes, resource disputes, etc.).

d. Diplomacy: The main characteristics of the country’s diplomatic position; relations with foreign countries; alliances/coalitions; bilateral agreements; diplomatic representation; international law issues/problems (maritime claims, neutrality declarations, etc.); etc.

e. Natural Resources: Minerals (iron, zinc, lead, copper, silver, graphite, uranium, etc.); energy resources (thermal — coal, lignite, oil, natural gas, hydroelectric, wind, etc.), water supply, food supply, etc.
f. Economy: Key characteristics of economic system; economic policy; economic performance; national product (GNP); real growth of GDP; total budget; budget deficit; inflation rate; currency; debts (external, internal, etc.); external debt servicing payments; foreign investment; foreign aid; aid donors; finance (banking, insurance, etc.); domestic trade; land and maritime trade (coastal, regional, ocean-going, etc.); foreign trade; trade deficit; trading partners; heavy industry (mining, metallurgy, machine building, etc.); defense industry; military research and development; covert programs; production of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, chemical); aerospace industries; shipbuilding; ship repair facilities; light industry (consumer goods; chemicals and related products; pharmaceutical industry; food, beverages, tobacco; textile and clothing; wood and paper products; apparel, leather, footwear; etc.) petroleum products; electronics; electricity (by source-thermal, hydroelectric, nuclear, wind, solar; capacity, production, consumption); fisheries; tourism (domestic, foreign, etc.); work force by sectors (agriculture, industry, forestry, banking, education, culture, administration and justice; welfare and education, etc.); migrant workers; unemployment; income per capita; living standards; nutrition level, etc.

g. Agriculture: The main characteristics of agricultural production; cereal production; fodder crops; beef and dairy production; livestock production (sheep, cattle, etc.); produces; fruits, etc.

h. Transportation: General characteristics of the transportation system (domestic, links with other countries in the region or out of the area).

   (1) Land Transportation: roads (paved, unpaved — gravel, earth, etc.); railroads (standard, gauge, narrow gauge; electrified; industrial, etc.), inland waterways (rivers, lakes, canals, etc.)

   (2) Maritime transport: merchant marine (merchant vessels by type — passenger ships, ferries; crude oil tankers, liquefied natural gas tankers; container ships, size, age, speed, etc.); shipping companies; ports; port terminals (oil, container, freight, etc.)

   (3) Air transport: civil aviation; air carriers (domestic and international service); business aviation; agricultural aviation; airports (paved or unpaved runways; runways by length: >3,600 m; 2,400 to 3,659 m; 1,220 to 2,439 m; <1,220 m), etc.

i. Telecommunications: Wire services, commercial satellite, radio (FM/AM, short-wave), cable, land line, fiber optic lines, and other communications facilities in the area of operations that might enhance command and control of military forces.

j. Culture: Describe and analyze the main cultural traits; cultural biases and prejudices; sensitivities; prevalent view of other national groups, races, or nations; cultural differences among various ethnic groups, etc.

k. Ideology: Describe and analyze the key characteristics of the political ideology; strengths and weaknesses; vulnerabilities; etc.

l. Nationalism: Describe briefly and analyze the key aspects of the nationalism (country or political parties/groups, etc.); nationalistic feelings; strengths and weaknesses/vulnerabilities; etc.

m. Sociology: Social conditions run a wide range from the psychological ability of a population to withstand the rigors of war, to the health and sanitation conditions in the area of operations. Language, social institutions and attitudes, and similar factors that may affect selection of a course of action should be considered.

n. Science and Technology: Although little immediate military impact may result from the state of science and technology in a target area, the long-range effects of such factors as technical skill level of the population and scientific and technical resources in manpower and facilities should be considered in cases where they may affect the choice of a COA.

2. Factor Forces: Factor “forces” should be understood as not only “troops,” “naval forces,” or “air forces,” but also forces of all services of the armed forces. The broader term “means” can be used when not only military forces but other sources of power (political, economic, etc.) of a nation or group of states (these issues are addressed in the preceding sections of step 2) are brought to bear. Hence, depending on the scale of the forthcoming military action and the command echelon, this part of the estimate may provide a detailed analysis of the armed forces as a whole or individual services or focus on the combat forces and combat support forces on both sides. Use Figure A-3 to record the results.
### Figure A-3. Analysis of Factor Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OWN FORCES:</th>
<th>COMPOSITION</th>
<th>LOCATION-DISPOSITION</th>
<th>RELATIVE STRENGTH</th>
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<td>Reinforcements:</td>
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<th>ENEMY FORCES:</th>
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<td>Reinforcements:</td>
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a. Defense System: Provide an overview and analysis of the defense system; components of defense system (armed forces, police, paramilitary forces/groups; civil defense, etc.); national military organization; civilian control; civil-military relations; defense expenditures; security assistance; arms transfers; arms imports; foreign military aid; military relations with foreign countries; foreign military advisors; etc.

b. Armed Forces: Total strength; trained reserve; mobilized manpower; officer corps, NCOs/POs, soldiers/sea-men; services (Army, Navy, Air Force and/or Air Defense, Marine Corps or Naval Infantry, Coast Guard); etc. The following elements should be analyzed: overall numerical strength of forces on both sides; active forces vs. reserves; combat vs. noncombat forces; forces in combat vs. forces assigned for protection of the rear areas; type of forces and forces’ mix; mobility (tactical or strategic); task organization; reconstitution ability; logistic support and supportability; combat readiness; transportation assets, etc.

c. Relative Combat Power of Opposing Forces: The relative combat power is derived by evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of own and enemy forces, their location and disposition, logistics, time and space factors, and combat efficiency. Normally, the staff will identify relevant factors, tabulate the facts, and then draw conclusions. Comparisons are meaningful only if they reflect the forces that will directly oppose each other. Any strength or weakness factor must reflect directly or indirectly the ability or inability of a force to achieve its assigned objective.

(1) Composition of forces: This includes order of battle of major enemy forces or formations; type and forces’ mix; major weapons systems and equipment and their operational characteristics.

(2) Reserves: Describe and analyze reserves (tactical, operational, or strategic) for the forthcoming action on both sides.

(3) Reinforcements: Estimate own and enemy reinforcement capabilities that can affect the forthcoming action in the area under consideration. This study should include ground, naval, air elements; weapons of mass destruction; and an estimate of the relative capacity to move these forces into the area of operations or theater of operations.

(4) Location and Disposition: This includes geographic location of enemy units; fire support elements; C² facilities; air, naval, and missile forces; and other elements of combat power in or deployable to the area of operations or the given theater of operations.

(5) Relative Strengths: List the number and size of enemy units committed and those available for reinforcement in the area. This should not be just a tabulation of numbers of aircraft, ships, missiles, or other weapons, but rather an analysis of what strength the enemy commander can bring to bear in the area in terms of ground (air, naval) units committed and reinforcing, aircraft sortie rates, missile delivery rates, unconventional, psychological, and other strengths the commander thinks may affect the ratio of forces in the employment area.

d. Logistics: Summarize such considerations as transportation, supply, maintenance, hospitalization and evacuation, labor, construction, type of lines of communications (land, air, sea) and their position (exterior or interior); protection and degree of vulnerability to diverse type of threat, and other elements of logistical support and sustainment.
e. Combat Efficiency: Estimate own and enemy state of training, readiness, battle experience, physical condition, morale, leadership, motivation, doctrine, discipline, and whatever significant strengths or weaknesses may appear from the preceding paragraphs.

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3. Factor Time: This part of the estimate should analyze the factor in generic terms and how it affects the mission accomplishment on both sides. Particular attention must be given to time-space and time-forces factors. Use Figure A-4 to record the results.

   a. Preparation Time: Estimate the time required to prepare for war or for the forthcoming military action based on the doctrinal tenets or empirical data.

   b. Duration of the Enemy Action: Estimate the time of the expected or pending enemy tactical action, major operation, or campaign.

   c. Warning Time: Estimate the warning time for the forthcoming military action for both own and enemy forces (based on the existing RECCE/intelligence and early warning capabilities).

   d. Decision Cycle: Estimate the time required for both sides to make a decision — the time from receipt of the mission to the selection of the optimal COA.

   e. Planning Time: Estimate the time required for both sides to issue a directive — the time from the selection of a COA to the issuance of a directive.

   f. Time for Mobilization: Estimate the time required for both sides to mobilize ready reserves or complete partial or total mobilization.

   g. Reaction Time: Estimate the time for both sides (based on doctrinal tenets or empirical data) to effectively react to the opponent’s move or action.

   h. Time Required for Deployment: Estimate the time both sides require to prepare and move force from their home stations to the ports or airfields of embarkation.

   i. Deployment Transit Time: Estimate the time required to move forces by land, sea, and air from major base or staging/deployment areas into the theater or area of operations; compute distances and transit times for each own unit/force, and enemy unit/force.

   j. Time for Concentration: Estimate the time both sides require to move and concentrate forces on or off the battlefield.

   k. Time to Prepare and Complete Maneuver: Estimate the time necessary for both sides to prepare, execute, and complete their maneuvering (tactical or operational).
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<th>ITEM</th>
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Figure A-4. Analysis of Factor Time
l. Time to Accomplish the Mission: Estimate the time both sides require to accomplish the entire combat mission.

m. Rate of Advance (or delay): Estimate potential rates of advance (in an offensive) or rate of delaying action (in a defensive) for both sides (applicable only in land warfare).

n. Time for Bringing Up Reinforcements: Estimate the time required by both sides to move and effectively employ reinforcements.

o. Time to Commit Reserves: Estimate the time required by both sides to effectively commit tactical or operational reserve.

p. Time to Regenerate Combat Power: Estimate the time both sides need to regenerate combat power (R&R for manpower; replenishment of POL, ammunition, food, water, etc.).

q. Time for Redeployment: Estimate the time both sides require to prepare and complete redeployment of forces to a new area/mission.

r. Time to Reconstitute Forces: Estimate the time required by both sides to reconstitute forces after the end of the hostilities (it encompasses regeneration of combat power and reorganization).

s. Summarize the Key Elements of Factor Time:

```
SUMMARY OF FACTOR TIME:
```

4. Make Initial Determination of Adequacy of Own Forces: Estimates of relative power require an analysis of the forces that may directly oppose each other in combat. This will help the commander to draw conclusions as to the ability of own forces to carry out a COA against expected opposition.

```
ARE OWN FORCES ADEQUATE?   YES   NO
```

```
COMMENTS/CONCERNS:
```
A.4 STEP 3: DEVELOP ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

In this step, the commander must identify enemy capabilities and then estimate how the enemy commander could combine those capabilities into ECOAs\(^1\). The primary source of information on ECOAs is the intelligence estimate (prepared by intelligence section). The paragraphs of the intelligence estimate on the enemy situation and ECOAs are normally inserted verbatim into the Commander’s Estimate. Enemy capabilities are considered in the light of all known factors affecting military actions including time, space, and forces.

Steps to be followed in determining ECOAs are described below:

1. Review Relevant Data: Accurate identification of ECOAs requires the commander and his/her staff to think “as the opponent thinks.” From that perspective, it is necessary first to postulate possible enemy objectives and then visualize specific actions within the capabilities of enemy forces that can be directed at these objectives and that would also affect the accomplishment of one’s own mission. From the enemy’s perspective, appropriate physical objectives might include own forces or their elements, own or friendly forces being supported or protected, facilities or line of communications, geographic areas or positions of tactical, operational or strategic importance.

Potential enemy actions relating to specific physical objectives normally need to be combined to form statements of ECOAs. These statements should be broad enough so that the fundamental choices available to the enemy commander are made clear. Once all ECOAs have been identified, the commander should eliminate any duplication and combine them when appropriate.

To develop an ECOA, one should ask the following two questions:

1. Can the enemy do it?

2. Would it materially affect the accomplishment of my mission?

### POSSIBLE ENEMY OBJECTIVE(S)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHYSICAL</th>
<th>INTANGIBLE</th>
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### LIST OWN CRITICAL FACTORS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>CRITICAL STRENGTHS</th>
<th>CRITICAL WEAKNESSES</th>
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</table>

\(^1\) Identified in earlier versions of this worksheet as enemy capabilities. The current approach defines ECs as individual components (tools) available to the enemy commander that he/she combines to form comprehensive ECOAs.
2. Identify Individual ECs: To ensure a thorough analysis, the staff should review and list the individual capabilities of the enemy’s ground, air/space, naval, and special forces relative to a thorough knowledge of the enemy’s doctrinal procedures and methods of force employment. See figure A-5.

3. Develop ECOAs. ECOAs are then generated that are general courses of action described by the acronym DRAW-D (defend, reinforce, attack, withdraw, delay) or other specific courses of action (if known). Each ECOA should take into account all the known factors (space, forces, time) that affect military action. This analysis should include factors that favor or mitigate against the adoption of a particular ECOA and vulnerabilities the enemy will be liable to if such a capability is adopted as an enemy course of action.

Normally, an accurate identification of ECOAs requires us to think and act from the enemy commander’s perspective. Thus, the situation must be analyzed from the enemy’s perspective. The commander should not consider ECOAs based solely on factual or supposed knowledge of the enemy intentions. The real course of action by the enemy commander cannot be known with any confidence without knowing the enemy’s mission and objective — and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIST OWN CENTERS OF GRAVITY (From Enemy Perspective)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Strategic, Operational, Tactical as Appropriate)</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIST OWN CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIST OWN DECISIVE POINTS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GEOGRAPHICALLY ORIENTED</td>
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<tr>
<td>FORCES</td>
<td>CAPABILITY</td>
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<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROUND</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVAL</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MARINES/NAVAL INFANTRY</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AIR/SPACE</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
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<tr>
<td>STRATEGIC WEAPONS</td>
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Figure A-5. Individual Enemy Capabilities
that information is rarely known to the commander. Even if such information were available, the enemy could change or feign his/her ECOA. Therefore, considering all the options the enemy could physically carry out is more prudent. No ECOA should be dismissed or overlooked because it is considered as unlikely or uncommon. Remember, retain only those ECOAs that would materially affect the accomplishment of the commander’s own mission.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECOA</th>
<th>VULNERABILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECOA #1</td>
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<td>ECOA #2</td>
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<td>ECOA #3</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOA #4</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOA #__</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. List ECOAs in Sequence of Probability of Adoption: The commander lists retained ECOAs in the order that they are likely to be adopted based on the analysis conducted above. To establish such a sequence requires an analysis of the situation from the enemy’s perspective with what may be known about the enemy’s intentions. Enemy intentions should not be applied uncritically, (i.e., to consider only what one believes the enemy will do).

Consideration of ECOAs should influence ordering, but not the number of retained ECOAs. The analysis should not be limited to most likely or most threatening ECOAs, nor should an ECOA be excluded because it is unlikely or uncommon. If it affects the mission, retain it, list it low in probability if you consider it so, but do not discard it. In short, do not overlook any ECOA.
After listing the ECOAs in relative probability of adoption, a listing of associated enemy vulnerabilities that can be exploited by own forces should be compiled. This list can be a general list, or tied to specific ECOAs. The list will aid in subsequent steps when own COAs are compared against ECOAs and advantages and disadvantages of own COAs are compared.

Retained ECOAs (in order of relative probability of adoption):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECOAs (PRIORITIZED)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECOA #___</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOA #___</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOA #___</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOA #___</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A.5 STEP 4: DEVELOP OWN COURSES OF ACTION

A COA is any course of action open to a commander that, if adopted, would result in the accomplishment of the mission. For each COA, the commander must envisage the employment of own forces and assets as a whole, taking into account externally imposed limitations, the factual situation in the area of operations, and the conclusions previously drawn up during steps 1 (Mission Analysis) and 2 (Analysis of Factors).

Normally, a COA consists of two parts: (1) the objective to be accomplished, and (2) the action(s) to be taken to accomplish that objective. First, the commander should again review the mission to ensure that it is fully understood. After examining the capabilities of the forces, and with the mission in mind, the commander and staff develop COAs. Each COA should be expressed in broad terms using simple and clear language. Each COA must be fundamentally different from the others, and all of them taken together should exhaust the possibilities for meaningful action by own forces and assets. If these criteria are met, then the COAs are considered collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive!
1. Review the restated mission: Once again review the mission to ensure a complete understanding of its objective — the mission establishes the *adequacy* criteria.

**RESTATED MISSION:**

2. Review Pertinent Data:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OWN OBJECTIVE(S)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHYSICAL</td>
<td>INTANGIBLE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIST ENEMY’S CRITICAL FACTORS</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CRITICAL STRENGTHS</td>
<td>CRITICAL WEAKNESSES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIST ENEMY’S CENTERS OF GRAVITY (Strategic, Operational, Tactical as Appropriate)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
3. Develop Tentative COAs: Develop innovative COAs that take full advantage of the situation and all available forces and assets. Construct COAs that are clearly distinctive of each other. Ensure that each COA statement is not just rewording of the mission statement drafted in step 1 of the commander’s estimate. Unless the mission predetermines the COA, each COA statement should be more focused on the objective than the mission statement is. Reconcile each COA, with external limitations and the ROE. Within each COA identify when/where/how the commander is prepared to accept risk.

Ensure COAs are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. Each COA must also be reviewed for its completeness and variability. A COA is complete if it includes the following: Who? (which command is to conduct combat action); What? (the type of combat action; DRAW-D); When? (the time the action will begin); Where? (the location of action); How? (the method or scheme of employment of forces and assets); and Why? (the purpose of combat action). The variability or distinctiveness of each COA is ensured by emphasizing distinctions in regard to:

1. Focus of direction of the main effort
2. Scheme of maneuver (air, land, maritime)
3. Task organization, phasing (if required)
4. Anticipated use of reserves
5. Principal method of combat employment or method of mission accomplishment
6. Important logistic matters.
4. Conduct Tests for Adequacy: A COA is considered *adequate* when, if successful, it would by itself accomplish the mission and complies with the superior’s guidance. A course of action that does not meet this test *must be modified to make it acceptable or discarded* at this point in the estimate.

5. Conduct Preliminary Tests for Feasibility: A COA is considered *feasible* if it can be carried out with the forces and assets available, within constraints of the physical environment, and in the face of extreme enemy opposition. This requires a visualization of the COA against each ECOA. A thorough test of feasibility is carried out during step 5 (Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action). Therefore, any assessment of the feasibility at this point in the estimate is only *tentative*. However, the intent here is to identify COAs that are clearly not feasible because available forces and assets are inadequate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COA ADEQUATE</th>
<th>RETAINED</th>
<th>MODIFICATIONS/ISSUES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#1 YES/NO</td>
<td>YES/NO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#2 YES/NO</td>
<td>YES/NO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#3 YES/NO</td>
<td>YES/NO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#___ YES/NO</td>
<td>YES/NO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Conduct Preliminary Tests for Acceptability: A COA is considered acceptable if the estimated results are worth the estimated costs — losses of own forces versus the mission’s purpose. Moreover, losses in regard to time, position, or opportunity must be estimated as well. Whether a COA is acceptable must be considered both from the commander’s view and the view of the commander’s superior. Like the feasibility test, the acceptability of a specific COA can only be tentative at this stage. The prospect of risk needs to be taken into account and may have to be accepted.

Risk is inherent in any use of military force or routine military activity. There are several types of risk, including that associated with accidents. Accident risk is managed by both the commander and the staff. Staff members are constantly looking for accident hazards associated with their areas of expertise and recommend controls to reduce risk. However, the risk discussed in relation to the CES is associated with the dangers that exist because of the presence of the enemy, the uncertainty of the enemy intentions, and the potential rewards or dangers of own force action in relation to mission accomplishment.

Where resources are scarce, the commander may accept risk by applying the principle of economy of force in order to generate “massed effects” of combat power elsewhere. In an effort to effect surprise or maintain tempo, he/she may begin action prior to the closure of all units or sustainment. To maneuver or move the force for further actions, he/she may sacrifice somewhat on force protection by transiting a part of the force through a contested area. It is the rare situation where forces are so mismatched that the commander is not concerned with risk to the mission, and, even in these situations he/she will still desire to minimize the individual risk to his/her troops. All these are examples of risk — risk the commander alone determines how and where he/she is willing to accept.

While risk cannot be eliminated it can be “managed” by a systematic approach that weighs the costs — time, personnel, resources — against the benefits of mission accomplishment. Commanders have always risk-managed their actions: intuitively, by their past experiences, or otherwise. Risk management will not prevent losses but, properly applied, it will allow the commander to take necessary and prudent risks without arbitrary restrictions and while maximizing combat capabilities.

Accepting risk is a function of both risk assessment and risk management. This entails:

a. Identification of Dangers: Identify dangers to the force. Consider all aspects of METT-T for current and future situations. Sources of information about dangers include reconnaissance, intelligence, experience of commander and staff, etc.
b. Assessment of Dangers: Assess each danger to determine the risk of potential loss based on probability and severity of the danger. Determining the risk is more an art than a science. Use historical data, intuitive analysis, judgment, and the following matrix (Figure A-6) to estimate the risk of each danger. Probability and severity levels are estimated based on the user’s knowledge of probability of occurrence and the severity of consequences once the occurrence happens. The intersection of the probability column and the severity row defines the level of risk. This method allows consistency in interpretation and evaluation of the risk to the force.

c. Address Risk, Determine Residual Risk, and Make Risk Decision: For each danger, develop one or more options that will eliminate or reduce the risk of the danger. Specify who, what, where, when, and how. Determine any residual risk and revise the evaluation of the level of risk remaining. The commander alone then decides whether or not to accept the level of residual risk. If the commander determines the risk is too great to continue the mission or a COA, he/she directs the development of additional measures to account for the risk or he/she modifies (or rejects) the COA.

d. Define Indicators: Think through the danger: What information will provide indication that the risk is no longer acceptable? Ensure subordinates and staff are informed of the importance of communicating the status of those indicators.

e. Supervise and Evaluate: In execution, monitor the status of the indicators and enact further options as warranted. Postaction, evaluate the effectiveness of each option in reducing or eliminating risk. For options that were not effective, determine why and what to do the next time the danger is identified.

Applying risk management requires a clear understanding of what constitutes “unnecessary risk,” when the benefits actually do outweigh costs, and guidance as to the appropriate level to make those decisions. When a commander decides to accept risk, the decision must be coordinated with the affected units. Where and how the commander is willing to accept risk is detailed in each COA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COA ACCEPTABLE</th>
<th>RISK CONCERNS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#1  YES/NO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#2  YES/NO</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>#3  YES/NO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#___ YES/NO</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Conduct Check for Variety: Normally, there will always be several COAs for a given military action. To be useful, each COA should differ significantly from the others.
8. Conduct Check for Completeness: A COA is considered complete if it adequately answers the following questions:
   
a. Who (what type units will execute it)?

b. What type of action is contemplated?

c. When is it to begin?

d. Where will it take place?

e. How will it be accomplished?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DANGER PROBABILITY</th>
<th>Frequent</th>
<th>Likely</th>
<th>Occasional</th>
<th>Seldom</th>
<th>Unlikely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catastrophic</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SEVERITY**
- **Catastrophic** - Mission is made impossible
- **Critical** - Severe mission impact
- **Marginal** - Mission possible using alternate options
- **Negligible** - Minor disruptions to mission

**PROBABILITY**
- **Frequent** - Occurs often, continuously experienced
- ** Likely** - Occurs several times
- **Occasional** - Occurs sporadically
- **Seldom** - Unlikely, but could occur at some time
- **Unlikely** - Can assume it will not occur

**RISK**
- **Extremely High** (E) - Loss of ability to accomplish mission.
- **High** (H) - Significantly degrades mission capabilities in terms of required mission standards.
- **Moderate** (M) - Degrades mission capabilities in terms of required mission standards
- **Low** (L) - Little or no impact on accomplishment of mission

Figure A-6. Danger Assessment Matrix
9. COAs retained (as originally stated or modified):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RETAINED COURSES OF ACTION:</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COA #___:</td>
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<td>COA #___:</td>
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<tr>
<td>COA #___:</td>
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<td>COA #___:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. Develop a Concept of Operations for Each COA: The purpose of this step is to clarify the commander’s initial intent about the deployment, employment, and support of one’s own forces and assets and to identify major objectives and target dates for their attainment. In drafting the tentative concept of operations for each COA, the commander should state, in broad but clear terms, what is to be done, the size of forces deemed necessary, and time in which force needs to be brought to bear.

A tentative concept of operations should be simple and complete. It should address all the elements of organizing the battlefield. It should also include key considerations necessary for developing a scheme of maneuver. Normally, the concept of operations for each COA should include:

a. When own forces will be deployed
b. How and where own forces will be employed
c. Sector of main effort (or main sector of defense)
d. Scheme of maneuver (tentative)
e. Reconnaissance and security operations
f. Reserves.

The scheme of maneuver is the key element of the concept of operations. It should normally include:

a. An outline of the movement of own forces
b. Identification of major objectives to be accomplished
c. Assigned responsibilities for zones, sector, or areas
d. Prescribed dispositions for force elements
e. Identification of maneuver options that may develop during the forthcoming action

f. Identified requirements for combat support and combat service support.

Other considerations in the scheme of maneuver are:

a. Preliminary guidance for nuclear targeting

b. The effects of weapons of mass destruction on own forces

c. Specific aspects of the physical environment

d. Areas and degrees of risk

e. Preliminary composition of reserves

f. Sequencing of tasks

g. Preliminary C² arrangements.

If necessary, and time permits, a synchronization matrix depicting the cumulative actions and effects of force elements (ground, air, naval) and service component actions in the COA can also be prepared. This will be particularly helpful during analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONOPS FOR COURSES OF ACTION:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COA #____:</td>
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<td>COA #____:</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>COA #____:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At this stage of the process, the staff might propose or the commander require a briefing on the COAs developed and retained. The purpose of this briefing is to gain the commander’s approval of the COAs to be further analyzed, to receive guidance on how COAs are to be compared and evaluated, or to receive guidance for revision of briefed COAs or the development of additional COAs.

After a decision is made concerning which COAs will be further analyzed, the commander should provide additional planning guidance to subordinate commands and also request their analysis of the COAs. During crisis action planning, these actions may be completed verbally through the transmission of a change to the original warning order and/or through the release of a commander evaluation request message.
A.6 STEP 5: ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION

The heart of the commander’s estimate process is the analysis of opposing courses of action. Analysis is nothing more than wargaming — either manual or computer assisted. In the previous steps of the estimate, ECOAs and COAs were examined relative to their basic concepts. ECOAs were developed based on enemy capabilities and COAs were developed based on own mission and capabilities. In this step, the Commander and his/her staff conduct a dynamic analysis of the probable affect each ECOA has on the chances of success of each COA. The aim is to develop a sound basis for determining the feasibility and acceptability of the COAs. Predicted outcomes may also show the need to consider additional modifications to the COAs that could mitigate risk or improve their expected performance.

Analysis of opposing courses of action consists of the following:

a. Reexamine the mission statement.

b. Review own/enemy physical objectives.

c. Determine measure(s) of effectiveness.

d. Conduct analysis (gaming) and predict outcomes of each interaction.

e. Interpret the results of the analysis.

f. List COAs retained.

1. Reexamine the Mission Statement: The first step is to reexamine the mission statement. This again reacquaints us with the task(s)/purpose(s) which provide the definition of adequacy.

   **RESTATED MISSION:**

   ![Restated Mission]

2. Review Physical Objectives: Next, review the physical objectives identified during mission analysis and during the development of ECOAs and COAs.

   **PHYSICAL OBJECTIVES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OWN</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
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</thead>
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</tbody>
</table>
3. Measure(s) of Effectiveness: A major part of the commander’s decision is based on predicting and describing the expected results of each possible interaction between own and enemy courses of action. The basic question to be answered is how much better is one course of action than the other in accomplishing the objective? The expected results should be expressed in quantitative terms.

Analysis as applied to the CES process tends to be of the “force-on-force” type wherein the Commander and his/her staff are trying to determine how effective a group of forces might be over a foe when applied in a particular manner. There are many “attributes” that can describe a force or its components — size, forces mix, weaponry, mobility, speed of advance/movement, range/endurance, to name a few. From the list of many there are usually one or more which, in the eyes of the commander or the staff, are most important — these are called “criteria.” Examples of criteria might be numbers of infantry troops, artillery tubes, tanks, missiles/missile launchers, fighters, bombers, surface combatants, etc.

An MOE (combat indices or figure of merit) is an estimation of the degree to which each of the alternative COAs accomplishes what the commander wishes to achieve against each of the ECOAs. As many objectives are difficult to quantify (example: deter, defeat), a substitute that represents a large portion of the objective and that can be measured with reasonable accuracy is necessary — that’s where the criteria come in. “...There are nearly endless possible ways to measure ‘effectiveness’. The art form of measuring effectiveness is to select those which reflect (and allow the resulting analyses to reflect) the differences between the alternatives in terms which are relevant to military missions."

The subjective nature of choosing which criteria will represent the more “unmeasureable” MOE is the crux of a correct analysis. Regardless, some way of expressing the results must be selected.

As each situation is different, there is no established form for expressing a MOE. However, there must be a distinct correlation between the MOE and the mission. A properly selected MOE should satisfy the following requirements:

a. Relate to the physical objective(s) to be accomplished
b. Reflect how well that/those objectives are met (criteria for success as determined during mission analysis)
c. Provide a reasonable basis for comparing the relative merits of the COAs under consideration
d. Reflect the perspective of the commander.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAJOR PHYSICAL OBJECTIVES</th>
<th>CRITERIA</th>
<th>POSSIBLE MOEs (Select at Least One for Analysis)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

The MOE(s) must be closely related to the objective(s) of the forthcoming action. Otherwise, there cannot be a satisfactory way of choosing among the alternative COAs. To provide a basis for comparison, a MOE must be expressed in terms that clearly show the degree of the accomplishment of the given objective. These values

---

are necessarily predicted values. Should there be multiple tasks/physical objectives, multiple MOEs may be required. However, in each case, the MOE will be specifically picked for the objective and there must be a distinct correlation between the MOE and the mission.

MOEs are used in the commander's estimate at all levels of war. The higher the level is, the more ambiguous the MOEs tend to be and, therefore, more difficult to evaluate. Similarly, there are considerable differences among MOEs used in a war on land, at sea, and in the air. For selected examples of MOE, see Annex B.

4. Wargaming — Conduct the analysis and predict the outcomes: The two basic methodologies of wargaming, the interaction between the COAs and ECOAs are manual (mental) wargaming and computer-assisted wargaming. The latter requires time for the setup and data base builds, if data is available. Simulation models that could be used include:

   a. Integrated Theater Engagement Model
   b. Tactical Warfare Model
   c. Joint Conflict Model
   d. Joint integrated contingency model
   e. Extended Air Defense Simulation.

   These models provide “data” on interactions between opposing forces and weapon systems. This data can then be used to provide a quantitative analysis of the predicted outcomes. It is incumbent on the user to have an adequate knowledge of the model: its currency, inputs, outputs, and methodology of resolving the interactions. Never trust the model answer unless you are comfortable with the method that the model uses.

   Manual wargaming is intended to provide an analysis of certain key interactions during each phase of the forthcoming combat action. This type of analysis can look at events constructed at set intervals on a timeline, phasing of key functions by functional area or components, and/or critical events (decision points). Critical events typically encompass the essence of the COA (e.g., can we defend the port facilities?). If time is extremely critical, the analysis will only focus on the most decisive event in the planned combat operation.

   A simple matrix (see Figure A-7) can be used to record the probable results of interactions between COAs and ECOAs graphically. The matrix is essentially a “portrait” of the wargame in which each COA is played against each ECOA to provide the probable outcomes based on the selected physical objective/critical event and MOE. While quantitative measures are desired, either quantitative (numbers, percentages) or subjective (+/-s/-s, adjectives — good, better, best/high, medium, low, etc.) terms can be used to express the outcomes. In constructing the analysis matrix include:

   a. A short title and description of each COA/ECOA for quick reference
   b. Define the physical objective to which the MOE is related
   c. Note and describe (range/threshold) MOE selected.

   The outcomes of military action are dependent on the decisions made by many players on both sides. This analysis is in fact a war game in which own and enemy decisions (action-reaction-counteraction) are played so that conclusions can be drawn as to the probable outcomes of the interactions. Identify the COA/ECOA combination at the beginning of each analysis. The outcome of each interaction should be expressed in a way that predicts the likelihood that the commander’s mission would be accomplished and estimates the probable losses that could be expected on both sides. When the mission includes several major tasks, separate matrices may be used for each task, because the likelihood of their accomplishment will vary with each COA/ECOA combination. Greater insights will be achieved and the process will be sped up if each interaction analysis is limited strictly to the specific COA/ECOA combination that is being war gamed and the same MOE is consistently applied to all similar interactions.
When making predictions of probable outcomes, the commander must consider the relative strengths of forces that are likely to engage each other, taking into account the size and the quality of such forces, their combat readiness and training, methods of employment, the effect of the environment on their actions and other foreseeable aspects of the expected interaction.

Using similar indices for each interaction between COAs and ECOAs, write probable outcomes in the upper part of each square (data on the probable outcomes of actions by one’s own forces should be prepared by the staff in advance). Notes on each interaction, such as expected losses, can be put in the lower part of the cell.

5. Interpret the Results of Analysis: The systematic analysis of each interaction should provide the commander some valuable insights into the dynamics of the action. The analysis may reveal to the commander what factors might indeed become the keys to success. Note any particular advantages/disadvantages of each COA as they come to light through the analysis. Comparisons of these advantages/disadvantages (along with others previously noted) will be conducted during the next step of the estimate. However, if the inadequacy, unfeasibility, or unacceptability of a COA becomes readily apparent during the analysis, the commander should modify or discard it and concentrate on the other COAs. Modifications made to individual COAs must be applied to all COAs (where appropriate). The need to create additional combinations of COAs may also become apparent.

Should the number of COAs for evaluation be unwieldy at this point (for instance, because of the time available), the analysis may be used to reduce them by arbitrarily setting a threshold so as to eliminate the weaker COAs. When comparing a single COA to all ECOAs, determine the number of times in which the MOE has been met; write that number in the MOE OCCUR column (see Figure A-8). Carry forward only those that meet the arbitrarily set threshold.
6. List COAs Retained: After the analysis of the interactions is completed, the commander lists all retained COAs, including those that have been combined. Only adequate COAs are retained. Normally, this step of the commander’s estimate should result in at least three COAs retained; however, this is dependent on time available and level of combat action.

**Note**

The use of MOEs alone should not be the sole criteria for discarding or retaining of a particular COA.
A.7 STEP 6: COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION

The sixth step in the commander’s estimate is a comparison of the remaining courses of action. The commander and staff develop and evaluate a list of important governing factors, consider each COA’s advantages and disadvantages, identify actions to overcome disadvantages, make final tests for feasibility and acceptability and weigh the relative merits of each. Finally, the commander selects the single COA that, in his/her estimation, offers the greatest chance of accomplishing the mission. The reconciliation of objectives in this step of the commander’s estimate must be tied to the mission.

1. Governing Factors: The comparison of COAs begins with governing factors — those aspects of the situation (or externally imposed factors) that the commander deems decisive to the accomplishment of his/her mission. Potential influencing factors include elements of the commander’s intent, selected principles of war, external constraints, and even anticipated future operations for involved forces or against this same objective. For selected examples of governing factors see Annex C.

The techniques for conducting the comparison vary, but all of them must assist the commander in reaching a sound decision. Normally, a decision matrix (Figure A-9) is used to ease this process. This matrix numerically portrays subjectively chosen and subjectively weighted indicators. Each staff member may use his/her own matrix or recommend his/her own choice of governing factors based on his/her respective area of responsibility. The commander reviews this list and deletes or adds to it as he/she sees fit. The list need not be a lengthy one; there should be relatively few factors that will differentiate what makes a particular COA the best. Some general comments for creating the decision matrix:

   a. Having determined the governing factors, ensure each is defined so its meaning is understood by all. (For example, if MASS is selected as a factor, is MASS good as in massing effects, or is it bad as in complicating operational protection.)

   b. Prioritize the governing factors by overall importance. (This assists in determining if weights should be assigned to each.)

   c. Determine the range of values which may be assigned. The higher number in the range indicates the better value. Keep the numbers manageable in order to be meaningful.

As demonstrated in the completed decision matrix of Annex D, the governing factors may be evaluated on their individual merits (all weights equal) or each factor may be weighted for importance.

   a. When assigning weights, the question should be asked, “is this factor really two (or three) times more important than that factor?”

   b. The weights are multiplied by the initially assigned score in each column. The results are then totaled.

The result obtained is not meant to be absolute or objective in nature. However, if the same criteria are ruthlessly applied to all COAs, the relative ranking and the merits (or faults) of each should be readily apparent. Note that each situation is different and requires a different set and number of governing factors to be established.

2. List Advantages and Disadvantages of Each COA Retained: This is perhaps the most valuable part of the comparison as it is here that the tradeoffs between the COAs should be most apparent. The advantages and disadvantages of any particular COA could be quite lengthy and detailed. Many advantages and disadvantages should be carried forward from the conception and analysis steps. Performance relative to the MOE developed earlier (during analysis) and any governing factor(s) established by the commander can be used as well. Figure A-10 provides a format.

3. Identify Actions to Overcome Disadvantages: In considering disadvantages of each COA, consider what additional actions, if any, might be taken to reduce or overcome disadvantages made apparent by the analysis.

   Note

To maintain an unbiased approach in COA selection, actions proposed to overcome disadvantages in one COA must be applied to all the retained COAs (where appropriate).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOVERNING FACTORS</th>
<th>WT</th>
<th>COA #1</th>
<th>COA #2</th>
<th>COA #3</th>
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</table>

**Figure A-9. Sample Decision Matrix**
(Not all possible “governing factors” are displayed)
4. Make Final Test for Feasibility: Before selecting the final COA, the commander applies a final test for feasibility (can it be done with the assets available?). Courses of action that fail this test should be discarded.

DISCARDED COAs: __________ __________ __________ __________

5. Make Final Test for Acceptability: Make final test for acceptability (is the cost worth the risk?). COAs that fail this test should be discarded.

DISCARDED COAs: __________ __________ __________ __________

6. Compare the Merits of COAs: The commander compares the various remaining COAs and selects the one which, in the commander’s judgment, best satisfies the requirements of the mission. The commander should also ask: “Is this the utmost I can do in carrying out my mission?” This question requires a resounding “yes!” The commander relies heavily on professional judgment and experience in making a final selection of COA. The remaining COAs should not be discarded; they may be retained as possible branches, alternate plans, or deception plans.

However, the commander may find none of the COAs analyzed to be valid. Consequently, new COAs would need to be developed. They must also be tested for adequacy and then analyzed against each ECOA in order to predict the outcomes of the new COAs against each ECOA. If, after all analysis and comparison, no COAs are found adequate, feasible, and acceptable, the commander should present the examined options along with supporting facts to the superior commander. The commander should point out what could be accomplished under the circumstances and estimate what additional forces would be required to accomplish the original mission. It is then the responsibility of the superior commander to either order that a selected COA be carried out despite the consequences or change the original mission statement.

Remember, the second best COA should not be discarded, but retained to serve as the basis for developing an alternate plan or deception plan.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COA</th>
<th>ADVANTAGES</th>
<th>DISADVANTAGES</th>
<th>MODIFICATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>#3:</td>
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<tr>
<td>#Nth:</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Any changes to overcome disadvantages should be applied to all COAs.

Figure A-10. Comparison of Advantages/Disadvantages and Modifications
A.8 STEP 7: THE DECISION

The decision is a brief statement by the commander that clearly, concisely, and in a straightforward manner sets forth the selected COA. The commander makes a decision based upon his/her knowledge, experience, his/her estimate of the situation, and his/her confidence in his/her staff. The responsibility for making a decision rests solely on the commander, though his/her staff provides input. The commander must announce the decision to the staff and transmit it to both subordinate units and the superior who sent the original tasking directive.

A decision must include (like any COA) the elements of What, Who, When, Where, How, and Why. Each of these elements should be explained in writing in relation to the physical environment in which the expected action is to take place. Normally, a decision should include a concept of operations so that the planners can develop a plan for the forthcoming combat action.

1. WHAT: A statement of what the COA will accomplish when executed — the mission.

2. Who: Normally refers to the command as whole, but may refer to a specific subordinate element.

3. WHEN: A statement of when the COA is to be carried out (i.e., at H-hour or on D-day).

4. Where: A description of the geographic area or position from which the selected COA is to be carried out.

5. How: A general description of the scheme of maneuver of a force or formation tasked to carry out the selected COA. Details of this element of the COA are normally reserved for the concept of operations.

6. Why: Usually a brief statement of the purpose of the forthcoming action. Additional details may be included in the concept of operations.

A.8.1 The Commander’s Concept of Operations. After the commander has announced his/her decision, he/she also provides his/her concept of operations — an elaboration of the selected COA. It must include the commander’s “vision” of how major events are expected to occur in the forthcoming combat action. Therefore, he/she must provide his/her commander’s intent. The concept of operations must be developed quickly so that subordinate commanders have the time necessary to prepare their units for the forthcoming action.

A.8.1.1 Purpose. The principal purpose of the concept of operations is to clarify the commander’s intent with respect to the deployment, employment, and support of own forces and assets and to identify major objectives and target dates for their attainment. The concept of operations helps detailed planning by the staff in preparing the operations order. It also ensures that these orders are developed according to his/her intent for the forthcoming action. The decision statement and concept of operations together are necessary elements of paragraph 3 of the operations order. During detailed planning, these two elements become the formal concept of operations, which is then issued to subordinate commanders as part of the operations order.
A.8.1.2 Content. The content of the concept of operations varies depending on the commander and whether it is given in writing or verbally. The written concept found in paragraph 3 of the operations order is normally a concise statement. The length of the oral statement depends primarily on how much information the staff needs to be able to accomplish detailed planning and upon the commander’s confidence in his/her staff. So, the commander may provide many or few details. However, the concept of operations normally specifies only major objectives and force elements. It also must clearly state the sector of main effort or thrust. The commander also explains his/her scheme of maneuver, supporting actions, command and control arrangements, the priority of fires, and how operational reserves are to be employed. In cases where the use of weapons of mass destruction is anticipated, the commander must address these issues in his/her concept of operations.

A.8.1.3 Elements of the Concept of Operations (suggested list; not all inclusive):

1. Decision statement
2. Physical objective(s)
3. Commander’s intent
4. Scheme of maneuver
5. Sector of main effort
6. Phasing
7. Cover and deception
8. Employment of force elements (ground, naval, air, special forces, etc.)
9. Fires (type, purpose, priorities)
10. Allocation of combat and combat support (CS) forces
11. NBC (offensive and/or defensive)
12. Reserves (designation, purpose, location, and anticipated employment).
COMMANDER’S CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

COMMANDER’S INTENT:
ANNEX A-1

Selected Examples of Planning Assumptions

1. Shipping and air augmentation assets will be available when the country YELLOW becomes involved in the hostilities.

2. Country YELLOW will remain neutral, but will deploy major part of its forces along the border of country BROWN.

3. Country GREEN will (not) allow use of its ports and airheads for transit of BLUE forces.

4. Canal ZULU will remain open during hostilities for all U.S. shipping.

5. Country PURPLE and YELLOW will (not) remain neutral.

6. Country GREEN will (not) allow overflight rights to U.S. aircraft.

7. Country ORANGE will (not) provide basing rights for U.S. ships (not) carrying nuclear weapons.

8. Country CRIMSON will (not) allow basing of U.S. ships and aircraft if they do (not) conduct combat missions against country RED.

9. Country BROWN will not grant basing rights to the enemy forces.

10. RED forces will (not) use weapons of mass destruction.

11. No RED reinforcements are expected in the BRAVO area.

12. RED force ALFA will (not) use air surveillance/targeting aircraft.

13. Ratios of forces will (not) remain unchanged for the next 48 hours.

14. BLUE forces will (not) be attacked from space.
ANNEX A-2

Selected Examples of Measures of Effectiveness

A-2.1  INTRODUCTION

MOEs are used in the estimate of the situation conducted by the joint and component commanders and can refer to joint, land, airspace, and naval warfare. Depending on the level of war, they can be expressed in terms of methods of force combat employment (tactical actions — battles, engagements, etc.; major operations; or campaigns); service or force tasks to be done (e.g., offensive/defensive counter air, close air support, reconnaissance, sea control/denial, undersea warfare, surface warfare, etc.); lengths of time the action is conducted (hours, days, weeks, and even months); and the size of the physical environment in which the actions take place (i.e., combat zone, area of operations, theater of operations, and even theater of war). Finally, they are applied in the conduct of offensive and/or defensive operations.

A-2.2  LAND WARFARE

A primary MOE in ground combat is the probability of success in relation to casualty and time constraints. Typical MOEs used in ground combat analysis are:

1. Probability of success in achieving the mission
2. Rate of advance or withdrawal (km/miles per day or high/medium/low rates)
3. Time (days/weeks/months) to accomplish the assigned objective
4. Attrition rates inflicted on enemy (in percentages)
5. Ratios of own/enemy casualties
6. Comparative combat power.

A-2.3  AIR WARFARE

MOEs used may include:

1. Exchange ratios in 1V1 encounters
2. Exchange ratios in nth-on-nth battle/major operation
3. Probability of shooting down a given fraction of penetrating aircraft
4. Probability of zero penetration to key targets
5. Percent of penetrators destroyed before releasing weapons
6. Tons of weapons delivered
7. Tons of weapons delivered within “x”-time of request of support
8. Percent of request for support carried out within “x”-time
9. Percentage of targets destroyed vs. sorties flown
10. Percentage of targets hit
11. Percent change in the rate of enemy resupply
12. Percentage (or tons) of weapons delivered on targets
13. Probability of delaying commitment of second-echelon
14. Percent reduction in attrition of own strike aircraft
15. Probabilities of shutting down air activity at an enemy airfield (or airfields in a given area of operation) for at least “x” time
16. Fraction of the enemy on-ground aircraft destroyed
17. Exchange ratios (enemy/own aircraft losses)
18. Probability of a target kill
19. Fraction of target value destroyed.

Some criteria for air combat actually relate to the time-phased allocation of air missions during a battle/major operation. One example is the percent of tactical air sorties in an operation devoted to close air support within “x” days after D-day. Emphasis on close air support during the first days of a war may yield lower close air support sorties in an operation than could be obtained by allocating more sorties to air superiority sorties at the outset.

A-2.4 NAVAL WARFARE

MOEs used may include:

1. Degree of target degradation (in percentage or capabilities)
2. Number of ships sunk or damaged
3. Hampering enemy maritime traffic (25 to 30 percent vessels sunk)
4. Curtailing (30 to 60 percent vessels sunk)
5. Breakdown of enemy maritime traffic (60 to 80 percent vessels sunk)
6. Cutting off enemy maritime traffic (at least 80 percent vessels sunk)
7. Tons of shipping sunk per submarine per day at sea
8. Tons of new ships built per month
9. The number of enemy submarines sunk
10. Ratios of cargo arrived/destroyed (in tons or percentages)
11. Attrition of own convoys (percentage or number of ships that survived enemy action).

MOEs can also relate to joint/combined/multinational operations during conduct of war or military operations other than war. It is equally important to be able to measure “success” in MOOTW as it is during the planning of combat operations. However, knowing when success has been achieved is dependent on how it is defined and the ability to discover the appropriate MOE.

A-2.5 WAR

MOEs used may include:

1. Success of defense or attack
2. Restoration of integrity of national boundaries
3. Ability to flow follow-on forces into the theater
4. Success of embargo/blockade/maritime interception operations
5. Destruction of critical C² nodes
6. Establishment of air supremacy
7. Ability of coalition partners to provide for own defense
8. Destruction (percent) of adversaries’ offensive capabilities

A-2.6 MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER-THAN-WAR

MOEs used may include:

1. Number of people fed
2. Tons of food available in secure warehouses
3. Number of deaths caused by disease/starvation
4. Ability of host government to _______________________________________________________________________
5. Ability of host nation infrastructure to support __________________________________________________________________________
6. Free elections supervised by _________________________________________________________________________________________
7. Establishment of a __________________________________________________________ police force
8. Number of inoculations
9. Number of reports of government abuses
10. Percentage of decrease in the number of people leaving government controlled areas
11. Public support for __________________________________________________________________________.
ANNEX A-3

Examples of Governing Factors

1. Which is most decisive?
2. Which is least complicated by rules of engagement?
3. Which allows the greatest flexibility in selecting the time and place of the action?
4. Which is easiest to support from the perspective of command, control, and communications?
5. Which offers best logistics/sustainability?
6. Which makes the enemy’s logistic support most difficult?
7. Which is most dependent on weather? on terrain?
8. Which offers best use of our transportation links?
9. Which has the most adverse affect on the enemy’s center of gravity?
10. Which allows the accomplishment of the assigned objective in the shortest time?
11. Which will best facilitate the attainment of the next objective?
12. Which best capitalizes on the principles of war (MOOSEMUS) or principles of MOOTW (SLURPO)? (List each.)
13. Which offers the fewest losses?
14. Which inflicts the largest losses on the enemy?
15. Which offers the greatest hope of splitting the enemy’s coalition?
16. Which will most strengthen the cohesion of our coalition?
17. Which will reduce the enemy morale the most?
18. Which offers the most favorable ratio of relative combat power?
19. Which will best facilitate future operations?
## ANNEX A-4

### Sample Decision Matrix

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<th>GOVERNING FACTORS</th>
<th>WT</th>
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<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEIGHTED TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>86</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Numerical values for each governing factor are assigned after the COA are war gamed. These values reflect the relative advantages or disadvantages of each governing factor for each COA.

2. These numbers provide a subjective evaluation of the best COA without weighting one governing factor over another.

3. The weights are multiplied by the initially assigned score in each column.

4. Scores are totaled to provide a “best” COA based on weights assigned by the commander.
APPENDIX B

Formats for Estimates

CLASSIFICATION

Issuing Headquarters
Place
Day, Month, Year, Hour, Zone

B.1 COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

( ) REFERENCES:  
a. Maps and charts  
b. Other pertinent documents

1. ( ) MISSION. State the assigned or deduced task and its purpose. If the mission is multiple, determine priorities. List any intermediate tasks, prescribed or deduced, necessary to the accomplishment of the mission.

2. ( ) THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION

a. ( ) Considerations Affecting the Possible Courses of Action. Determine and analyze those factors that will influence the choice of a course of action as well as those which affect the capabilities of the enemy. Consider such of the following and other factors as are involved and include under each a statement of each fact (or an assumption if necessary), and deduce the probable influence on enemy or friendly actions.

(1) ( ) Characteristics of the Area of Operations

(a) ( ) Military Geography

1. ( ) Topography. Consider factors of relief and drainage, vegetation, surface materials, and similar characteristics because they affect such elements of an operation as observation, maneuver, fire support, concealment, cover, air and surface movement, lines of communication, avenues of approach, key terrain, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons employment, electronic emissions of all types, and unconventional, psychological, and other significant activities.

2. ( ) Hydrography. Include the characteristics of offshore sea areas, approaches to the beaches, currents, tides, the beaches themselves, ports, docks, and similar maritime considerations.

3. ( ) Climate and Weather. Extremes of temperature, wind velocities, cloud cover, visibility, precipitation, and other such factors that can affect military operations should be determined and presented. Sunrise, sunset, and twilight data are normally given in this subparagraph.

(b) ( ) Transportation. Indicate characteristics of roads, railways, inland waterways, and airfields, including such factors as size, capacity, conditions, and other facts that affect enemy capabilities and friendly courses of action.
(c) Telecommunications. List radio, cable, landline, and other communications facilities in the area of operations that might aid in the exercise of command over military forces. Facilities considered by this subparagraph are not those in the organic capability of the opposing forces, but rather those present in the area.

(d) Politics. Include such considerations as political stability, alliances, relations with other countries, aspects of international law, control over subversion and dissidence, and similar factors that may influence the selection of a course of action. Neutrality or belligerency of neighboring states in the area is often listed here.

(e) Economics. Include the organization of the economy and sometimes its mobilization capacity; the industrial base of the antagonists to support hostilities, finance, foreign trade; and similar influences as they affect selection of a course of action.

(f) Sociology. Consider social conditions that run a wide range from the psychological ability of the populace to withstand the rigors of war, to health and sanitation conditions in the area of operations. Language, social institutions and attitudes, and similar factors that may affect the selection of a course of action must be considered.

(g) Science and Technology. Although little immediate military impact may result from the state of science and technology in a target area, consider the long-range effects of such factors as technical skill level of the population and scientific and technical resources in manpower and facilities in cases where they may affect the choice of a course of action.

(2) Relative Combat Power

(a) Enemy

1. Strength. Give number and size of enemy units committed and those available for reinforcement in the area. This is not intended to be a tabulation of numbers of aircraft, ships, missiles, or other military weaponry. Rather, it is a study of what the enemy commander can bring to bear in the area in terms of ground units committed and reinforcing, aircraft sortie rates, missile delivery rates, unconventional, psychological, and other strengths the commander thinks may affect the balance of power.

2. Composition. Include order of battle of major enemy combat formations, equivalent strengths of enemy and friendly units, and major weapon systems and armaments in the enemy arsenal and their operational characteristics.

3. Location and Disposition. Indicate geographical location of enemy units, fire support elements, command and control facilities, air, naval, and missile forces, and other combat power in or deployable to the area of operations.

4. Reinforcements. Estimate the enemy reinforcement capabilities that can influence the battle in the area under consideration. This study should include ground, air, naval, and missile forces; nuclear, biological, chemical, and other advanced weapon systems; and an estimate of the relative capacity to move these forces about, to, and in the battle area.

5. Logistics. Summarize the enemy ability to support the capabilities with which they have been credited and include such considerations as supply, maintenance, hospitalization and evacuation, transportation, labor, construction, and other essential logistic means. Broadly speaking, it is a feasibility test for enemy capabilities.

6. Time and Space Factors. Estimate where and when initial forces and reinforcements can be deployed and employed. Such a study will normally include distances and travel times by land, sea, and air from major bases or mounting areas into the battle area.
7. ( ) Combat Efficiency. Estimate enemy state of training, readiness, battle experience, physical condition, morale, leadership, motivation, tactical doctrine, discipline, and whatever significant strengths or weaknesses may appear from the preceding paragraphs.

(b) ( ) Friendly. In general, follow the same pattern used for analysis of the enemy when appraising the commander’s own force. The description of what to consider and the approach to the problem outlined in subparagraph 2a(2)(a) apply to analysis of friendly forces.

(3) ( ) Assumptions. Assumptions are intrinsically important factors on which the conduct of the operation is based and must be noted as such in paragraph 2 of the commander’s estimate.

b. ( ) Enemy Capabilities. State the enemy capabilities that can affect the accomplishment of the commander’s mission. (Enemy capabilities are obtained from the intelligence estimate of the situation.)

c. ( ) Own Courses of Action. State all practicable courses of action open to the commander that, if successful, would accomplish the mission.

3. ( ) ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION. Determine the probable effect of each enemy capability on the success of each of the commander’s own courses of action.

4. ( ) COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION. Weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each of the commander’s courses of action with respect to the governing factors. Decide which course of action promises to be the most successful in accomplishing the mission.

5. ( ) DECISION. Translate the course of action selected into a concise statement of what the force as a whole is to do, and so much of the elements of when, where, how, and why as may be appropriate.

(Signed) ______________________________

Commander

ANNEXES: (As required: by letter and title)

DISTRIBUTION: (According to policies and procedures of the issuing headquarters)
B.2 INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

CLASSIFICATION

Issuing Headquarters
Place of Issue
Day, Month, Year, Hour, Zone

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER ____________________

b. Other relevant documents.

1. ( ) MISSION. State the assigned task and its purpose. The mission of the command as a whole is taken from the commander’s mission analysis, planning guidance, or other statement.

2. ( ) ENEMY SITUATION. State conditions that exist and indication of effects of these conditions on enemy capabilities and the assigned mission. This paragraph describes the area of operations, the enemy military situation, and the effect of these two factors on enemy capabilities.

   a. ( ) Characteristics of the Area of Operations. Discuss the effect of the physical characteristics of the area of operations on military activities of both combatants. If an analysis of the area has been prepared separately, this paragraph in the intelligence estimate may simply refer to it, then discuss the effects of the existing situation on military operations in the area.

      (1) ( ) Military Geography

          (a) Topography

              1. ( ) Existing Situation. Describe relief and drainage, vegetation, surface materials, cultural features, and other characteristics in terms of their effect on key terrain, observation, fields of fire, obstacles, cover and concealment, avenues of approach, lines of communication, and landing areas and zones.

              2. ( ) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effect of topography on broad enemy capabilities such as attack and defense, describing generally how the topography affects each type of activity. The effect on employment of nuclear and CB weapons; amphibious, airborne, or air-landed forces; surveillance devices and systems; communications equipment and systems; electronic warfare; psychological operations, OPSEC and military deception; logistic support; and other appropriate considerations should be included.

              3. ( ) Effect on Friendly Course of Action. Discuss the effects of topography on friendly forces’ military operations (attack, defense, etc.) in the same fashion as for enemy capabilities in the preceding subparagraphs.

          (b) ( ) Hydrography

              1. ( ) Existing Situation. Describe the nature of the coastline; adjacent islands; location, extent, and capacity of landing beaches and their approaches and exits; nature of the offshore approaches, including type of bottom and gradients; natural obstacles; surf, tide, and current conditions.

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1 When this estimate is distributed outside the issuing headquarters, the first line of the heading is the official designation of the issuing command, and the ending of the estimate is modified to include authentication by the authoring section, division, or other official according to local policy.

2 Normally, these are numbered sequentially during a calendar year.
2. ( ) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the existing situation on broad enemy capabilities.

3. ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the existing situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(c) ( ) Climate and Weather

1. ( ) Existing Situation. Describe temperature, cloud cover, visibility, precipitation, light data, and other climate and weather conditions and their general effects on roads, rivers, soil trafficability, and observation.

2. ( ) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the existing climate and weather situation on broad enemy capabilities.

3. ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the existing climate and weather situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(2) ( ) Transportation

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe roads, railways, inland waterways, airfields, and other physical characteristics of the transportation system; capabilities of the transportation system in terms of rolling stock, barge capacities, and terminal facilities; and other pertinent data.

(b) ( ) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the existing transportation system and capabilities on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the existing transportation system and capabilities on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(3) ( ) Telecommunications

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe telecommunication facilities and capabilities in the area.

(b) ( ) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the existing telecommunications situation on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the existing telecommunications situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(4) ( ) Politics

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe the organization and operation of civil government in the area of operation.

(b) ( ) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Consider the effects of the political situation on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Consider the effects of the political situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(5) ( ) Economics

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe industry, public works and utilities, finance, banking, currency, commerce, agriculture, trades and professions, labor force, and other related factors.
(b) ( ) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the economic situation on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the economic situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(6) ( ) Sociology

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe language, religion, social institutions and attitudes, minority groups, population distribution, health and sanitation, and other related factors.

(b) ( ) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the sociological situation on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the sociological situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(7) ( ) Science and Technology

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe the level of science and technology in the area of operations.

(b) ( ) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of science and technology on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of science and technology on broad COAs for friendly forces.

b. ( ) Enemy Military Situation (Ground, Naval, Air, Other Service)

(1) ( ) Strength. State the number and size of enemy units committed and enemy reinforcements available for use in the area of operations. Ground strength, air power, naval forces, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, electronic warfare, unconventional warfare, surveillance potential, and all other strengths (that might be significant) are considered.

(2) ( ) Composition. Outline the structure of enemy forces (order of battle) and describe unusual organizational features, identity, armament, and weapon systems.

(3) ( ) Location and Disposition. Describe the geographic location of enemy forces in the area, including fire support elements; command and control facilities; air, naval, and missile forces; and bases.

(4) ( ) Availability of Reinforcements. Describe enemy reinforcement capabilities in terms of ground, air, naval, missile, nuclear, biological, and chemical forces and weapons; terrain, weather, road and rail nets, transportation, replacements, labor forces, prisoner of war policy; and possible aid from sympathetic or participating neighbors.

(5) ( ) Movements and Activities. Describe the latest known enemy activities in the area.

(6) ( ) Logistics. Describe levels of supply, resupply ability, and capacity of beaches, ports, roads, railways, airfields, and other facilities to support supply and resupply. Consider hospitalization and evacuation, military construction, labor resources, and maintenance of combat equipment.

(7) ( ) Operational Capability to Launch Missiles. Describe the total missile capability that can be brought to bear on forces operating in the area, including characteristics of missile systems, location and capacity of launch or delivery units, initial and sustained launch rates, size and location of stockpiles, and other pertinent factors.
(8) **Serviceability and Operational Rates of Aircraft.** Describe the total aircraft inventory by type, performance characteristics of operational aircraft, initial and sustained sortie rates of aircraft by type, and other pertinent factors.

(9) **Operational Capabilities of Combatant Vessels.** Describe the number, type, and operational characteristics of ships, boats, and craft in the naval inventory; base location; and capacity for support.

(10) **Technical Characteristics of Equipment.** Describe the technical characteristics of major items of equipment in the enemy inventory not already considered (such as missiles, aircraft, and naval vessels).

(11) **Electronics Intelligence.** Describe the enemy intelligence-gathering capability using electronic devices.

(12) **Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons.** Describe the types and characteristics of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the enemy inventory, stockpile data, delivery capabilities, nuclear, biological, and chemical employment policies and techniques, and other pertinent factors.

(13) **Significant Strengths and Weaknesses.** Discuss the significant enemy strengths and weaknesses perceived from the facts presented in the preceding subparagraphs.

c. **Enemy Unconventional and Psychological Warfare Situation**

(1) **Guerrilla.** Describe the enemy capability for, policy with regard to, and current status in the area of guerrilla or insurgent operations.

(2) **Psychological.** Describe enemy doctrine, techniques, methods, organization for, and conduct of psychological operations in the area of operations.

(3) **Subversion.** Describe enemy doctrine, techniques, methods, organization for, and conduct of subversion in the area of operations.

(4) **Sabotage.** Outline enemy organization and potential for and conduct of sabotage in the area of operations.

3. **ENEMY CAPABILITIES.** List each enemy capability that can affect the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Each enemy capability should contain information on the following: What the enemy can do; where they can do it; when they can start it and get it done; what strength they can devote to the task. In describing enemy capabilities, the J-2 must be able to tell the commander what the enemy can do using its forces in a joint effort. First, of course, the J-2 must assess the enemy’s ground, naval, and air forces. It is customary to enumerate separately the WMD and unconventional warfare capacities. Hypothetical examples follow:

a. **Ground Capabilities**

(1) The enemy can attack at any time along our front with an estimated 6 infantry divisions and 2 tank divisions supported by 24 battalions of artillery.

(2) The enemy can defend now in its present position with 7 infantry divisions supported by 2 tank divisions and 16 battalions of medium and light artillery.

(3) The enemy can reinforce its attack (or defense) with all or part of the following units in the times and places indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PLACE</th>
<th>TIME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>315th Airborne Div</td>
<td>Vicinity RESOGA</td>
<td>8 hr after starting time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41st Motorized Div</td>
<td>Vicinity CARDINAL</td>
<td>6 hr after starting time</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. ( ) Air Capabilities

(1) ( ) Starting now and based on an estimated strength of 300 fighters and 100 medium bomber aircraft, the enemy can attack in the area of operations with 240 fighter sorties per day for the first 2 days, followed by a sustained rate of 150 sorties per day and 60 bomber sorties per day for 1 day followed by a sustained rate of 48 sorties per day.

(2) ( ) Using airfields in the vicinity of ______, the enemy has sufficient transport sorties to lift one regiment in a single lift to airfields in the vicinity of ______, ______, and ______ within 4 hours of flying time.

c. ( ) Naval Capabilities. Starting now, the enemy can conduct sustained sea and air operations in the entire area with 6 DDs, 4 FFs, 1 CV, 7 SSNs, a mine force of 20 craft, and 70 gunboats and smaller craft now on station in the area.

d. ( ) Nuclear Capabilities. The enemy can employ at any time and in any part of the area of operations an estimated 40 to 60 nuclear weapons of yields from 2 to 50 kt delivered by cannon and rocket artillery, guided missile, and aircraft.

e. ( ) CB Capabilities. The enemy can employ the CB agents ____,______, and ____ in the area of operations at any time delivered by air, cannon, and rocket artillery and by guided missile.

f. ( ) UW Capability. The enemy can conduct UW operations in the area within 10 days after starting the operation using dissident ethnic elements and the political adversaries of the current government.

g. ( ) Joint Capabilities. The enemy can continue to defend in its present position with 6 infantry divisions, supported by 16 artillery battalions, and reinforced by 3 mechanized divisions within 8 hours after starting movement. Enemy defense also can be supported by 150 fighter sorties daily for a sustained period and by continuous naval surface and air operations employing 6 DDs, 4 FFs, 7 SSNs, and 1 CV.

4. ( ) ANALYSIS OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES. Analyze each capability in light of the assigned mission, considering all applicable factors from paragraph 2 above, and attempt to determine and give reasons for the relative order of probability of adoption by the enemy. An examination of each enemy capability should include a discussion of the factors that favor or militate against their adoption by the enemy and when applicable, enemy vulnerabilities attendant to that capability (i.e., conditions or circumstances of the enemy situation that render the enemy especially liable to damage, deception, or defeat). Finally, the analysis should also include a discussion of any indications that point to possible adoption of the capability. For example, the following:

a. ( ) Attack now with forces along the forward edge of the battle area....

(1) ( ) The following factorsfavor the enemy’s adoption of this capability:

(a) ( ) ....

(b) ( ) ....

(2) ( ) The following factors militate against the enemy’s adoption of this capability:

(a) ( ) Road and rail nets will not support large-scale troop and supply movements necessary for an attack in the area.

(b) ( ) Terrain in the area does not favor an attack.
(3) ( ) Adoption of this capability will expose the enemy’s west flank to counterattack.

(4) ( ) Except for minor patrol activity in the area, there are no indications of adoption of this capability.

b. ( ) Delay from present positions along the ___ River line....

(1) ( ) The following factors favor the enemy’s adoption of this capability:

(a) ( ) There are several excellent natural barriers between the ____ River and the ____ Mountains.

(b) ( ) The effectiveness of the water barriers will improve, and trafficability on the upland slopes of the terrain barriers will deteriorate with advent of the monsoon.

(2) ( ) The following factors militate against the enemy’s adoption of this capability:

(a) ( ) ....

(b) ( ) ....

(3) ( ) In the adoption of this capability, the enemy’s lines of communication will be restricted by a limited road and rail net that can easily be interdicted.

(4) ( ) The following facts indicate adoption of this capability:

(a) ( ) Aerial photography indicates some preparation of barriers in successive positions.

(b) ( ) Considerable troop movement and pre-positioning of floating bridge equipment along the water barriers have been detected.

5. ( ) CONCLUSIONS

Conclusions resulting from discussion in paragraph 4 above. Include, when possible, a concise statement of the effects of each capability on the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Cite enemy vulnerabilities where applicable. This paragraph contains a summary of enemy capabilities most likely to be adopted, listed in the order of relative probability if sufficient information is available to permit such an estimate. If appropriate, it should also include a concise statement of the effects of each enemy capability on the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Exploitable vulnerabilities should also be listed, where applicable.

a. ( ) Enemy Capabilities in Relative Probability of Adoption

(1) ( ) Defend in present locations with ....

(2) ( ) Delay from present positions along ....

(3) ( ) Reinforce the defense or delay with ....

(4) ( ) Conduct UW operations in the area ....
b. ( ) Vulnerabilities

(1) ( ) Enemy left (west) flank is open to envelopment by amphibious assault ....

(2) ( ) The enemy’s air search radar coverage is poor in the left (west) portion of its defensive sector ....

(Signed) ______________________________

J-2

(The staff division chief signs the staff estimates produced by that division. If the estimate is to be distributed outside the headquarters, the heading and signature block must be changed to reflect that fact.)

ANNEXES: (By letter and title) Annexes should be included where the information is in graphs or of such detail and volume that inclusion makes the body of the estimate cumbersome. They should be lettered sequentially as they occur throughout the estimate.

DISTRIBUTION: (According to procedures and policies of the issuing headquarters)
B.3 LOGISTIC ESTIMATE

CLASSIFICATION

Issuing Headquarters
Place
Date-time Group, Month, Year

LOGISTIC ESTIMATE NUMBER ___________

( ) REFERENCES: a. Maps and charts
   b. Other pertinent documents.

1. ( ) MISSION. State the mission of the command as a whole, taken from the commander’s mission analysis, planning guidance, or other statements.

2. ( ) SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS
   a. ( ) Characteristics of the Area of Operation. Summarize data about the area, taken from the intelligence estimate or area study, with specific emphasis on significant factors affecting logistic activities.
   b. ( ) Enemy Forces
      (1) ( ) Strength and Dispositions. Refer to current intelligence estimate.
      (2) ( ) Enemy Capabilities. Discuss enemy capabilities, taken from the current intelligence estimate, with specific emphasis on their impact on the logistic situation. Address enemy abilities to interdict strategic sealift and airlift, to attack and reduce the effectiveness of transportation nodes, and to attack pre-positioned stocks ashore and afloat, if applicable.
   c. ( ) Friendly Forces
      (1) ( ) Present Disposition of Major Elements. Include an estimate of their strengths.
      (2) ( ) Own Courses of Action. State the proposed COAs under consideration, obtained from operations or plans division.
      (3) ( ) Probable Tactical Developments. Review major deployments and logistic preparations necessary in all phases of the operation proposed.
   d. ( ) Logistic Situation. State known personnel problems, if any, that may affect the logistic situation.
   e. ( ) Command, Control, and Communications Situation. State the command, control, and communications situation, emphasizing known command, control, and communications problems that may affect the logistic situation.

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3 When this estimate is distributed outside the issuing headquarters, the first line of the heading is the official designation of the issuing command, and the ending of the estimate is modified to include authentication by the authoring section, division, or other official according to local policy.

4 Normally, these are numbered sequentially during a calendar year.
f. ( ) **Assumptions.** State assumptions about the logistic aspects of the situation made for this estimate. Because basic assumptions for the operation already have been made and will appear in planning guidance and in the plan itself, they should not be repeated here. Certain logistic assumptions may have been made in preparing this estimate, and those should be stated.

g. ( ) **Special Features.** Special features not covered elsewhere in the estimate that may influence the logistic situation may be stated here.

h. ( ) **Logistic Situation**

   (1) ( ) **Supply and Service Installations.** Describe and give location of key supply and service installations that will be used to support the operation.

   (2) ( ) **Supply.** State availability of PWRS, authorized levels of supply, known deficiencies of supply stocks and supply systems, and responsibilities and policies regarding supply.

   (3) ( ) **Transportation.** List air, sea, and surface transportation availability, coordination, regulations, lift capability, responsibilities, and policies regarding supply.

   (4) ( ) **Medical Services.** Describe availability of evacuation and hospital facilities and medical responsibilities and policies, including the anticipated evacuation policy.

   (5) ( ) **Civil Engineering Support.** List responsibilities for civil engineering support, limiting factors, and other appropriate considerations.

   (6) ( ) **Miscellaneous.** Include other logistic matters not considered elsewhere that may influence selection of a specific COA. Include identity of known deficiencies of combat service support. Include identity of civil and indigenous materiel resources available or essential to support military operations. Also, consider the requirement to meet minimum essential needs of civil populace for whom the commander may become responsible.

3. ( ) **LOGISTIC ANALYSIS OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION.** Make an orderly examination of the logistic factors influencing the proposed COAs to determine the manner and degree of that influence. The objective of this analysis is to determine if the logistic requirements can be met and to isolate the logistic implications that should be weighed by the commander in the commander’s estimate of the situation.

   a. ( ) Analyze each COA from the logistic point of view. The detail in which the analysis is made is determined by considering the level of command, scope of contemplated operations, and urgency of need.

   b. ( ) For each COA under consideration, analyze the logistic factors described in paragraph 2. Examine these factors realistically from the standpoint of requirements versus actual or programmed capabilities, climate and weather, hydrography, time and space, enemy capabilities, and other significant factors that may have an impact on the logistic situation as it affects the COAs.

   c. ( ) Throughout the analysis, keep logistic considerations foremost in mind. The analysis is not intended to produce a decision; it is intended to ensure that all applicable logistic factors have been properly considered and serve as the basis for the comparisons in paragraph 4.

4. ( ) **COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION**

   a. ( ) List the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed COA from the J-4’s point of view.

   b. ( ) Use a worksheet similar to that used for the commander’s estimate, if necessary.
5. ( ) CONCLUSIONS

   a. ( ) State whether or not the mission set forth in paragraph 1 can be supported from a logistic standpoint.

   b. ( ) State which COA under consideration can best be supported from a logistic standpoint.

   c. ( ) Identify the major logistic deficiencies that must be brought to the commander’s attention. Include recommendations concerning the methods to eliminate or reduce the effects of those deficiencies.

   (Signed) __________________________________________

   J-4

ANNEXES: (By letter and title) Use annexes when the information is in graphs or is of such detail and volume that inclusion in the body makes the estimates too cumbersome. Annexes should be lettered sequentially as they occur throughout the estimate.

DISTRIBUTION: (According to procedures and policies of the issuing headquarters)
B.4 INFORMATION OPERATIONS/INFORMATION WARFARE ESTIMATE

CLASSIFICATION

Issuing Headquarters
Place
Date-Time Group, Month, Year

INFORMATION OPERATIONS/INFORMATION WARFARE (IO/IW) ESTIMATE NUMBER ________

() REFERENCES: a. Maps and charts
           b. Other pertinent documents.

1. () MISSION. State the mission of the command as a whole, taken from the commander’s mission analysis, planning guidance, or other statements.

2. () SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS

   a. () Characteristics of the Area of Operation. Summarize data about the area, taken from the intelligence estimate or area study, with specific emphasis on significant factors affecting IO/IW activities.

   b. () Enemy Forces

      (1) () Strength and Dispositions. Refer to current intelligence estimate.

      (2) () Enemy Capabilities. Discuss enemy capabilities, taken from the current intelligence estimate, with specific emphasis on their impact on the IO/IW situation.

   c. () Friendly Forces

      (1) () Present Disposition of Major Elements. Include an estimate of their strengths.

      (2) () Own Courses of Action. State the proposed COAs under consideration, obtained from operations or plans division.

      (3) () Probable Tactical Developments. Review major deployments and IO/IW preparations necessary in all phases of the operation proposed. C²W against enemy capabilities should be included.

   d. () Personnel Situation. State known personnel problems that may affect the IO/IW situation.

   e. () Logistic Situation. State known logistic problems that may affect the IO/IW situation.

f. () Assumptions. State assumptions about the IO/IW aspects of the situation made for this estimate. Because basic assumptions for the operation already have been made and will appear in planning guidance and in the plan itself, they should not be repeated here. Certain IO/IW assumptions may have been made in preparing this estimate, and those should be stated here.

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5 When this estimate is distributed outside the issuing headquarters, the first line of the heading is the official designation of the issuing command, and the ending of the estimate is modified to include authentication by the authoring section, division, or other official according to local policy.

6 Normally, these are numbered sequentially during a calander year.
g. ( ) Special Features. State special features that are not covered elsewhere in the estimate but that may influence the IO/IW situation.

h. ( ) Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Situation. Consideration should be given to line-of-sight communications, satellite communications, UHF SATCOM, ground mobile command post, the DSCS ground mobile segment, and DCS interface.

(1) ( ) Communications.

(2) ( ) Administrative Communications.

(3) ( ) Communications Intelligence.

(4) ( ) Communications Security.

(5) ( ) Communications Support for Combat Operations.

(a) ( ) Joint Tactical Air Operations.

(b) ( ) Air-to-Ground Operations (CAS and BAI).

(c) ( ) Naval Surface Fire Support Operations.

(6) ( ) Communications Control and Aids for Supporting Arms

(7) ( ) Communications Requirements for Other Activities.

3. ( ) COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTER ANALYSIS OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION. Make an orderly examination of the IO/IW factors influencing the proposed COAs to determine the manner and degree of that influence. The objective of this analysis is to isolate the IO/IW implications that should be weighed by the commander in the commander’s estimate of the situation.

a. ( ) Analyze each COA from an IO/IW point of view. The detail in which the analysis is made is determined by considering the level of command, scope of contemplated operations, and urgency of need.

b. ( ) The IO/IW factors in paragraph 2 are the elements to be analyzed for each COA under consideration. Examine these factors realistically and include appropriate considerations of climate and weather, hydrography, time and space, enemy capabilities, and other significant factors that may have an impact on the IO/IW situation as it affects the COAs.

c. ( ) Throughout the analysis, keep IO/IW foremost in mind. The analysis is not intended to produce a decision but to ensure that all applicable factors have been properly considered and serve as the basis for the comparisons in paragraph 4.

4. ( ) COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION

a. ( ) As in the commander’s estimate, list the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed course of action from the J-6’s point of view.

b. ( ) Use a worksheet similar to the one in the commander’s estimate, if necessary.

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Each subparagraph analyzes systems requirements, identifies capability and availability of equipment, and identifies facilities, installations, and units needed to satisfy requirements and furnish adequate support for the subject of that subparagraph.
5. ( ) CONCLUSIONS

   a. ( ) State whether or not the mission set forth in paragraph 1 can be supported from a IO/IW standpoint.

   b. ( ) State which COA under consideration can best be supported from a IO/IW standpoint.

   c. ( ) Identify the major IO/IW deficiencies that must be brought to the commander’s attention. Include recommendations concerning the methods of eliminating or reducing the effects of those deficiencies.

      (Signed)______________________________

      J-6

ANNEXES: (By letter and title.) Use annexes when the information is in graphs or is of such detail and volume that inclusion in the body makes the estimates too cumbersome. They should be lettered sequentially as they occur throughout the estimate. Subject areas that should be discussed are communications security, IO/IW systems protection (including identification of initial nodes), and communications planning.

DISTRIBUTION: (According to procedures and policies of the issuing headquarters)
APPENDIX C

Formats for Plans

C.1 BASIC OPERATION PLAN/CINC’S STRATEGIC CONCEPT

CLASSIFICATION

Headquarters, Issuing Command
Location
Day/Month/Year

ISSUING COMMAND OPLAN XXXX-YR (U)
TITLE OF OPLAN (U)

( ) REFERENCES: List any maps, charts, or other documents essential to comprehension of the Basic Plan.

( ) TASK ORGANIZATION: Annex A.

1. ( ) SITUATION

a. ( ) General. Describe the general politico-military environment that would establish the probable preconditions for execution of the plan. When submitting a CINC’s strategic concept include, as an opening statement in this subparagraph, a reference to the tasking from the joint strategic capabilities plan or other tasking document. Summarize the competing political goals that caused the conflict. Identify primary antagonists. State U.S. policy goals, the estimated goals of other parties, and political decisions wanted from other countries in order to obtain U.S. policy goals and conduct effective U.S. military operations to attain U.S. military missions.

b. ( ) Area Of Concern

(1) ( ) Area of Responsibility. Provide a geographic description of the commander’s area of responsibility. A map may also be included as an attachment.

(2) ( ) Area of Interest. Provide a geographic description of the general area of interest covered by the CINC’s strategic concept and/or basic plan. This description should address all air, ground, and sea areas that directly affect the operation. A map may also be included as an attachment.

(3) ( ) Theater of Operations. Provide a geographic description of the specific areas to be covered in each option contained in the CINC’s Strategic Concept and/or Basic Plan. Map(s) may also be included as an attachment.

c. ( ) Deterrent Options. Delineate deterrent options desired to include those categories specified in the current JSCP. Specific units (type of units for CINC’s strategic concept format) and resources will be prioritized in terms of LAD relative to C-day. Include possible military support to diplomatic, political, or economic deterrent options that would support U.S. mission accomplishment.


2. ( ) Mission. State concisely the task and purpose to be accomplished on execution. This statement should answer the following questions: who, what, when, where, why, and occasionally how. State the mission of the commander originating the plan (e.g., the mission may be the task assigned by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, or it may be deduced from the Commander’s Estimate based on a task assigned by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff). If the plan being prepared is a supporting plan, indicate the plan that it supports and include, when applicable, plans prepared by commanders of allied forces.

3. ( ) Execution

a. ( ) Concept of Operations. For most OPLANs and the CINC’s strategic concept, include the entire concept of operations in this section. However, some OPLANs necessarily encompass alternative COAs for accomplishing the mission, and others require considerable detail to convey adequate guidance for the development of supporting plans. Accordingly, the entire concept may be placed in Annex C.

(1) ( ) Commander’s Intent. Describe the commander’s overall intent and intent by phase. Describe the desired end state. It should be a concise expression of the purpose of each phase of the operation. It may include how the posture of units at the end state facilitates transition to future operations. It may also include the commander’s assessment of the enemy commander’s intent. The commander’s intent is not, however, a summary of the concepts of operation.

(2) ( ) General. Base the concept of operations on the CES. The estimate states how the commander intends to accomplish his mission, including the forces involved; the timephasing of operations; the general nature and purpose of operations to be conducted; and the interrelated or cross-service support, coordination, and cooperation necessary to successful execution. The commander’s estimate should include a statement concerning the perceived need for Reserve force mobilization based on plan force deployment timing and Reserve force
size requirements. The concept of operations should be sufficiently developed to include an estimate of the level and duration of conflict to provide supporting and subordinate commanders a basis for preparing adequate supporting plans. To the extent possible, the plan should incorporate the following concepts of joint operation planning doctrine:

(a) ( ) Combatant commander’s strategic intent and operational focus.

(b) ( ) Orientation on the strategic and operational centers of gravity of threat.

(c) ( ) Protection of friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity.

A graphic timeline may be used to assist in describing the various options or phases covered in the concept to include items such as warning and response times, major deployments, and employment phases. The concept should show how the initiative will be gained, security against enemy actions will be maintained, and superiority and surprise will be achieved. In the Basic Plan, reference should be made to Annex A for detailed force requirements. Additionally, if commanders are planning for sustained armed conflict during execution of the plan, the concept of operations should outline the synchronized employment of air, land, maritime, space, special operations, PSYOP, and C2W in a joint campaign. In corporate Special Technical Operations into the overall concept in a separately published plan annex. Acknowledging that details of campaigns cannot be determined before armed conflict, sufficient detail should be provided to guide force structure, organization, and development, and the planning and conduct of pre-conflict operations.

(3) ( ) Note on OPLAN Structure. For plans addressing situations that could involve armed conflict, the next two paragraphs will include a separate description for each phase of the operation. The following phases should include, as applicable, the following:

(a) ( ) Prehostilities

(b) ( ) Lodgment

(c) ( ) Decisive combat and stabilization

(d) ( ) Follow-through

(e) ( ) Posthostilities and redeployment

(4) ( ) Deployment. Summarize the requirements to deploy forces from their normal peacetime locations to the area of operations. Such deployments may include those to be carried out within the command area as well as deployments of augmentation forces. Particular attention should be given to expected deployments that may be required in order to implement and support the plan when directed. Consideration should also be given to the deployment of rapid reaction forces as a partial implementation of the plan and to deception measures required to provide security, mislead the enemy, and achieve surprise. A graphic timeline may be used to assist in describing the various options and phases covered.

(5) ( ) Employment. Describe the concept of how the forces are employed in each of the phases contained in OPLAN structure listed above. The concept should clearly outline plans for the use of nuclear weapons and chemical munitions or agents, if any. Plans to conduct supporting operations (e.g., IW, SO, SAR, reconnaissance, and space) will be indicated in this section for the CINC’s strategic concept or by reference to appropriate appendixes of Annex C for the basic plan. Summarize any specific Reserve component augmentation requirements for plan execution. When a nuclear appendix or deception tab is not prepared for Annex C, a statement to that effect will be made in this paragraph. A graphic timeline may be used to assist in describing the various options and phases covered.

b. ( ) Tasks. List the tasks assigned to each element of the supported and supporting commands in separate numbered sub-subparagraphs. Each task should be a concise statement of a mission to be performed either in future
planning for the operation or on execution of the OPORD. The task assignment should encompass all key actions that subordinate and supporting elements must perform in order to fulfill the concept of operations, including theater and tactical military deceptions. However, do not link the actions to deception. If the actions cannot stand alone without exposing the deception, they must be published only in the deception tab to the C²W appendix to the plan in order to receive special handling. When the plan requires the establishment of a subordinate joint force, tasks are assigned to the component commanders, supporting commanders, and subordinate joint force commanders, as appropriate. State the support that each component is expected to provide for another.

c. ( ) Coordinating Instructions. List the instructions applicable to the entire command or two or more elements of the command that are necessary for proper coordination of the operation but are not appropriate for inclusion in a particular annex. Coordinating instructions establish, in particular, the conditions for execution. Terms pertaining to the timing of execution and deployments should be explained as should other operational terms that appear in the plan but are not defined in the Joint Staff publications.

4. ( ) Administration and Logistics

a. ( ) Concept of Support. In preparing the basic plan, the major portion of guidance on service support is normally contained in a series of detailed annexes listed in the subsequent subparagraphs. To provide a general understanding of the requirements for logistic support, personnel policies, and administrative plans, this subparagraph should provide broad guidance as to how such support is to be furnished. Additional subparagraphs refer to the annexes that provide detailed guidance on each major aspect of support. When preparing the CINC’s strategic concept, this subparagraph will state the same broad guidance as to how such support is to be furnished and instead of referring to specific annexes in the subsequent subparagraphs, will provide additional summary level guidance.

b. ( ) Logistics. In preparing a basic plan, refer to Annex D. When preparing the CINC’s strategic concept, state the policies, guidance, and procedures to support all options for operations contained in the CINC’s strategic concept. Logistic phases will be concurrent with operational phases. This subparagraph should address sustainment priorities and resources; base development and other civil engineering requirements; host-nation support; and inter-service responsibilities. The priority and movement of major logistic items should be identified for each option and phase of the concept. Strategic and theater ports for resupply should be identified. Transportation policies, guidance, and procedures for all options should be outlined. Logistic and transportation assumptions should be identified and included with other plan assumptions in subparagraph 1f. Identify detailed planning requirements and subordinate tasking.

c. ( ) Personnel. In preparing a basic plan, refer to Annex E. When preparing the CINC’s strategic concept, state the policies, guidance, and procedures to support all options contained in the CINC’s strategic concept. Identify detailed planning requirements and subordinate tasking. Assign tasks for establishing and operating joint personnel facilities and making provisions for staffing them. Discuss the administrative management of participating personnel, the reconstitution of forces, command replacement policies, and required staff augmentation to command headquarters.

d. ( ) Public Affairs. In preparing the basic plan, refer to Annex F.

e. ( ) Civil Affairs. In preparing the basic plan, refer to Annex G.

f. ( ) Meteorological and Oceanographic Services. In preparing the basic plan, refer to Annex H.

g. ( ) Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy. In preparing the basic plan, refer to Annex M.

h. ( ) Medical Services. In preparing the basic plan, state Annex Q. When preparing the CINC’s strategic concept, outline the policies and guidance for medical care and support. Identify planning requirements and subordinate tasking for hospitalization and evacuation. Address critical medical supplies and resources. Assign tasks for establishing joint medical authorities and provisions for staffing them. Medical assumptions should be identified and included in subparagraph 1f, assumptions. Wartime host-nation support agreements or provisions to support should be referenced in Annex P.
5. ( ) Command and Control

a. ( ) Command Relationships. In preparing a basic plan, refer to Annex J. When preparing the CINC’s strategic concept, state the organizational structure expected to exist during plan implementation. Indicate any changes to major command and control organizations and the time of the expected shift. Identify all command arrangement agreements and memorandums of understanding used and those that require development.

b. ( ) Command Posts. List the designations and locations of each major headquarters involved in execution. When headquarters are to be deployed or the OPLAN provides for the relocation of headquarters to an alternate command post, indicate the location and time of opening and closing of each headquarters.

c. ( ) Succession to Command. Designate in order of succession the commanders responsible for assuming command of the operation in specific applicable circumstances.

d. ( ) Command, Control, and Communications Systems. Provide a general statement concerning the scope of C³ systems and procedures required to support the operation. Highlight any C³ systems or procedures requiring special emphasis. When preparing a basic plan, refer the reader to Annex K for details.

(For a Basic Plan, list only those actually published). Listing not required when preparing CINC’s strategic concept.

ANNEXES

A — TASK ORGANIZATION
B — INTELLIGENCE
C — OPERATIONS
D — LOGISTICS
E — PERSONNEL
F — PUBLIC AFFAIRS
G — CIVIL AFFAIRS
H — METEOROLOGICAL AND OCEANOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS
J — COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
K — COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
L — OPERATIONS SECURITY
M — MAPPING, CHARTING, AND GEODESY
N — SPACE OPERATIONS
P — HOST-NATION SUPPORT
Q — MEDICAL SERVICES
R — CHAPLAIN ACTIVITIES
S — SPECIAL TECHNICAL OPERATIONS (Provided under separate cover)
X — EXECUTION CHECKLIST
Z — DISTRIBUTION

OFFICIAL:
s/
s/
Major General
Director, J-5

CLASSIFICATION
C.2 CONCEPT PLAN

CLASSIFICATION

Headquarters, Issuing Command
Location
Day/Month/Year

ISSUING COMMAND CONPLAN XXXX-YR
TITLE OF CONPLAN ( )

() REFERENCES: List any maps, charts, or other documents essential to an understanding of this plan and refer to the appropriate listing of essential elements of information required to support a decision or a recommendation to implement the plan.

() TASK ORGANIZATION: Annex A.

1. () SITUATION

a. () General. Describe the general politico-military environment that would establish the probable preconditions for execution of the plan. Include, as an opening statement in this subparagraph, a reference to the tasking from the joint strategic capabilities plan or other tasking document. Summarize the competing political goals that caused the conflict. Identify primary antagonists. State U.S. policy goals and the estimated goals of other parties, and political decisions wanted from other countries in order to obtain U.S. policy goals and conduct effective U.S. military operations to attain U.S. military missions.

b. () Area of Concern.

(1) () Area of Responsibility. Provide a geographic description of the commander’s area of responsibility. A map may also be included as an attachment.

(2) () Area of Interest. Provide a geographic description of the general area of interest covered by the CINC’s strategic concept. This description should address all air, ground, and sea areas that directly affect the operation. A map may also be included as an attachment.

(3) () Theater of Operations. Provide a geographic description of the specific areas to be covered in each option. Maps may also be included as an attachment.

c. () Deterrent Options. Delineate deterrent options desired to include those categories specified in the current JSCP. Include possible military support to diplomatic, political, or economic deterrent options that would support U.S. mission accomplishment.

d. () Enemy Forces. Identify the opposing forces expected on execution and appraise their general capabilities. Provide all information essential to a clear understanding of the magnitude of the hostile threat. When applicable, identify the enemy’s strategic and operational centers of gravity.

e. () Friendly Forces.

(1) () Identify friendly centers of gravity, both strategic and operational, that require protection for the successful accomplishment of the mission.

(2) () Describe the operations of unassigned forces other than those tasked to support this operation that could have a direct significant influence on the operations envisaged in this plan.
(3) () List the specific tasks of friendly forces, commands, or Government agencies that would directly support OPORD execution (e.g., USTRANSCOM, USSTRATCOM, DIA).

f. () Assumptions. List the necessary assumptions, including common assumptions contained in the JSCP or other tasking, on which the plan is based (i.e., those contingent conditions the absence of which will have a significant impact on this plan or supporting plans). State expected conditions over which the commander has no control. Include assumptions that are directly relevant to the development of this CONPLAN that express conditions that should they not occur as expected would invalidate the entire CONPLAN or its concept of operations. Include additional assumptions relevant to specific aspects of the operation in appropriate annexes.

g. () Legal Considerations. List those significant legal considerations on which the plan is based.

2. () MISSION State concisely the task and purpose to be accomplished on execution. This statement should answer the following questions: who, what, when, where, why, and occasionally how. State the mission of the commander originating the plan (e.g., the mission may be the task assigned by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, or it may be deduced from the commander’s estimate based on a task assigned by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff).

3. () EXECUTION

a. () Concept Of Operations. Include the entire concept of operations in this section.

(1) () Commander’s Intent. Describe the commander’s overall intent and intent by phase. Describe the desired end state. It should be a concise expression of the purpose of each phase of the operation. It may include how the posture of units at the end state facilitates transition to future operations. It may also include the commander’s assessment of the enemy commander’s intent.

(2) () General. Base the concept of operations on the commander’s estimate of the situation. The estimate states how the commander intends to accomplish his mission, including the forces involved; the time phasing of operations; the general nature and purpose of operations to be conducted; and the interrelated or cross Service support, coordination, and cooperation necessary to successful execution. The commander’s estimate should include a statement concerning the perceived need for Reserve force mobilization based on plan force deployment timing and Reserve force size requirements. The concept of operations should be sufficiently developed to include an estimate of the level and duration of conflict to provide supporting and subordinate commanders a basis for preparing adequate supporting plans. To the extent possible, the CONPLAN should incorporate the following concepts of joint operation planning doctrine:

(a) () Combatant commander’s strategic intent and operational focus.

(b) () Orientation on the strategic and operational centers of gravity of threat.

(c) () Protection of friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity.

A graphic timeline may be used to assist in describing the various options or phases covered in the concept to include items such as warning and response times, major deployments, and employment phases. The concept should show how the initiative will be gained, security against enemy actions will be maintained, and superiority and surprise will be achieved. If appropriate, reference should be made to Annex A for detailed force requirements. Additionally, if commanders are planning for sustained armed conflict during execution of the plan, the concept of operations should outline the synchronized employment of air, land, maritime, space, special operations, PSYOP, and C²W in a joint campaign. Incorporate special technical operations into the overall concept in a separately published plan annex. Acknowledging that details of campaigns cannot be determined before armed conflict, sufficient detail should be provided to guide force structure, organization, and development, and the planning and conduct of pre-conflict operations.

(3) () Note on CONPLAN Structure. For plans addressing situations that could involve armed conflict, the next two paragraphs will include a separate description for each phase of the operation. The following phases should include, as applicable, the following:
(a) ( ) Prehostilities

(b) ( ) Lodgment

(c) ( ) Decisive combat and stabilization

(d) ( ) Followthrough

(e) ( ) Posthostilities and Redeployment.

(4) ( ) Deployment. Summarize the requirements to deploy forces from their normal peacetime locations to the area of operations. Such deployments may include those to be carried out within the command area as well as deployments of augmentation forces. Particular attention should be given to expected deployments that may be required in order to implement and support the plan when directed. Consideration should also be given to the deployment of rapid reaction forces as a partial implementation of the plan and to deception measures required to provide security, mislead the enemy, and achieve surprise. A graphic timeline may be used to assist in describing the various options and phases covered.

(5) ( ) Employment. Describe the concept of how the forces are employed in each of the phases contained in CONPLAN structure listed above, to include the commander’s intent for each phase. The concept should clearly outline plans for the use of nuclear weapons and chemical munitions or agents, if any. Plans to conduct supporting operations (e.g., IW, SO, SAR, reconnaissance, and space) will be indicated in this section or by reference to appropriate appendixes of Annex C if published. Summarize any specific Reserve component augmentation requirements for plan execution. A graphic timeline may be used to assist in describing the various options and phases covered.

b. ( ) Tasks. List the tasks assigned to each element of the supported and supporting commands in separate numbered sub-subparagraphs. Each task should be a concise statement of a mission to be performed either in future planning for the operation or on execution of the OPORD. The task assignment should encompass all key actions that subordinate and supporting elements must perform in order to fulfill the concept of operations, including theater and tactical military deceptions. However, do not link the actions to deception. When the plan requires the establishment of a subordinate joint force, tasks are assigned to the component commanders, supporting commanders, and subordinate joint force commanders, as appropriate. Outline the support that each component is expected to provide for another.

c. ( ) Coordinating Instructions. List the instructions applicable to the entire command or two or more elements of the command that are necessary for proper coordination of the operation but are not appropriate for inclusion in a particular annex. Coordinating instructions establish, in particular, the conditions for execution. Terms pertaining to the timing of execution and deployments should be explained, as should other operational terms that appear in the plan but are not defined in the Joint Staff publications.

4. ( ) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. ( ) Concept of Support. To provide a general understanding of the requirements for logistic support, personnel policies, and administrative plans, this subparagraph should provide broad guidance as to how such support is to be furnished. Additional subparagraphs refer to the annexes that provide detailed guidance on each major aspect of support. Additional subparagraphs may refer to annexes that provide detailed guidance on each major aspect of support.

b. ( ) Logistics. Refer to Annex D. State the policies, guidance, and procedures to support all options for operations contained in the CINC’s strategic concept. Logistic phases will be concurrent with operational phases. This subparagraph should address sustainment priorities and resources; base development and other civil engineering requirements; host-nation support; and interservice responsibilities. Logistic and transportation assumptions should be identified and included with other plan assumptions.

c. ( ) Personnel. State the policies, guidance, and procedures to support all options contained in the CINC’s Strategic Concept. Identify detailed planning requirements and subordinate tasking. Assign tasks for establishing and
operating joint personnel facilities and making provisions for staffing them. Discuss the administrative management of participating personnel, the reconstitution of forces, command replacement policies and required staff augmentation to command headquarters.

d. ( ) Public Affairs. State the general concept of support for the operation.

e. ( ) Civil Affairs. Estimate the general nature and extent of civil affairs activities required in the theater of operations.

f. ( ) Meteorological and Oceanographic Services. State the general concept of METOC support for the operation.

g. ( ) Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy. State the general concept of mapping, charting, and geodesy (MC&G) support for the operation. If appropriate, include information on available MC&G forces. Also, identify approved products and their required quantities.

h. ( ) Medical Services. Outline the policies and guidance for medical care and support. Address critical medical supplies and resources.

5. ( ) Command and Control

a. ( ) Command Relationships. State the organizational structure expected to exist during plan implementation. Indicate any changes to major command and control organizations and the time of the expected shift. Identify all Command Arrangement Agreements (CAAs) and Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) used and those that require development.

b. ( ) Command Posts. List the designations and locations of each major headquarters involved in execution. When headquarters are to be deployed or the CONPLAN provides for the relocation of headquarters to an alternate command post, indicate the location and time of opening and closing of each headquarters.

c. ( ) Succession to Command. Designate in order of succession the commanders responsible for assuming command of the operation in specific applicable circumstances.

d. ( ) Command, Control, and Communications Systems. Provide a general statement concerning the scope of C³ systems and procedures required to support the operation. Highlight any C³ systems or procedures requiring special emphasis. Refer the reader to Annex K for details.

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General
Commander in Chief

ANNEXES

A — TASK ORGANIZATION
B — INTELLIGENCE
C — OPERATIONS
D — LOGISTICS
J — COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
K — COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

List other annexes and appendices deemed necessary by the CINC for planning purposes.

OFFICIAL:
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Major General
Director, J-5

CLASSIFICATION

C-9
C.3 THEATER CAMPAIGN PLAN MODEL

THEATER CAMPAIGN PLAN: (Number or Code Name)

References: Maps, charts, and other relevant documents.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: Briefly describe the command relationships between the supported combatant commander and the supporting combatant commanders and the types of subordinates and their delegated authorities for the campaign. Include relationships with allies. Relate to para 5a(1). Detailed information may be included in the command relationships annex.

1. SITUATION. Briefly describe the composite conditions, circumstances, and influences of the theater strategic situation that the plan addresses (see national intelligence estimate, and strategic and commander’s estimates).

a. National and/or Multinational Strategic Direction. Provide a summary of national and/or multinational strategies, interests, or decision or policy statements, directives, letters of instruction, memorandums, or strategic plans (JSCP, UCP), including a global campaign plan, received from higher authority that apply to the plan.

   (1) Relate the strategic guidance and end state to the theater situation and requirements in its global, regional, and space dimensions.

   (2) List the national security or military objectives and strategic tasks assigned to the command.

   (3) Relate the military end state to the strategic end state.

   (4) Describe the current strategic advantages and disadvantages within the strategic situation.

   (5) Constraints/limitations. List actions that are prohibited or required by higher authority (ROE, LOAC, etc.).

b. Enemy Forces. Provide a summary of pertinent intelligence and counterintelligence data, including information on the following:

   (1) Composition, location, disposition, movements and strengths of major enemy forces that can influence action in the theater and its operational areas

   (2) Enemy’s strategy or strategic concept of operation (if known) should include enemy’s perception of friendly vulnerabilities and enemy’s intentions regarding those vulnerabilities

   (3) National and theater strategic objectives

   (4) Strategic leader or commanders idiosyncrasies and decisionmaking patterns

   (5) Strategic and operational sustainment capabilities

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1 JP 5-0 describes how campaign logic and principles fit into OPLAN format and the JOPES process. The JP 5-03 series further explains the process including models of planning messages, estimates, and OPLANs/CONPLANs. JP 5-00.1, JTTP for Campaign Planning (currently in development), was the source for this format.
(6) Enemy regional strategic vulnerabilities
(7) Enemy defensive/offensive theater vulnerabilities
(8) Enemy’s strategic center of gravity
(9) Key decisive points at all levels of war.

Note

Assumed information should be identified as such. Reference may be made to the intelligence annex for more detailed information.

c. Friendly Forces. State information about friendly forces not assigned that may directly affect the command.

(1) Strategic intent of U.S. NCA/multinational NCA.
(2) Intent of adjacent and supporting U.S. commands.
(3) Intent of higher, adjacent, and supporting allied, alliance, or other coalition forces.
(4) Comparison of allied capabilities for complimentary employment.
(5) Include deterrence, defense, and countermeasures against weapons of mass destruction.
(6) Protect friendly strategic center of gravity and decisive points.

d. Assumptions. State reasonable assumptions applicable to the plan as a whole. Include both specified and implied assumptions that if not valid would change the plan.

2. MISSION. State the key strategic task(s) of the combatant command and the purpose(s) and relationship(s) to achieving the national security or military objective(s) of the strategic and military end states in accordance with the exit strategy (termination conditions and post conflict activities). The mission statement should be expressed in terms of who, what, when, where, and why.

3. UNIFIED OPERATIONS.

a. Strategic Concept. (The appropriate strategic concept(s) can be taken from the theater strategy and developed into a strategic concept of operation for the theater campaign plan. The concept should be stated in terms of who, what, where and how.) State the CINC’s strategic vision and intent in the strategic concept of operation for the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of all participating forces, activities, and agencies. The broad scheme of strategic maneuver, based on conditions established for integrated land, sea, and air nonlinear offensive (and defensive) operations, should be stated as it relates to positions of strategic concentration and advantage, and the subsequent conducting of simultaneous maneuver operations in depth against the enemy’s decisive points, vulnerabilities, and ultimately his strategic center of gravity. The theater design elements, key planning considerations, fundamentals of campaigning, and considerations before, at the outset and during combat have to be integrated into the CINC’s concept of operation for achieving the strategic advantage and military end state. His strategic intent to achieve his military end state within the strategic end state should be clearly stated. The following subparagraphs of 3a have to be integrated into the concept to show the total unity of effort of the unified forces and operations. Further details can be placed in a plan annex.

(1) Theater strategic objectives
(2) Theater organization of operational areas
(3) General priorities and order of strategic deployments into the theater base
(4) Integration of allies, interagency, or United Nations forces, and nongovernmental or private voluntary organizations into a unified effort in the theater

(5) Theater deployment into position of strategic concentration

(6) Strategic maneuver in main and secondary efforts

(7) Strategic firepower (Conduct strategic attacks and interdiction to destroy or neutralize an enemy’s war sustaining capabilities or will to fight. Deter/protect against weapons of mass destruction.)

(8) Strategic Reserves

(9) Theater missile defense and protection of joint rear area and strategic center of gravity

(10) Overall deception planning (connect to national efforts)

(11) Psychological planning (connect to national efforts)

(12) Integration of theater strategic functions and tasks

(13) Strategic phases and timing of campaign (tempo, duration, opportunities, sequencing)

(14) How to achieve the strategic advantage including the contributions of the other instruments of national power (request FDOs)

(15) Tasks to supporting combatant commands

(16) Considerations for termination and postconflict operations.

b. Phase I

(1) Operational Focus. Include operational concepts, objectives, timing, and reach for this strategic phase for each subordinate command.

(2) Tasks. Tasks of subordinate commands and service forces composed of forces required by function or capability. Should consider Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine, Coast Guard, special operations, and space forces.

(3) Operational Firepower. General missions for joint interdiction and guidance to subordinates and service forces. Ensure that service fires are complementary with joint fires.

(4) Operational Reserve Forces. Location and composition. State “be prepared” missions.

(5) Deception.

(6) Psychological.

(7) Civil Military Operations. Particularly as applied to postconflict transitions to interagency control.

c. Phases II to IV. Cite information as stated in subparagraph 3b above for each subsequent phase based on expected sequencing, changes, or new opportunities. Provide a separate strategic phase for each related logical sequence in the campaign at the end of which a major reorganization of forces may be required and another significant action initiated.

d. Coordinating Instructions. If desired, instructions applicable to two or more phases or multiple elements of the command may be placed here.
4. **LOGISTICS.** Brief, broad statement of the theater strategic sustainment concept for the campaign with information and instructions applicable to the campaign by phase. Logistic phases must compliment with theater strategic employment phases. This information may be issued separately in a logistic annex and referenced here.

   a. Assumptions (including coalition requirements)
   
   b. Supply aspects
   
   c. Maintenance and modifications
   
   d. Medical service
   
   e. Transportation
   
   f. Base development (includes theater base)
   
   g. Personnel/reinforcements
   
   h. Foreign military assistance
   
   i. Administrative management
   
   j. Theater reception and onward movement (within the joint rear area/COMMZ)
   
   k. Line(s) of communication
   
   l. Transit and overflight rights
   
   m. Reconstitution of forces
   
   n. Joint and combined responsibilities
   
   o. Sustainment priorities and resources
   
   p. Interservice responsibilities
   
   q. Host-nation support arrangements and considerations

5. **COMMAND AND SIGNAL.**

   a. **Command**

      (1) **Command and Control Relationships.** State the subordinate command and control relationships by type for the entire campaign or portions thereof. Indicate any shifts of command or control contemplated during the campaign, indicating time of the expected shift. These changes should be consistent with the theater strategic and operational phasing and centralized direction in paragraph 3. Give location of theater and command posts. Further details can be placed in a command relationship annex.

      (2) **Delegation of Authority.** Delegate appropriate degree of authority to subordinate commanders to ensure decentralized execution.

   b. **Signal.** (Details can go into a signals annex.)

      (1) **Communications.** State plans of communications (may refer to a standard plan or be contained in an annex). Include time zone to be used; rendezvous, recognition, and identification instructions; code; liaison instructions; and axis of signal communications, as appropriate.
(2) **Electronics.** Deals with IO/IW. Plans of electronic systems (may refer to standard plan or may be contained in an annex). Include electronic policy and such other information as may be appropriate.

(3) Joint C^2** warfare.

Signed: ______________________________

Date of Commander’s Signature

ANNEXES

A — TASK ORGANIZATION
B — INTELLIGENCE
C — OPERATIONS
D — LOGISTICS
E — PERSONNEL
F — PUBLIC AFFAIRS
G — CIVIL AFFAIRS
H — METEOROLOGICAL AND OCEANOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS
J — COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
K — COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
L — ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
M — MAPPING, CHARTING, AND GEODESY
N — SPACE OPERATIONS
P — HOST-NATION SUPPORT
Q — MEDICAL SERVICES
S — SPECIAL TECHNICAL OPERATIONS (to be provided under separate cover)
X — EXECUTION CHECKLIST
Z — DISTRIBUTION

CLASSIFICATION

ORIGINAL C-14
APPENDIX D

Formats for Orders

D.1 BASIC OPERATION ORDER

CLASSIFICATION

(Change from oral orders, if any)

COPY 1 of 20 copies
Issuing headquarters
(e.g. Pacific Fleet)
Place of issue
(coordinates, flagship)
(e.g. CVN Vinson (CVN-70)
Date-time group of signature
(day, month, year)
(e.g., 0912006 Dec 1995)
Message reference No.

OPERATION ORDER (code name)
(number)

REFERENCES: Maps, charts, and other relevant documents (e.g., ComSeventhFlt No 7-94; NWP 7,
NWP 5-01; Commander’s Estimate CTG 70.5, etc.). When using a map/chart,
include the map/chart series number (and country or geographic areas if required),
sheet number (and names if required), edition, and scale (if required).

TIME ZONE: Time zone used throughout the order (including annexes, appendices, etc.).
State the time zone applicable to the operation. Times in other zones are converted
to this time zone for this operation.

TRANSMISSION INFORMATION. Immediate precedence will be used unless otherwise specified in the implement-
ing directive.

1. () FROM (). Command originating or updating the information.
2. () TO (). Action addressees will be appropriate planning participants directly concerned as identified by the origi-
nator. Specific action addressees may be designated in the implementing directive.
3. () INFO (). Information addressees will be all other interested planning participants as identified by the origi-
nator. Specific INFO addressees may be designated in the implementing directive.
4. () DISTRIBUTION (). By policy and procedure of the issuing headquarters.
TASK ORGANIZATION: In assigning forces to the various task forces/groups, ensure that each element is adequate for its assigned task. Optimally, forces should be organized for combat as they are organized in peacetime.

Describe the appropriate allocation of forces to support the commander’s concept. If task organization is long and complex, put it in an annex (Annex A: Task Organization). List major subordinate control headquarters in the correct sequence. Qualify relationships other than attached by using parenthetical terms (for example, OPCON, TACON, support, coordination, etc.). Show all command and support relationships in the task organization.

A command or support relationship is not a mission assignment. Put mission assignments in paragraph 3 (execution). For units attached to another unit, list the time or times that attachment is effective if different from the time the order is effective. Place the time in parentheses following the unit designation. (May also be listed in subparagraph 1c, but not in both places.) To avoid confusion, use the full designation for nonorganic forces/units. Identify subsequent command or support relationships in the task organization. Depict task organization by phase, if appropriate.

Group units (other than major subordinate commands and those units which are attached to or which support a major subordinate command) under a single heading which reflects that they are under the command and control of the force headquarters. List combat force or maneuver units, followed by units providing combat support, then combat service support units. List combat support units by size of the command echelon, then alphabetically. List combat service support under force headquarters control by size of command echelon, then alphabetically.

**Note**

The task organization must reflect the selected COA and decision. Hence, it cannot be the same as that given in the superior commander’s order. Depict chain of command one echelon above and two echelons below.

When detailing the task organization, give the numerical designations of units in Arabic numerals. When distinguishing between national forces of two or more nations (combined operations), insert the distinguishing letters of the country between the numerical designation and the unit name (for example, 3d (GE) Corps).

Use abbreviated designations for organic units in orders. However, show nonorganic unit designations in full. Using force modifier symbols (plus (+) and minus (-) signs) alerts commanders and staffs of significant changes to a unit’s primary force structure that occur through the task organization. Designate task forces by the last name of the commander of the task force (TF SMITH), a code name (TF STRIKE), or a number (TF 17 or TG 60.5).

OPERATION DESCRIPTION. This free text paragraph should briefly describe the specific military operation for which the present scheme was developed. Once defined and until changed, this paragraph may be used for citing references to previous messages. References to applicable maps, charts, and time zones may also be included. For the initial entry, include such information as the target areas, role to be played by U.S. forces, and other significant characteristics necessary to identify adequately the operation being supported. Ordinarily, the initial description by the supported command will be sufficiently comprehensive to apply to all commands. Thereafter, only substantial modifications in the nature or dimensions of the operation (e.g., expansion in scope or scale, deletion, or addition of tasks) need be reported to update the operation description.

NARRATIVE. This free text paragraph can be used to amplify the operation description or to give informative or directive guidance. Normally, such a narrative would only be prepared by the supported command. However, when warranted, any participant command may enter command-unique aspects of the operation having significance for other commands but not reflected elsewhere. In all cases, narrative information must be kept as brief as possible and to the point.

When used, the content of the narrative is structured as follows:

1. ( ) SITUATION ( ). The commander who issues the order and a subordinate commander who receives it must ensure that none of the information on the current situation needed in the development of general courses of action is missing or overlooked. Ensure that paragraph 1 contains all the necessary information on friendly and enemy forces.
This paragraph should contain a complete statement of all information available to the commander issuing the order. This information would generally not be known by subordinate commanders to whom tasks are assigned in paragraph 3 and would be considered essential for the intelligent execution of these tasks or for the comprehension of paragraph 2. In general, the higher command echelon is, the more general and shorter this paragraph will be. There are three subparagraphs written in this section.

a. **Enemy Forces**. Give composition, disposition, location, movements, estimated strengths, identification, and capabilities. Summarize the enemy situation in the intended area of operations. This section may be prepared as an annex (in which case it should be referred to here). Use an intelligence annex (Annex B) only if the amount of information is too long to include in the body of the order. Be sure this subparagraph contains information describing the enemy’s most probable COA. Express this information in terms of one enemy echelon below. When possible, provide a sketch of the enemy course of action in lieu of verbiage (Appendix .. [sketch] to Annex B [Intelligence]). If this is used with other intelligence sources as a reference, the intelligence annex may be referred to. If more sources need to be referenced, use the final subparagraph to refer the reader to the documentation. This subparagraph also contains an assessment of terrorist activities directed against the U.S. government interests in the area or theater of operations.

b. **Friendly Forces**. Give information on friendly forces other than those covered by the operation order that may directly affect the action of subordinate commanders. These forces include those not attached or organic to the command for the contemplated operation but whose presence on a flank or other adjacent area is of interest. Information on such forces is limited to what subordinate commanders need to know to accomplish their tasks. This subparagraph includes the following:

1. **The mission of the higher unit, the higher commander’s intent, and the concept of operations (if appropriate, use a sketch to portray the higher commander’s scheme of maneuver)**

2. **Additional subparagraphs that state the missions of the units immediately adjacent and other critical units whose actions have a significant bearing on the issuing headquarters**

3. **Additional instructions for minimizing exposure to fratricide; specifically, actions that units must take that are not inherent in existing C² measures.**

c. **Attachments and Detachments.** If such units are listed in the task organization or Annex A, write, “See task organization” or “See Annex A.” When they are not given under task organization, list here the units attached to or detached from the issuing unit (or formation) by this order together with the times when the attachment or detachments are to be effective if different from when the OPORD is in effect (for example, on order, on commitment of the reserve, etc.). Use the term “remains attached” when units will be or have been attached for some time.

2. **MISSION**. This paragraph is together with the preceding paragraph probably the most important in the entire order. It contains the essence of the commander’s decision. It links the commander’s will to the initiative of the subordinate commanders. However, in order to ensure that subordinate commanders have a perfect understanding of the commander’s plan, it is necessary to read paragraph 2 in conjunction with paragraph 1 in their entirety.

In formulating an order, you must decide what to put in the general plan of action, what terms to use, and how to arrange them. You must make absolutely clear what must be accomplished with your force as a whole. There must be statement of the common goal of the force acting as a whole. Unless that is done, there is no effective guide to subordinate commanders. Afterwards, ask yourself how, when, where, and why I have to carry out my selected COA. Then insert such details as may be necessary to make this paragraph perfectly clear. However, no unnecessary details should be included at this stage, because this paragraph deals with the force as whole.

To include “how” in this paragraph can lead to confusion and weakening of the commander’s intent. Paragraph 2 of an order expresses your will as to the employment of your force as a whole. Strictly speaking, no one can alter that paragraph except the commander who issues the order. If you include “how” in paragraph 2 that are repeated in the paragraph 3, you will include something that your subordinate commanders are entitled to do. In other words, you will infringe on their freedom of action.
The content of paragraph 2 can only be changed by a subordinate commander in the case of extreme necessity. However, if the same task is also given in paragraph 3, a subordinate commander would also be changing a part of the commander’s intent; a serious matter indeed. If in addition it changes the purpose behind the task given by the higher commander, he will also accept the gravest responsibility.

Note

Remember your mission statement cannot be the same or a slight variation of the mission received from the higher commander. You have to write your mission statement based on the mission analysis of the received mission from the higher commander. Write the mission statement always for two echelons below.

3. ( ) EXECUTION ( ). This paragraph is the task paragraph. Subparagraphs a., b., c., etc., state what the higher commander issued as detailed tasks to each subordinate force. These statements should be as complete as possible, but also concise. They should allow subordinates due discretion in the event of unforeseen circumstances to complete their assigned task.

In drafting paragraph 3, careful attention should be given to ensure unity of command. Therefore, the senior commander should always be in command when two or more forces operate in the same general area.

The tasks should be spelled out as “situations” rather than “actions.” For example, it is better to say “seize position ALFA” or “hold the line GOLD” rather than say “attack position ALFA” or “defend position GOLD.” Of course, sometimes it is necessary to state “actions” instead “situations.” Nevertheless, it is better to state the task as a situation to be brought about or maintained and then, if necessary, add how that situation is to be accomplished.

Normally, the task should be stated in the first part of each subparagraph, and details should follow. Otherwise the task can be easily obscured or lost among the verbiage. For example, it is improper to state, “Sail out in 6 hours, proceed by southwesterly route, and destroy the enemy force BRAVO in the sea area WAHOO.” Instead, it is more proper to state, “Destroy the enemy force BRAVO in the sea area WAHOO; sail out in 6 hours and proceed by southeasterly route to the assigned area.” The focus should always be on the task to be accomplished.

The sum of all the tasks listed in this paragraph should lead to the accomplishment of the mission spelled out in paragraph 2. The subordinate commanders must understand fully what they have to do. The commander issuing the order should not interfere in their area of responsibility except in exceptional circumstances.

Very often a decision cannot be executed by issuing a single order. It might be necessary to issue a series of orders. Therefore paragraph 2 may contain only a part of the entire decision. You must ensure that this paragraph contains a definite concrete part of the entire decision and contributes directly to its accomplishment.

In the first subparagraph give a summary of the overall COA selected. In subsequent subparagraphs, assign specific tasks to each element of the command. Use proper terms when assigning tasks. There is a considerable difference among tactical, operational, and strategic tasks. For example, conducting fires to isolate enemy forces in a given area of operations is an operational task (method used is by delivering “operational fires”), while fire support is a tactical task (carried out by naval gun fire support). However, an amphibious demonstration can be a tactical task, or can be a part of operational deception.

Provide details of coordination and the task organization/grouping if they are not included under the heading “Task Organization.” Instructions referring to two or more elements of the command may be written in a final subparagraph entitled “Coordinating Instructions.”

a. ( ) Concept of Operations. Describe, in brief, how you envision the execution of the operation from start to completion. Accurately convey to subordinates your intent so that mission accomplishment is possible in the time available and in the absence of additional communications or further instructions.
State the commander’s intent, the commander’s stated vision, defining the purpose of an operation. This is the military end state with respect to the relationship of the force, the enemy, and the terrain. State briefly how the force as a whole will accomplish that military end state. Using doctrinal terms from the appropriate manuals explain HOW this goal is to be achieved. Select the one word which best describes the impending military action. For example, in the employment of ground forces, use the terms for a maneuver to be conducted (envelopment, turning movement, penetration, encirclement, etc.) and/or forms of attack (infiltration, frontal attack, combined frontal attack and envelopment, etc.). For defensive actions, either defensive patterns (mobile or area defense) or types of retrograde operations (delay, withdrawal, or retirement) can be used.

Expand your intent, particularly your vision of how to conduct the operation and who will be assigned to carry it out. The concept of operations should be the COA statement from your decision. As a minimum, you should describe the overall form of maneuver and designate the sector of main effort. Use this subparagraph if you think that more details should be provided to ensure appropriate action by subordinates in the absence of additional communications or further instructions.

Style is not important here. However, the concept statement should not exceed five or six sentences. Refer to the operation overlay if required. If the operation overlay is the only annex referenced, show it after “a. Concept of Operations.” Also place the commander’s intent and concept of operations statement on the overlay if the overlay does not accompany the OPORD.

After the concept of operation statement, include any subparagraphs needed to clarify the concept and to ensure synchronization. Phase the operation only if required. If phased, be sure subsequent subparagraphs clearly outline what is to happen during each phase. The sequence of subparagraphs follows:

(1) Set forth the phases of a major operation/campaign as they are anticipated from the commander’s decision.

(2) Schemes of maneuver for major subordinate task elements should state precisely what the commander expects to be done.

(3) The general plans for the employment of supporting fires and weapons should be stated, including nuclear and chemical weapons.

(4) In an amphibious operation, the general plan for the landing force should be included.

(5) In large-scale operations, the concept of operations may be too long as to require its inclusion in an annex. In such case, it should be briefly summarized here and the annex referred to.

b. (Name of first tactical/operational grouping.) This and subsequent lettered subparagraphs of paragraph 3 assign specific tasks to each element of the command charged with the execution of tactical missions.

c. Instructions to the reserve forces of the command appear in the next to last subparagraph of paragraph 3.

x. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) The last subparagraph of paragraph 3, usually labeled ‘x,’ contains coordinating instructions pertaining to two or more tactical/operational groupings of the command. Typically, such instructions might include boundaries, objectives, beaches, lines of departure, time and direction of attack, and other specifics needed to coordinate the activities of two or more tactical groupings. Cooperation must be clearly spelled out in this subparagraph. The lack of properly established cooperation procedures lead to considerable difficulties and often to defeats.

(2) Tentative dates for D-day and H-hour are usually given in this subparagraph. In the case of an operation order that is not effective on receipt, this subparagraph should indicate the date and time the order will become effective (see Figure D-1 for details).
4. **ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS** ( ). Include a statement of the administrative and logistic arrangements applicable to the operation. This paragraph sets forth the manner of logistic support for the contemplated operation. For large operations, it is almost always necessary to prepare a separate logistic and personnel annex or plan. In any event, enough information should be included in the body of the order to make clear the basic concept for logistic support. For paragraph 4 of the order, an appropriate sequence of presentation follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>M-Day:</th>
<th>The day on which mobilization commences or is due to commence.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-Day:</td>
<td>The unnamed day on which a deployment commences or is to commence. The deployment may be movement of troops, cargo, weapon systems, or a combination of these elements utilizing any or all types of transport. The letter 'C' will be the only one used to denote the above. The highest command or headquarters responsible for coordinating the planning will specify the exact meaning of C-day within the aforementioned definition. The command or headquarters directly responsible for the execution of the operation, if other than the one coordinating the planning, will do so in light of the meaning specified by the highest command or headquarters coordinating the planning. All the deployment dates are designated as C-days. The time of deployment of the first unit is designated as C-Day. If a certain unit deploys 10 days after C-Day, the time is designated as C +10, the unit deploying 15 days after C-Day, the time is designated as C +15, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-Day:</td>
<td>1. The unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence. An operation may be the commencement of hostilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-Day:</td>
<td>The day when the first air action begins or is to commence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-Day:</td>
<td>The day when the first action by the ground forces begins or is to commence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-Hour:</td>
<td>The specific time at which an operation or exercise commences or is due to commence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure D-1. Designation of Days and Hours

**Note**

Remember that in formulating the tasks to be inserted in paragraph 3 of an order, their sum must total to the common objective stated in the preceding paragraph. Your subordinate commanders must understand clearly what they have to accomplish. Do not violate the principle of unity of command and infringe on their authority.
a. ( ) Concept of Combat Service Support. Briefly summarize, as with subparagraph 3a, the overall operation, this time from the combat service support point of view. In some cases, this subparagraph along with a reference to the logistic and personnel annex or plan may be all that is stated.

b. ( ) Material and Services. List material and services for supply, maintenance, transportation, and construction, and allocation of labor for logistic purposes.

c. ( ) Medical Services. List plans and policies for hospitalization and evacuation of both military and civilian personnel.

d. ( ) Personnel. List unit strengths, replacements, and personnel policies and procedures, including those pertaining to civilians and prisoners of war.

e. ( ) Civil Affairs. Describe control of civil populations, refugees, and related matters.

f. ( ) Miscellaneous.

5. ( ) COMMAND AND CONTROL ( ). This paragraph should include signal, recognition, and identification instructions, electronic policy, headquarters locations and movements, code words, code names, and liaison.

a. ( ) Command, Control, and Communications. This gives information about pertinent command, control, and communications nets, operating procedures, recognition and identification procedures, electronic emission constraints, and so on. A separate annex may be required.

b. ( ) Command

(1) ( ) Joint operations, by their nature, have complex command relationships. Joint operation orders must be specific concerning these arrangements including shifts that may take place as the operation progresses from one phase to another. It is usually advisable to set these relationships out in chart form and to include them as an annex to the operation order.

(2) ( ) The locations of the commander and his second in command during the operation, command posts, alternate command posts, flagships, and alternate flagships along with their times of activation and deactivation should be included in this paragraph.

OBJECTIVE. This free text paragraph can be used to identify the particular operational objective (or a discrete increment) to which the reported information pertains. It is especially useful for providing functional context in OPREP-1 messages where operational description and narrative paragraphs are omitted.

CORRECTIONS. Report changes or corrections to preceding OPREP-1 reports. Refer to a message and specific subparagraph to be changed or corrected.

REMARKS. Add remarks as appropriate to identify location of deployment data; to enhance comprehension of this operations planning report, including an estimate of when a more detailed report (if any) may be expected; and to identify broad assumptions, planning factors, GEOLOCs, etc.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT. Normally, the single word “Acknowledge” is sufficient, indicating that the recipient is to acknowledge receipt and understanding of the order by sending the message reference number in the heading to the originator. If other measures are to be used, they should be prescribed here.

ANNEXES. (By letter and title) An annex may be a written text, a trace, an overlay, an overprinted map, a sketch, a plan, a graph, or a table. The staff officer who has responsibility for the activity or service that the annex covers prepares the annex. Use capital letters for annexes in the same sequence. For example, Annex H (Signal) to Operation Order 5-95 CINCPAC.
Annexes are called plans only when they are in fact plans. If the annex does not provide a standalone plan, it is not a plan. Do not use the term plan in the title. By doing so, you might cause confusion between supporting annexes and complete plans.

Issue annexes simultaneously with the order or distribute them separately. Annexes do not include matters covered with standard operating procedures. However, where appropriate, annexes should refer to the SOP.

If an annex has wider distribution than the basic order or when issuing an annex separately, give it a heading and title. Include all formal entries (acknowledgment instructions, the commander’s or authorized representative’s signature or authentication, appendixes, and distribution). When an annex, which is integral to the basic order, has the same distribution as the basic order, identify it by its title and headquarters (for example, Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order No 7-92 CINCPAC).

APPENDIXES. Appendixes contain any additional information necessary for expanding an annex. Number appendixes serially with Arabic numbers. There is no standard format. Use the five-paragraph OPORD format when appropriate.

TABS. A tab contains any additions necessary for expanding an appendix. Designate tabs alphabetically. There is no standard format. Use the five-paragraph OPORD format when appropriate.

ENCLOSURES. These contain any additions necessary for amplifying a tab. Number enclosures serially with Arabic numbers (for example, Enclosure 1 .... to Tab A..... to Appendix ...... to Annex ... to Operation Order CINCPAC 5-95). There is no standard format. Use the five-paragraph OPORD format when appropriate.

Identify additions necessary for expanding enclosures by repeating the procedures for tabs and enclosures. Use double letters (AA) or hyphenated double numbers (1-1) (for examples Enclosure 1-1 ( ) to Tab AA.... to Enclosure 1 ....... to Tab A ...... to Appendix ...... to Annex ...... to Operation Order CINCPAC 5-95).

Refer to annexes, appendixes, tabs, and enclosures in the body of the parent document by letter or number and title (enclosed in parentheses). Also list them at the bottom of the parent document under the appropriate heading.

DISTRIBUTION: The distribution is listed on the left-hand side directly below the list of annexes. It shows to whom the directive is to be transmitted and the medium of transmission. When more than one copy is to be delivered to an addressee, the total number of copies for each addressee is shown in parentheses. Consider the size and degree of decentralization of each command in determining the number of copies it is to receive. Address all mail using administrative titles, if possible, although for joint and combined commands this may be impractical. No reference should be made to the task organization. When the distribution is extensive, provide it in distribution annex and refer to the annex here.

AUTHENTICATION: Authentication is the process of certifying that copies of a directive are exact copies of the original directive approved by the commander. Authentication is required when the commander’s signature appears only on the original. Authentication is accomplished by an authorized member of the commander’s staff, usually the flag secretary. The authenticating officer may sign all other copies of the directive or have his signature reproduced on all copies. The authentication must appear on the same page of the copy on which the commander’s signature appears on the original. (The authentication procedure is followed if the commander signs the original copy of an annex, appendix, or tab issued separately.) If the commander signs an original that is reproduced, the reproduction of that signature suffices as certification, and authentication is not required. The basic requirement to establish the validity of a directive is met by the appearance at the end of the basic document of either the commander’s signature or the authentication.

ENDING TEXT: For exercise messages, the last line of text should repeat the exercise term. If the message is classified, downgrading and declassification instruction must be included (e.g., DECL OADR).
GENERAL REMARKS

Use of Code Names. Use code names whenever referring to:

1. Name of major operation/campaign
2. Phaseline
3. Boundary (or demarcation) line
4. Objectives (to be seized, held, controlled, destroyed, etc.)
5. Assembly (concentration) area
6. Bases/airfields
7. Logistical bases.

Identification of Succeeding Pages. Use a short title identification heading. Include the number (or letter) designation and headquarters on second and succeeding pages (for example, OPORD CINCPAC 6-94, ANNEX B (INTEL) to OPORD CINCPAC 2-94). Number second and succeeding pages of orders with Arabic numbers. Use alphabetical letters and Roman numerals alternately to further identify annexes, appendixes, tabs, enclosures, and additions. Number pages consecutively beginning on the first page. Use dashes to separate the alphabetical and Roman numeral groups that precede the Arabic page numbers of annexes, appendixes, etc. For example, the designation of the third page of enclosure 7 to tab B to appendix 2 to annex A is A-II-VII-3. Center page numbers from approximately 1 to 1-1/2 inches from the bottom of the page.
D.2 CJCS WARNING ORDER

1. PURPOSE. The warning order will be issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate Phase III — Course of Action Development. If the crisis warrants change in the alert status of units or pre-positioning of units, then the warning order can contain a deployment preparation or deployment order. The warning order is normally approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If the order contains deployment of forces, Secretary of Defense authorization is required.

2. WHEN ISSUED. The warning order will be issued at the earliest practicable time following recognition of a crisis.

3. HOW ISSUED. The warning order normally will be issued by record communication, using a precedence of immediate or flash, as appropriate. If the situation is time sensitive, voice communications or WIN TLCF should be used initially to pass warning order information. A voice order or a WIN TLCF may be acted on immediately; however, a record communication will be forwarded as soon as practicable to confirm oral or WIN orders, tasks, etc., and to keep all crisis participants informed. The focal point system will be used if the situation dictates. Restricted access SPECAT handling with a specific authorized code word on messages is often used to ensure maximum security for operational intentions and is generally transmitted to predetermined addressees.

4. ADDRESSEES. AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees in the AIG include the services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.

5. CONTENTS

   a. The warning order of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff generally equates to a planning directive in the deliberate planning process and should contain all readily available guidance pertaining to the crisis. The precise contents of the warning order may vary widely, depending on the nature of the crisis and the degree of prior planning. Where little or no prior planning exists to meet a crisis, the supported commander will be provided with essential guidance necessary to permit him to commence crisis planning. The warning order should be issued as soon as possible, even if detailed guidance is not available. During the preparation of the warning order, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will use the WIN TLCF to interact with the supported commander to ensure mission requirements are adequately detailed.

   b. The WARNING ORDER defines the objectives, anticipated mission or tasks, pertinent constraints, command relationships, and, if applicable, tentative combat forces available to the commander for planning and strategic lift allocations. Further guidance relating to the crisis, such as changes to existing ROE or any specific directions from the NCA, will also be provided as necessary, but maximum flexibility will be left to the supported commander in determining how to carry out the assigned mission and tasks.

   c. Major paragraphs and items of information that should be considered for inclusion in the warning order are:

      (1) PURPOSE STATEMENT. Statement that the message is a WARNING ORDER. Indicate specific tasking or requests to supported and supporting commanders, such as the deadline for receipt of the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE and preliminary deployment estimates.
(2) **Situation.** Short summary of the situation, including, as appropriate:

(a) Political situation and possible enemy forces in the expected area of operation. A brief description of the area of operation.

(b) Anticipated attitude and actions of friendly nations.

(c) Type, level, and source of major combat forces available for planning or a request for the commander’s assessment of forces and strategic lift required.

(d) Assumptions that may significantly affect the commander’s planning.

(3) **Mission.** A concise statement of the mission to be accomplished and its purpose.

(4) **Execution**

(a) **Courses of Action.** If the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire that specific COAs be examined, they will be listed here. Otherwise, the supported commander will develop the COAs he considers appropriate. Reference will be made to an existing OPLAN or CONPLAN if applicable.

(b) **OPSEC and Deception Guidance**

(c) **PSYOP Guidance**

   1. **PSYOP Mission.** Directions to conduct PSYOP in support of the military mission. Circumstances may dictate a more definitive statement.

   2. **PSYOP Objectives.** List specific target audience perceptions and behaviors sought.

   3. **PSYOP Themes.** List themes to stress and avoid to achieve each objective, or refer to themes in an OPLAN.

(d) **Intelligence Guidance**

   1. Intelligence personnel and equipment available to augment the supported commander

   2. Availability of national intelligence collection and communication assets

   3. Delegation of SIGINT operational tasking authority

   4. ROE for intelligence collection operations.

(e) **Counterintelligence Guidance**

   1. Designate service(s) to provide CI element(s).

   2. Establish CI liaison responsibilities.

   3. Develop CI collection requirements.
(f) Civil Affairs (CA) Guidance

1. **CA Mission.** List required actions and specific results sought, such as minimizing interference and maximizing influence regarding the civilian population’s impact on military operations; satisfying legal and moral obligations of the commander to the civil population; determining the availability of host nation support resources; providing support for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations; enhancing friendly nation stability and infrastructure development; and facilitating postconflict restoration or transition activities.

2. **CA Objectives.** List specific results sought, such as determination assessment of civil, indigenous, and host nation support resources; support for humanitarian assistance and population or resource control operations; assistance to civil requirements; facilitation of postconflict transition activities; and enhanced friendly nation self-help capabilities to provide socioeconomic services.

(g) Coordinating Instructions

1. Tentative C-day and L-hour (if other than 0001Z) for planning.\(^1\)

2. Anticipated date of execution (D-day). The date may be highly tentative at this time, but it provides the commander with a relative time frame for planning, based on the NCA perception of urgency.

3. Anticipated duration of operations.

4. DEFCON or deployability posture.

5. Known operational constraints (e.g., overflight, port clearances).

6. Use of the JOPES.

7. ROE guidance.

8. Supporting commander coordination or monitoring instructions.


(5) Administration and Logistics

(a) Transportation as follows:

1. Airlift movement priority

2. Allocation of strategic lift resources available for planning, if applicable (number and type if known)

3. Load planning factors for each lift resource type, if available (allowable cabin load; number of passengers; outsize, bulk, and oversize cargo)

4. Other strategic movement planning guidance as appropriate (such as fund cites for pre-positioning strategic lift resources).

(b) JOPES instructions.

(c) Force activity designators assigned to forces in the operation or CJCS project code if warranted. (The CJCS project code is obtainable from JMPAB.)

\(^1\)Updated, if required, in a planning order or alert order. Firmly established by a CJCS deployment order or execute order.
(d) Known logistic constraints.

(e) Personnel deployment criteria.

(f) Code words or nicknames of the operation.

(g) Reporting instructions. Special instructions and suspense for the submission of reports.

(h) Classification and declassification guidance.

(i) Public affairs guidance.

(j) Combat camera.

(k) Restricted access SPECAT handling.

(6) Command and Signal

(a) Communications guidance.

(b) Command relationships. Specify the supported and supporting commanders and supporting agencies, coordination instructions, and provide listing of the NCA-approved command relationship the gaining command will exercise (COCOM, OPCON, TACON) over transferred forces (if known and if NCA approval has been obtained at this point in the crisis response).

(c) WIN TLCF guidance.

6. DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION AND DEPLOYMENT ORDERS. If required by prevailing circumstances, the warning order may include a deployment preparation order or deployment order (i.e., changes to alert status of units and movement of selected forces to pre-position for impending operations). If the warning order contains such information, the first paragraph will state, “This is a warning order. The Secretary of Defense has authorized . . . .”
D.3 CJCS PLANNING ORDER

1. PURPOSE. The planning order may be issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during crisis action planning to initiate Phase V for the supported commander. It does not eliminate the CJCS requirement in Phase IV to obtain NCA approval of a COA before execution in Phase VI. The planning order is normally approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. WHEN ISSUED. A planning order is issued when execution planning is desired before NCA approval of a COA is obtained or to compress the phases of the CAP while obtaining NCA approval on a CJCS-recommended COA.

3. HOW ISSUED. A planning order is normally issued by record communication using a precedence of immediate or flash, as appropriate. If the situation is sufficiently time sensitive, voice communications or WIN TLCF can be used to pass planning order information; however, a record communication will be forwarded as soon as practicable to confirm oral or WIN orders, tasks, etc., and to keep all crisis participants informed.

4. ADDRESSEES. AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are the CINCs and DIRNSA. The C² paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees will include the services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.

5. CONTENTS

   a. At the Joint Staff level, the planning order generally equates to a planning directive in the deliberate planning process and will contain all readily available guidance pertaining to the crisis. The precise contents of the planning order may vary widely depending on the nature of the crisis and the degree of prior planning. Where little or no prior planning exists to meet a crisis, the supported commander will be given the guidance necessary to permit him to begin crisis planning. The planning order should be issued as soon as possible, even if detailed guidance is not available.

   b. The planning order defines the objectives, anticipated mission or tasks, pertinent constraints, and, if applicable, tentative combat forces available to the commander for planning and strategic lift allocations. Further guidance relating to the crisis, including any specific direction from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will also be provided as necessary, but the supported commander will retain maximum flexibility in determining how he will carry out his assigned mission and tasks.

   c. Major paragraphs and items of information that should be considered for inclusion in the planning order are:

      (1) Statement That the Message Is a Planning Order. State that the message is a planning order and indicate specific tasking or requests to supported and supporting commanders, such as the deadline for receipt of the operations order. If not previously requested in a commander’s estimate request order, task USTRANSCOM to provide a preliminary deployment estimate and force closure profile to the supported commander and inform the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

      (2) Situation. A short summary of the situation, including as appropriate:

         (a) Political situation and possible enemy forces in the expected area of operation and a brief description of the area of operation

         (b) Anticipated attitude and actions of friendly nations
(c) Type, level, and source of major combat forces available for planning or a request for the commander’s assessment of forces and strategic lift required.

(d) Assumptions that may significantly affect the commander’s planning.

(3) **Mission.** A concise statement of the mission to be accomplished and its purpose.

(4) **Execution**

(a) **Course of Action.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will specify a COA to be planned. Reference may be made to an existing OPLAN or CONPLAN.

(b) **OPSEC Guidance.** Provide guidance similar to that in the WARNING ORDER.

(c) **PSYOP Guidance**

1. **PSYOP Mission.** Give directions to conduct PSYOP in support of the military mission. Circumstances may dictate a more definitive statement.

2. **PSYOP Objectives.** List specific target audience perspectives and behaviors sought.

3. **PSYOP Themes.** List themes to stress and avoid to achieve each objective or refer to theme in an OPLAN.

(d) **Intelligence Guidance**

1. Intelligence personnel and equipment available to augment the supported commander

2. Availability of national intelligence collection and communication assets

3. Delegation of SIGINT operational tasking authority

4. ROE for intelligence collection operations.

(e) **Counterintelligence Guidance**

1. Designate service(s) to provide forward CI element(s).

2. Establish CI liaison responsibilities.

3. Develop CI collection requirements.

(f) **Civil Affairs Guidance**

1. **CA Mission.** List required actions and specific results sought, such as minimizing interference and maximizing influence regarding the civilian population’s impact on military operations; satisfying legal and moral obligations of the commander to the civil population; determining the availability of host nation support resources; providing support for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations; enhancing friendly nation stability and infrastructure development; and facilitating postconflict restoration or transition activities.

2. **CA Objectives.** List specific results sought, such as determination assessment of civil, indigenous, and host nation support resources; support for humanitarian assistance and population or resource control operations; assistance to civil requirements; facilitate postconflict transition activities; and enhance friendly nation self-help capabilities to provide socio-economic services.
(g) Coordinating Instructions

1. Proposed C-day and L-hour (if other than 0001Z) for planning. (Updated, if required, in alert order. Firmly established by a CJCS deployment order or execute order.)

2. Anticipated date of execution (D-day). This date may be tentative at this time, but it provides the commander with a relative time frame for planning, based on the CJCS perception of urgency.

3. Anticipated duration of operations.

4. DEFCON or deployability posture.

5. Known operational constraints (e.g., overflight, port clearances, and revisions to existing ROE).

6. USTRANSCOM coordination and monitoring instructions.


(5) Administration and Logistics

(a) Transportation as follows:

1. Airlift movement priority

2. Allocation of strategic lift resources available for planning, if applicable (number and type if known)

3. Load planning factors for each type of lift resource, if available (ACL; number of passengers; outsize, bulk, and oversize cargo)

4. Other strategic movement planning guidance as appropriate (such as fund cites for pre-positioning strategic lift resources).

(b) JOPES instructions.

(c) FADs assigned to forces in the operation or CJCS project code if warranted. (CJCS project code is obtainable from JMPAB.)

(d) Known logistic constraints.

(e) Personnel deployment criteria.

(f) Code words and code numbers of the operation.

(g) Reporting instructions. Special instructions and suspense for the submission of reports.

(h) Classification and declassification guidance.

(i) Public affairs guidance.

(j) Combat camera.

(k) Restricted access SPECAT handling.

(6) Command and Signal

(a) Communications guidance.
(b) Command relationships. Include a designation of supported and supporting commanders, coordination instructions, and listing of the command relationships (COCOM, OPCON, TACON) being proposed for NCA approval that the gaining commander may exercise over transferred forces and the locations where the transfer will be effective (normally the AOR boundary). When it is decided that forces will not transfer from one CINC to another but those forces must perform actions at the direction of the supported commander, then a “support” relationship must be established between the two combatant commanders.

(c) WIN TLCF guidance.
D.4 CJCS ALERT ORDER

1. PURPOSE. The alert order will be issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The alert order requires Secretary of Defense authorization because it conveys the NCA decision on COA selection that might initiate execution planning.

2. WHEN ISSUED. An alert order will normally be issued following a decision by the NCA that conduct of military operations in support of national interests is a distinct possibility. The alert order will normally be issued following receipt of the commander’s estimate. In a rapidly developing situation, however, the alert order may be issued immediately following recognition of a crisis without the prior exchange of information normally included in Phases I, II, and III of CAP procedures or it may be omitted if a planning order has been issued.

3. HOW ISSUED. The alert order will be issued by record communication, normally using a precedence of immediate. In a particularly time-sensitive situation, a flash precedence or an emergency action message may be appropriate. Oral or WIN teleconferencing notification should be made but must be followed by record communication.

4. ADDRESSEES. AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are the CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees in the AIG include the services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.

5. CONTENTS

   a. The specific contents of the alert order may vary widely, as with the WARNING ORDER or planning order, depending on the nature of the crisis and the degree of prior planning. An existing plan may be applicable as written, partially applicable, or adapted to fit the particular crisis. When no existing plan is adaptable to the crisis, the emergency preparation of an OPORD may be necessary.

   b. The alert order will generally follow the major paragraph headings of an OPORD and may include any or all of the information listed in subparagraphs 5b(1) through (6) below. For valid information previously covered in the WARNING ORDER or PLANNING ORDER, reference to the order is sufficient. Information that is not applicable or is irrelevant to execution planning may be omitted. Where an OPLAN is applicable, only minimal information such as the target date for execution or changes in ROE may be necessary. The following format is designed to serve as a checklist for guidance information that may be relevant. It is not intended as a listing of mandatory information, and unnecessary headings should be deleted in situations where they are not required.

      (1) Authority. Statement indicating authority for issuing the alert order. Indicate specific tasking or requests to supported and supporting commanders.

      (2) Situation. A description of the current politico-military situation as developed in the latest DIA intelligence assessment. Reference to enemy and friendly forces is not required unless necessary for execution planning or not otherwise available to the supported commander.

      (3) Mission. A refined statement of the tasks and purpose to be accomplished. It may or may not have changed from the anticipated mission previously provided in the warning order or planning order or the estimate of the supported commander.

      (4) Execution

         (a) Course of Action. The COA as finally approved by the NCA in clear, precise military objectives. This will be the basis for the concept of operation of the supported commander.

         (b) Combat Forces. A listing of the combat forces approved for the operation.

         (c) Strategic Lift Pre-Positioning. Authority, if appropriate, to pre-position lift assets preparatory to deployment operations.
(d) **OPSEC Guidance.** When no WARNING ORDER or planning order has been issued, provide guidance as shown in Appendix 1, Annex C, subparagraph 5e.

(e) **PSYOP Guidance.** When no WARNING ORDER or planning order has been issued, provide guidance as shown in Annex C, subparagraph 5c(4)(c).

(f) **Intelligence Guidance**

(g) **Counterintelligence Guidance.** When no WARNING ORDER or planning order has been issued, provide guidance as shown in Annex C, subparagraph 5c(4)(e).

(h) **Civil Affairs Guidance.** When no WARNING ORDER or PLANNING ORDER has been issued, provide guidance as shown in Annex C, subparagraph 5c(4)(f).

(i) **Coordinating Instructions**

   1. Proposed C-day and L-hour for deployments.2
   2. Proposed M-day for mobilization
   3. Target D-day for execution
   4. Estimated duration of the operation
   5. DEFCON or deployability posture
   6. Operational constraints, including any special ROE for this specific operation
   7. Release of SIOP-committed forces
   8. Unit combat readiness criteria

(j) **Public Affairs Guidance.** See CJCS WARNING ORDER or PLANNING ORDER.

(k) **Combat Camera Guidance.** See CJCS WARNING ORDER or PLANNING ORDER.

(5) **Administration and Logistics**

(a) **Transportation, as follows:**

   1. Airlift movement priority.
   2. Maximum numbers and types of strategic lift resources available.
   3. Load-planning factors for each type of lift resources.
   4. Other strategic movement planning guidance, as appropriate.

---

2 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or designated agent coordinates the proposed date with USCINTRANS and the other CINCs as required and recommends changes to C-day and L-hour if required. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will establish or issue a firm C-day and L-hour. One C-day and L-hour will be established per plan, crisis, or theater of operations and will apply to both air and surface movements. In establishing L-hour, effort should be made to allow C-day to be a 24-hour day.
(b) FAD assigned to forces in the operation or CJCS project code, if warranted.

(c) Fund citations, authorization to commit resources, or both.

(d) Personnel deployment criteria.

(e) Code names and code numbers of the operation.

(f) Reporting instructions.

(g) Classification and declassification guidance.

(h) Known logistic constraints.

(6) Command and Signal

(a) Communications Guidance. Specific guidance on request of CJCS-controlled assets.

(b) Command Relationships

1. Designation of supported and supporting commanders and coordination instructions

2. NCA-approved command relationships (COCOM, OPCON, TACON) the gaining commander will exercise over forces transferred by the NCA and locations where the force transfers will be effective (normally AOR boundary).

6. DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDERS OR DEPLOYMENT ORDERS. If required by circumstances, the alert order may include a deployment preparation order or deployment order (i.e., changes to alert status of units and movement of selected forces to pre-position for impending operations).
D.5 CJCS EXECUTE ORDER

1. PURPOSE. The execute order will be issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to direct execution of an OPORD or other military operation to implement an NCA decision. The execute order will be issued by authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense.

2. WHEN ISSUED. The execute order will be issued upon decision by the NCA to execute a military operation. Under the full CAP procedures, an execute order would normally result from an NCA decision, following execution planning initiated by a planning or alert order. In a particularly time-sensitive situation requiring an immediate response, an execute order may be issued without prior formal crisis planning as would normally take place in Phases I through V of CAP.

3. HOW ISSUED. Normally, the execute order will be issued by record communication with immediate or flash precedence. If the situation is sufficiently time-sensitive, voice communication or WIN TLCF may be used initially to pass the execute order, with immediate follow-up record communication to confirm oral or WIN orders and keep all crisis participants informed.

4. ADDRESSEES. AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are CINCs and DIRNSA. The C\(^2\) paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees in the AIG include the services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and to facilitate planning.

5. CONTENTS

   a. When prior execution planning has been accomplished through adaptation of an existing plan or the development of an emergency OPORD, most of the guidance necessary for execution will already have been passed to the implementing commands, either through an existing plan or by a previously issued warning order, planning order, alert order, deployment preparation order, deployment order, or redeployment order. Under these circumstances, the execute order need only contain the authority to execute the planned operation and any additional essential guidance, such as the date and time for execution. Reference to previous planning documents is sufficient for additional guidance.

   b. In the no-prior-warning response situation where a crisis event or incident requires an immediate response without any prior formal planning, the execute order must pass all essential guidance that would normally be issued in the warning order, planning order, and alert order. Under such rapid reaction conditions, the execute order will generally follow the same paragraph headings as the planning or alert order and may include the information listed in the following subparagraphs. Information and subheadings that are not applicable should be omitted. If some information may be desirable but is not readily available, it can be provided in a subsequent message because the execute order will normally be very time sensitive.

   c. Major paragraphs and items of information that should be considered for inclusion in the execute order are:

(1) Authority. Statement indicating authority for issuing the execute order.

(2) Situation. A description of the latest politico-military situation that has generated a need for a response by U.S. military forces. Reference to enemy and friendly forces is not required unless necessary for execution planning and not otherwise available to the supported commander.

(3) Mission. A refined statement of the tasks and purpose to be accomplished.

(4) Execution

   (a) Course of Action. Deployment (if not previously directed) and employment of forces approved by the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Special or unusual tasks assigned to a specific commander (supported or supporting) will be enumerated as required. Designation of supported and supporting commands in subparagraph 5c(6) below automatically incorporates normal mission tasking.
(b) **Major Combat Forces.** A listing of the major combat forces approved for the operation.

(c) **OPSEC and Deception Guidance**

(d) **PSYOP Guidance.** If execution is directed without warning, planning, or alert orders, provide guidance as shown in Annex C, subparagraph 5c(4)(c).

(e) **Civil Affairs Guidance.** If execution is directed without warning, planning, or alert orders, provide guidance as shown in Annex C, subparagraph 5c(4)(f).

(f) ** Intelligence Guidance.** If execution is directed without warning, planning, or alert orders, provide guidance as shown in Annex C, subparagraph 5c(4)(d).

(g) **Counterintelligence Guidance.** If execution is directed without warning, planning, or alert orders, provide guidance as shown in Annex C, subparagraph 5c(4)(e).

(h) **Coordinating Instructions**
   1. C-day and L-hour for deployments
   2. Target date and time for execution
   3. Estimated duration of the operation; circumstance or date that automatically terminates operations
   4. DEFCON or deployability posture
   5. Operational constraints, including any special ROE applicable to this specific operation
   6. Release of SIOP-committed forces
   7. Unit combat readiness criteria

(5) **Administration and Logistics**

(a) **Transportation as follows:**
   1. Airlift movement priority
   2. Allocation of strategic lift resources
   3. Load planning factors for each type of lift resource
   4. Other strategic movement planning guidance, as appropriate.

(b) **FAD if warranted**

(c) **Fund citations, authorization to commit resources, or both**

(d) **Personnel deployment criteria**

(e) **Reporting instructions**

(f) **Classification and declassification guidance, if required**
(g) Known logistic constraints

(h) Public affairs guidance

(i) Combat camera guidance.

(6) Command and Signal

(a) Communications Guidance. Any specific guidance on the use or release of CJCS-controlled C² assets contained in the JCSE.

(b) Command Relationships

1. Designation of supported and supporting commands and coordination instructions.

2. NCA-approved command relationships (COCOM, OPCON, TACON) the gaining commander will exercise over forces transferred by the NCA and locations where the force transfers will be effective (normally AOR boundary). When it is decided that forces will not transfer from one CINC to another but those forces must perform actions at the direction of the supported commander, then a “support” relationship must be established between the two combatant commanders.
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